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1
The Policy Challenges
of Increasing Longevity
Paying the Costs of Living Longer
Increases in life expectancy are no secret, yet government policy
does not explicitly deal with their well-known consequences for Social
Security ﬁnancing. Every day 12,000 baby boomers turn 50. Continuing improvements in life expectancy mean that those people will live
longer on average than any previous generation. That fortunate development, however, poses public policy challenges as to how to pay for
the living costs of those added years.
This book focuses on public policy issues concerning Social Security, pensions, and older workers that arise because people are living
longer. The question it addresses is, “What should be the retirement policy responses to increased longevity?” Not only has increased longevity
occurred for all major demographic groups, but people are healthier at
older ages. This book draws on international experience to recommend
solutions for U.S. policy.
The premise of the book is that public policy should recognize longevity policy as a distinct area—as we do now, for example, for climate change. The reason longevity policy is best treated as a uniﬁed
policy area is that the challenges arising from increased longevity are
best dealt with when the interrelationships between work at older ages,
Social Security, and pensions are recognized. Rather than separately
treating the issues raised by life expectancy in policies toward older
workers, and in other unrelated policies concerning Social Security and
pensions, a uniﬁed approach toward policies concerning Social Security, pensions, and work at older ages would facilitate making needed
changes in each of the areas. Because of interconnections between these
three areas, policy will be more effective if it considers them together,
rather than separately. Furthermore, the book argues that policy should
be developed that is directly related to the effects of increasing life
expectancy.

1
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Social Security is projected to have insufﬁcient funding to pay
promised beneﬁts on time. The 2010 report of the trustees of Social
Security projects that Social Security will not have sufﬁcient resources
to pay beneﬁts on time starting in 2037, at which point it will be able to
pay 75 percent of promised beneﬁts. The annual cost of Social Security
beneﬁts represented 4.8 percent of GDP in 2009 and is projected to
increase gradually to 6.1 percent of GDP in 2035 and then decline to
about 5.9 percent of GDP by 2050 and remain at about that level. The
projected 75-year actuarial deﬁcit for the combined Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance (OASI and DI) Trust Funds
is 1.92 percent of taxable payroll (Social Security Board of Trustees
2010).
When Social Security is reformed to deal with its ﬁnancing insufﬁciency, the effects of the changes will depend on whether employers and workers extend work at older ages and what changes are made
to pensions provided by employers. Features of Social Security affect
when people retire, but so do pensions and labor market conditions.
Living longer affects all three areas, so that policy dealing with greater
life expectancy should address all three areas at the same time.
Many of our social policies and employee beneﬁt policies were
designed for an era when people had shorter lives. With the demographic changes occurring, it is time to reexamine those policies so that
they ﬁt the realities of the new demographic era of living longer.

LIFE-EXPECTANCY INCREASES
Overall Gains and Distributional Issues
The policies proposed in this book are speciﬁcally designed to
address the effects of life-expectancy increases. Thus, as a starting
point, it is important to understand something about those increases. In
the past 50 years, the increase in life expectancy at older ages has been
considerable. Life expectancy at age 65 rose from 14.4 years in 1960
to 18.5 years in 2006, an increase of four years (Arias et al. 2008). This
change has considerably increased the cost of providing pensions.
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Yet the full story is more complex than simply one of widespread
increases in life expectancy. The United States has a diverse population
in terms of both income and ethnicity. The disparities in life expectancy
across some groups are large. When groups are broken into detailed
categories by race, gender, and geographical area, the gap between the
highest and lowest life expectancies at birth for race-county combinations in the United States is more than 35 years (Murray et al. 2006).
Furthermore, differences in life expectancy across demographic groups
have increased in recent decades (Freedman et al. 2004).1 For example,
disparity in life expectancy between whites and blacks is growing. (See
Chapter 2.)
Having important distributional (and thus social and political) consequences, the increase in longevity for older persons has occurred
mostly among those in the top half of the earnings distribution. A male
in the top half of the earnings distribution who reached age 60 in 1972
could expect to live 1.2 years longer than one in the bottom half. By
2001, the gap for 60-year-olds had grown to 5.8 years (Waldron 2007).
This large difference has major implications for public policy dealing
with the effects of longer life expectancy.
It is also important to note, however, that life expectancy improved
for both earnings groups. Measuring life expectancy from birth for the
male cohort born in 1912, researchers found that, among those in the
bottom half of the earnings distribution, 50 percent were still alive at
age 77. Those in the top half of the earnings distribution reached age
79 before their survival rate fell to 50 percent. By comparison, for the
male cohort born in 1941, the ages at which mortality reached 50 percent improved to 80 and 86, respectively. Thus, this measure of life
expectancy lengthened by three years for males in the bottom half and
by seven years for those in the top half.
The policy debate over the equity effects of raising the early retirement age for Social Security or other changes based on improvements
in life expectancy is determined to a large extent by the choice of the
baseline comparison. Often in policy issues relating to equity, the
choice of the baseline comparison is key. If the baseline comparison is
the present, then the differences in life expectancy by income are key.
If the baseline comparison is the past, then the improvement in life
expectancy by all groups is important. In that case, the increase in life
expectancy for all groups can be viewed as justifying raising the early
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retirement age, which would leave no group worse off compared to the
past. That is the perspective taken in this book.
Other Demographic Changes
As well as changes in life expectancy, changes in retirement age
and in the age at which people enter the labor force also affect Social
Security and pension ﬁnancing. In 1940, when Social Security ﬁrst paid
retirement beneﬁts and when the earliest age at which those beneﬁts
could be collected was 65, workers reaching age 65 lived, on average,
for another 13 years. Many workers began work at age 18, immediately after high school. These workers could work for as long as 47
years before reaching the normal retirement age of 65. For a full-career
worker, a pension plan could anticipate the amount of contributions
needed to ﬁnance 13 years in retirement and could make these contributions over a 47-year period. The number of years a full-career worker
spent in retirement was thus between one-fourth and one-third of the
number of years that worker had spent in the labor force.
Now most workers claim Social Security retirement beneﬁts at age
62 rather than at age 65. Many entered the labor force at a later age than
in the past, often at age 21 or even older, rather than at age 18. This
leaves about 40 years of work possible before an expected retirement
at age 62, with a remaining life expectancy of approximately 20 years.
Thus, a pension plan can anticipate about 40 years of contributions for a
full-career worker to ﬁnance about 20 years of retirement. The number
of years spent in retirement is about half of the number of years spent
in the labor force, up from less than one-third in 1940 (American Academy of Actuaries 2006). This book considers both changes in retirement
age (see, in particular, Chapter 4) and changes in life expectancy.
The Cost of Increased Longevity
What does increased longevity cost? Projected longevity increases
are a major cause of the projected funding shortfalls for Social Security.
The Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (CBO) has estimated the cost savings
if beneﬁts were indexed for life expectancy, a proposal considered in
this book. With that change, increases in life expectancy would reduce
annual beneﬁts received by future retirees. That one change would
eliminate 43 percent of Social Security’s long-term deﬁcit (CBO 2005).
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In the long term, increases in longevity are the main aspect of
demographic change that increases Social Security’s costs. A study by
the Social Security Administration indicates that if a baseline of 2008 is
chosen, increases in life expectancy after that date have little effect on
program costs through changes in the dependency ratio for the ﬁrst 20
years, but after 2030 they are projected to account for all the changes
in the dependency ratio (Goss 2010). The dependency ratio is a key
parameter in determining the costs of providing Social Security beneﬁts. Thus, in the long term, increases in life expectancy are key.
A related issue to increasing life expectancy is population aging.
Populations age when people live longer and when fertility decreases,
which results in there being fewer young people in the population. The
aging of the baby boom population bulge also contributes to population
aging. This book focuses speciﬁcally on increased life expectancy in
terms of its effects and the possible policy responses, and only deals
with population aging and the population bulge peripherally.
While the future course of life expectancy is unknown, the Social
Security Administration, other government agencies, and most demographers predict that it will continue to increase. One reason to expect
that life expectancy at older ages will continue increasing is that the
United States lags behind a number of countries in this regard. In 2005,
life expectancies at age 65 for women and for men in this country were
19.0 and 17.0 years. In that year, the ﬁgures in France were 19.8 and
18.2. In Japan, they were 23.4 and 18.5. Compared to U.S. ﬁgures, the
ﬁgures were higher for women in at least 17 countries and were higher
for men in at least 13 countries (National Center for Health Statistics
2009a).

THIS BOOK
The remainder of the book is organized into four parts, the ﬁrst
three of which all discuss various policy responses to increased longevity. The ﬁrst of these, Part 1, deals with issues relating to the labor market for older workers. It considers changes in the health of older workers and changes in job requirements by employers, two issues affecting
whether older workers could work longer. It argues that the evidence
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supports the ability of most people to extend their working lives, making feasible a policy that would encourage later retirement. The widespread strikes in France when this was proposed in 2010 indicate that
this can be an unpopular proposal.
Part 2 of the book considers how Social Security policy is affected
by increasing life expectancy. Its ﬁrst chapter examines automatic
adjustment mechanisms that could be adopted to restore and maintain
Social Security solvency, including raising the early retirement age.
Social Security currently adjusts beneﬁts for postponed beneﬁt receipt
so that, for a person with average actuarial life expectancy, the present
expected value of beneﬁts is roughly equal at age 62 or 63, thus providing neither an incentive nor a disincentive to postpone retirement. For
people expecting to live longer than the actuarial average, there is an
incentive to postpone retirement.2
The question could be asked, “Why raise the Social Security early
retirement age, given that Social Security provides incentives for some
workers to postpone retirement already?” Social Security provides
incentives for workers with longer-than-average life expectancy to
postpone retirement because the increased beneﬁts they receive are for
more than the average number of years. However, the actuarial adjustment for postponed receipt of beneﬁts is insufﬁcient to provide such
incentives to people with shorter-than-average life expectancy. In any
case, regardless of the incentives, many people are shortsighted and
take beneﬁts at age 62, the earliest age at which beneﬁts are available,
even though they would be better off ﬁnancially if they postponed beneﬁt receipt.
In discussions about policy reform of Social Security, participants
often ﬁnd the issue of raising the retirement age confusing. Often, when
those discussions refer to the Social Security retirement age, they are
referring to the normal retirement age, which is a technical term for the
age at which a person can receive what are considered to be full beneﬁts. For people currently aged 62, that age is 66, but changes already
enacted into law raise it to age 67 for people born in 1960 and later.
When this book refers to raising the retirement age for Social Security,
it is referring to the early retirement age, which is 62, but which for
more than 20 years at the start of Social Security was 65. The reason the
issue of raising the retirement age can be misleading is that raising the
normal retirement age would have no effect on the earliest age at which
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people can receive Social Security beneﬁts, which continues to be 62. It
is equivalent, instead, to a beneﬁt cut.
Retirement income policy is fundamentally about making hard
choices. This holds true for both individuals and national policymakers.
An alternative to workers working longer is to increase workers’ savings and worker and employer contributions to Social Security and pension funds to pay for retirements that are being lengthened by increasing life expectancy. Whatever changes are made in public policy, that
option with respect to personal savings remains for individuals: those
who wish to retire early can plan to do so by raising their savings. That
said, many individuals ﬁnd retirement planning, with its long time
frame, difﬁcult to do.
In the public arena, politicians and the general public face the possible choice, among others, between raising the Social Security payroll
tax and raising the Social Security early retirement age, so that beneﬁts
currently receivable at age 62 would instead be received at age 63. Any
change in the early retirement age would presumably take effect many
years in the future, with a phase-in period starting at that point. Given
the widespread antipathy toward raising Social Security contributions,
and the improvements in the ability of people to work in their early
sixties, this book presents the case for raising the early retirement age.
The section on Social Security also contains a proposal for a new
beneﬁt, called longevity insurance, that would be payable starting at
age 82. It focuses on two vulnerable groups: ﬁrst, workers who retire
at age 62 in poor health, with poor work prospects and little in retirement resources other than Social Security; and second, retirees in their
eighties who have spent down their non–Social Security assets and rely
primarily on Social Security beneﬁts.
Part 3 of the book looks at private pension policy as it is affected
by increasing life expectancy. It discusses issues for 401(k) plans and
for deﬁned beneﬁt plans. The most common type of pension plan in the
United States is the 401(k) plan, named after the section of the tax code
that enabled it. It is a deﬁned contribution plan, where the worker’s beneﬁt is based on the amount accumulated in a pension account. Ways to
encourage more people to annuitize their 401(k) plan account balances
are discussed.
The chapter on deﬁned beneﬁt plans proposes a new type of deﬁned
beneﬁt plan, called a life expectancy–indexed deﬁned beneﬁt plan.
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Deﬁned beneﬁt plans are traditional pension plans, where the worker’s
beneﬁt at retirement is typically based on a beneﬁt formula that incorporates years of work and some measure of the worker’s salary. A life
expectancy–indexed deﬁned beneﬁt plan would incorporate a feature
of deﬁned contribution plans that provide annuities. It would “de-risk”
deﬁned beneﬁt plans of most of the longevity risk that plan sponsors
bear currently, which could encourage employers to provide deﬁned
beneﬁt plans.
The book’s fourth and ﬁnal part is its conclusion, which consists
of a chapter on policy recommendations. Yet public policy books
shouldn’t be read like novels: readers need not wait for the suspense
to be resolved at the end. While this book ﬁrst presents the evidence
concerning the ability of many people to extend their working lives and
the evidence concerning other policy prescriptions, readers who care
more about the policy prescriptions and less about the development of
the material supporting them should read the last chapter ﬁrst. The next
several pages provide a brief overview of some of the major policy
recommendations.

FIVE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
While the ﬁnal chapter provides a more detailed summary and justiﬁcation of the policy recommendations I make, this section provides
an overview of ﬁve of the major recommendations (Table 1.1). Three
of the recommendations involve Social Security. While changes concerning Social Security that involve retrenchment are not popular, these
changes are recommended within the context of recognizing that some
changes are needed to restore solvency.
1) Index Social Security Beneﬁts for Life Expectancy
First, I recommend that Social Security beneﬁts be indexed for life
expectancy, so that increases in life expectancy would not cause an
increase in the lifetime value of pension beneﬁts. This type of indexation has been adopted by Sweden for its social security program.3 From
a lifetime perspective, this change is not a beneﬁt cut, but it does result
in lower annual beneﬁts than otherwise.
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Table 1.1 Overview of Major Policy Recommendations
Policy area
Policy
Goal
Help restore solvency
1) Social Security Life-expectancy indexing
of beneﬁts
Raise beneﬁt level to offset
2) Social Security Raise early retirement age
beneﬁt cuts
from 62 to 63
3) Social Security Longevity insurance beneﬁt Provide better targeting of
beneﬁts; offset beneﬁt cuts
payable at age 82
Encourage annuitization of
Require that annuities be
4) 401(k) plans
401(k) plans
offered when a deﬁned
beneﬁt plan is not also
offered
Encourage provision of
5) Deﬁned beneﬁt Life expectancy–indexed
deﬁned beneﬁt plans
DB plan
plans
SOURCE: Author’s recommendations.

With this type of indexation, every year, for each new retirement
cohort, beneﬁts would be slightly adjusted downward to take into
account the effect of increased life expectancy on the lifetime value of
beneﬁts. The adjustment would occur for each cohort only once; thus,
beneﬁts received at retirement would face no further adjustments for
continued increases in life expectancy during the retirement period.
According to calculations done by the CBO (2005), this change
would reduce the present value of the 75-year Social Security deﬁcit
by 0.5 percent of payroll, a reduction in the present value of the deﬁcit,
in the CBO’s calculations, of 42 percent. The Congressional Budget
Ofﬁce estimates that with this change the date of Social Security insolvency would be 2059, which is sufﬁciently far into the future that no
further cost-saving changes would need to be made for at least a decade.
This type of indexation results in a reduced replacement rate over time,
an issue addressed by the following proposal.
2) Raise the Early Retirement Age
Second, I recommend that, using a long delay and phase-in period,
the Social Security early retirement age be raised from 62 to 63. This
change is consistent with policy in Germany, the United Kingdom,
Switzerland, and a number of other countries that have early retirement
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ages of 63 or higher (Turner 2007). An early retirement age of 63 is two
years younger than what the early retirement age for Social Security
was when President Franklin Roosevelt signed the Social Security Act
and beneﬁts were ﬁrst paid in 1940. Life expectancy has increased for
all demographic groups since 1940.
This change could be accomplished in one of two ways. First,
it could be done so that persons retiring at age 63 would receive the
advantage of the actuarial adjustment currently provided for postponing beneﬁt receipt from age 62 to 63. This approach would raise the
level of beneﬁts for persons who previously would have retired at age
62, by providing an additional boost in their beneﬁts if they worked
the extra year. This approach would not affect Social Security’s longrun ﬁnances. Alternatively, the second approach would provide, at age
63, beneﬁts currently receivable at age 62. That approach does not cut
annual beneﬁts for those who were going to retire at age 62, but it does
cut lifetime beneﬁts and would result in cost savings.
3) Add a Longevity Insurance Beneﬁt
My third recommendation for Social Security is to add a new type
of beneﬁt called a longevity insurance beneﬁt. Longevity insurance
would be a type of social insurance providing beneﬁts to qualifying
persons at an advanced age—initially set at age 82, but automatically
increased to take into account future increases in life expectancy.
As retirees age, they face an increased risk of poverty as they spend
down their non–Social Security assets. A longevity insurance beneﬁt
would be paid by Social Security starting at age 82 for people who had
at least 20 years of covered earnings and were receiving Social Security
beneﬁts below a ﬁxed level. Payment would not require an application
or a means test; it would occur automatically. It would be a targeted,
cost-effective way of addressing poverty at advanced old age. Longevity insurance could be included in a reform package to restore Social
Security solvency that contained beneﬁt cuts, so that it would prevent
beneﬁt cuts from increasing poverty rates at advanced older ages. It
would not have the problem of low take-up rate, which Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) has, because eligible retirees would automatically receive it.
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4) Require 401(k) Plans to Offer Annuities, if They Are the Sole Plans
A fourth recommendation I make is to require that 401(k) plans
offer annuities when those plans are provided by an employer that does
not also provide a deﬁned beneﬁt plan meeting minimum standards of
generosity. Initially, most 401(k) plans were supplemental plans provided by employers who also provided deﬁned beneﬁt plans. That is no
longer the case, but they still are regulated to a large extent as if they
were supplemental plans. This requirement would treat 401(k) plans
that are the primary plan as pension plans rather than as savings plans,
as they are currently treated.
5) Permit Life Expectancy–Indexed Deﬁned Beneﬁt Plans
Because of the different types of risks that deﬁned beneﬁt and deﬁned
contribution plans impose on participants, a pension system would be
more diversiﬁed if it provided both deﬁned beneﬁt and deﬁned contribution plans to most workers. In order to encourage employer provision
of deﬁned beneﬁt plans, my ﬁfth recommendation is that pension law
be amended to permit a new type of deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) plan, called a
life expectancy–indexed DB plan. This plan would allow more efﬁcient
bearing of life expectancy risk than is currently permitted in deﬁned
beneﬁt plans, which may encourage employers to provide such a plan.
With a life expectancy–indexed DB plan, at retirement the generosity of the plan would be adjusted to take into account improvements in life expectancy, which would be analogous to annuitizing a
deﬁned contribution plan account using current life expectancy, or to
the changes proposed for Social Security. Thus, cohort life expectancy
risk would be shifted to workers, who can bear it more easily than plan
sponsors because the workers are the prime beneﬁciaries of the increase
in life expectancy. This recommendation for deﬁned beneﬁt plans is
equivalent to Recommendation 1 for Social Security.
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CONCLUSIONS
The premise of the book is that public policy should recognize longevity policy as a distinct policy area. Policy should be developed that
is directly related to the effects of increasing life expectancy. Rather
than separately treating the issues raised by life expectancy concerning
Social Security, pensions, and work at older ages, a uniﬁed approach
should be developed that recognizes their interrelationship. A uniﬁed
approach may facilitate the needed changes in each of the areas. Dealing
with only one area may be more difﬁcult and less effective than dealing
with all the areas at the same time. Together, the policies recommended
in this book would encourage work at older ages, move Social Security
toward solvency, provide better targeting of Social Security beneﬁts,
increase annuitization of 401(k) accounts, and encourage employers to
provide deﬁned beneﬁt plans.

Notes
1. Healthy life expectancy, which combines morbidity and mortality, is an indicator
of expected years of life lived in full health without disease or disability.
2. Actuarial life expectancy is based solely on a person’s age, and sometimes gender.
Some people have family histories where they expect to live substantially longer
than their actuarial life expectancy.
3. In this book, I follow the practice of uppercasing “Social Security” when referring
to the U.S. system, and of lowercasing the term when referring to social security
systems in other countries or to social security systems generally.
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Labor Market Policy
toward Older Workers
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2
Can Older Workers
Extend Their Work Lives?
Changes in Health and Job Requirements
This chapter addresses the question of whether workers would be
able to work longer without undue hardship. This issue is key in formulating policies to deal with the improvements in longevity. Speciﬁcally,
this chapter focuses on working past age 62, the early retirement age
for Social Security. The question of whether it would be feasible for
more workers to work longer has two parts. First, have older workers’
capabilities changed over the past several decades in ways that would
facilitate their continued employment? Second, have job requirements
changed in ways that would facilitate continued employment for older
workers?
While worker capabilities and job requirements can be viewed
separately, ultimately the matching of job requirements and worker
capabilities is what matters. Thus, the ultimate questions are “What
percentage of the older workforce cannot ﬁnd jobs that match their
capabilities as they age?” and “How has that percentage changed over
recent decades?”
In examining changes in worker capabilities and job requirements,
this chapter looks back over the past 20 to 40 years, depending on availability of data, and focuses on people in their late ﬁfties and their sixties.

WHY WORK LONGER?
In a wealthy country such as the United States, some people question why the issue of extending work lives is even discussed. As society
grows wealthier, people want to spend more of their wealth on leisure,
including longer periods of retirement. Can’t we as a society afford an
ever-increasing share of adult life spent in retirement?

15
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Paying for retirement is expensive. Longer retirements mean greater
costs for social programs. It also means workers need greater savings,
which means reduced consumption while working. Workers individually and society generally need to face the hard choice of saving more
to fund longer retirements or taking steps to postpone retirement. While
saving more is an option to postponing retirement, the reality is that
many workers are not setting aside sufﬁcient savings to fund longer
retirement. One study of retirement savings has found that roughly half
of households have insufﬁcient retirement savings, and the shortfall is
staggering. The total shortfall in 2010 was $6.6 trillion dollars, a shortfall roughly equal to the amount of savings in retirement plans (Retirement USA 2010).
In this era of increasing longevity and insufﬁcient savings, older
workers able to do so may gain a number of advantages from working
longer. They have more years to save and fewer years to spend during
retirement. They have more years to earn beneﬁt credits in traditional
deﬁned beneﬁt plans and Social Security, and more years to accumulate
assets in deﬁned contribution plans. Beneﬁts that are paid as annuities
will start at a later date, and early retirement reductions will be smaller.
They face less concern about inﬂation eroding the real value of their
beneﬁts during a lengthy period of retirement.
In addition to these savings and cost issues favoring longer work
lives, aspects of the labor market are more favorable to working longer
than in the past. Many people have jobs that are less physically strenuous than in the past. The move from deﬁned beneﬁt plans to deﬁned
contribution plans reduces pension disincentives to continue to work
at older ages. Changes in Social Security have raised the incentives to
continue working past age 62, up to age 70.
Yet working longer is not advantageous for all older workers. For
example, older workers with relatively short life expectancy reduce
their expected lifetime Social Security beneﬁts by postponing receipt
of beneﬁts. This contrasts with older workers who have relatively long
life expectancy, who raise their expected lifetime beneﬁts because of
the increase in annual beneﬁts that comes from postponing retirement,
and because of the relatively long period over which they will receive
the increased beneﬁts.
Statistics show that some men are working longer than did their
counterparts in the recent past. Starting in the 1990s, the decades-long
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decline or stagnation of labor force participation of men age 65 and
older was reversed, and the labor force participation rate for men in
that age group began to increase (Maestas and Zissimopoulos 2010). In
1995, 51 percent of males aged 62 were working (Quinn 1999), but by
2005, that ﬁgure had risen to 60 percent (Burkhauser and Rovba 2009).
This chapter examines how changes in worker capabilities and job
requirements over the past few decades affect the ability of older workers to work past the Social Security early retirement age of 62. This
issue arises because a possible reform of Social Security would raise
the early retirement age from 62 to 63. This change might be made in
conjunction with raising the normal retirement age in order to offset the
reduction in annual beneﬁts that workers would receive when retiring
at the early retirement age. The normal retirement age, also called the
full retirement age, is the age set in the Social Security beneﬁt formula
where there is no reduction for early retirement. The name can be misleading—it does not refer to when people actually (normally) retire.
The normal retirement age is currently 66 but is scheduled to increase
to 66½ for people who will reach age 62 in 2017, and to 67 for people
who will reach age 62 in 2022.

HEALTH INDICATORS AFFECTING THE ABILITY TO
WORK AT OLDER AGES
A survey in the 1980s concluded that persons aged 62–67 had experienced increased longevity over the previous 20 years but that their
health had worsened on average. Their health on average had declined
because advances in medicine were enabling more unhealthy people
to live to older ages. Disability rates and morbidity rates had increased
(Chapman, LaPlante, and Wilensky 1986). While recognizing that
improvements in medical technology and in healthy behaviors could
reverse this trend, the study projected that the trend of worsening health
at older ages would continue, because of improvements in medical care
that enable unhealthy people to live longer than in the past. After looking at trends in life expectancy, this section assesses the accuracy of
the predictions of that study and shows that its gloomy assessment was
incorrect.
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Life Expectancy
Improvements in life expectancy, if accompanied by better health,
allow workers to extend their work life and still enjoy a longer retirement. While life expectancy has improved generally in the United
States, its rate of improvement has differed across demographic groups.
Population life expectancy by age
Improvements in life expectancy can be measured different ways.
Life expectancy at age 65 rose from 14.4 years in 1960 to 18.4 years in
2000, an increase of four years (Robinson 2007). Let’s make a slightly
different comparison: a person aged 62 in 1960 had a life expectancy of
14.6 years, which was the life expectancy of someone aged 67 in 2000.
Thus, by this measure there has been an improvement of ﬁve years. A
third way to measure changes in life expectancy is to compare the age
in 2000 at which workers would have the same risk of death as a worker
aged 62 in 1960. The average person aged 68 in 2000 had the same risk
of death over the following two years as the average person aged 62 in
1960, an improvement of six years over four decades (Cutler, Liebman,
and Smyth 2006).
Gender and race differences in life expectancy
Examining differences over the past four decades in life expectancy
by gender, a man aged 65 had a life expectancy of 12.8 years in 1960,
compared to 16.8 years in 2003. The comparable ﬁgures for women
are 15.8 years and 19.8 years (Robinson 2007). Thus, for both men
and women life expectancy over this period increased by four years, or
about one year per decade.
Life expectancy improvements for blacks have lagged behind those
for whites. Life expectancy at age 65 was similar for black and white
males in 1950 and 1960 and for many years following. In 1975, black
and white males at age 65 both had a life expectancy of 13.7 years
(Table 2.1). However, by 2003, black male life expectancy was 14.9
years, while that of white males was 16.9 years (CDC 2003b). Thus, life
expectancy had improved for both groups, but had improved more for
whites than for blacks, by two full years. While the reasons no doubt are
complex, differential changes in smoking and in obesity may be factors.
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Table 2.1 Life Expectancy at Age 65, 1950–2005 (by number of years)
Year
White men
White women
Black men
Black women
1950
12.8
15.1
12.9
14.9
1960
12.9
15.9
12.7
15.1
1975
13.7
18.1
13.7
17.5
2006
17.1
19.8
15.1
18.6
SOURCE: National Center for Health Statistics (2009b).

Policy analysts sometimes argue that raising the early retirement
age in Social Security would hurt blacks more than whites because
blacks have a shorter life expectancy than whites. Instead of making
comparisons across racial groups, however, we can make an intergenerational comparison between blacks currently and blacks in the early
1960s. In that case, the early retirement age could be raised by at least
a year. Doing so would still result in a higher number of years in retirement for blacks and the same percentage of adult life spent in retirement
in comparison to that experienced by the black cohort retiring in the
early 1960s.
If we take a more granular approach, life expectancy by race can
be further divided into racial differences by geographic location. Doing
so produces much greater differences in life expectancy than the differences just discussed (Murray et al. 2006). The gap in life expectancy at
birth between the 3.4 million high-risk urban black males and the 5.6
million Asian females was 20.7 years in 2001. The gap in life expectancy at birth between the highest and lowest race-county categories
(i.e., race average at the county level) was more than 33 years. The life
expectancy at birth for Native American males in certain counties in
South Dakota was 58 years, which fell 33 years short of the life expectancy for Asian females in Bergen County, New Jersey, of 91 years.
For some narrowly deﬁned groups, life expectancy at birth actually
worsened between 1982 and 2001. For example, life expectancy worsened for low-income females in Appalachia and the Mississippi Valley
over that period. These disparities, which are enormous by international
standards, complicate efforts at structuring public policy to deal with
improvements in life expectancy, and suggest that policy changes need
to take into account the situation of vulnerable groups. It is not possible
to raise the early retirement age for Social Security and keep every racegeographical location group as well off as its comparison group for an
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earlier period. However, for major demographic groups, it is possible to
meet that criterion.
Socioeconomic differences in life expectancy
Studies have documented differences in mortality by income, education, and marital status (Brown 2001). Mirroring differences by race,
improvements in life expectancy have not occurred at the same pace for
all socioeconomic groups. In particular, the historical advantage in life
expectancy of higher education groups compared to lower education
groups has expanded over the past four decades for men but decreased
for women. In 1960, the mortality rates for white men aged 65 to 70
at the top of the education distribution were 10 percent lower than for
those at the bottom. Mortality rates have decreased for both the upper
and lower education groups. However, the improvements were much
more rapid for upper education groups—mortality rates were 70 percent lower for the upper income and education groups in the 1990s
compared to the lower income and education groups (Diamond and
Orszag 2004).
Health
As we have just discussed, people generally are living longer. However, those alive at the ages at which increased work might occur may be
less healthy on average than in the past because medical improvements
are allowing more unhealthy people to survive to older ages. This effect
of increased life expectancy on health at older ages was debated during the early 1980s when the 1983 Social Security Amendments were
passed, raising the normal retirement age. At that time it appeared that
health at older ages was declining (Social Security Administration 1986).
Many jobs have low physical requirements, so robust health is not
required to perform them. Thus, the low end of health may be more
relevant currently than the upper end for determining ability to work
for most jobs. Since the early 1980s, the percentage of older persons
reporting that they are in fair or poor health has decreased (Table 2.2).
Between 1982 and 2005, for the population aged 50–64, all demographic groups examined showed a decline in the percentage of persons
reporting themselves in fair or poor health. For example, for blacks that
percentage declined from 41 to 26 percent (Robinson 2007).
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Table 2.2 Self-Reported Health Status Rated as Fair or Poor, Aged 50–64,
by Gender, Race, and Ethnicity, 1982–2005, Selected Years (%)
NonNonHispanic
Hispanic
Year
Women
Men
blacks
Hispanics
whites
1982
24.4
23.2
40.9
29.6
21.7
1985
21.0
20.4
37.1
25.3
18.6
1990
18.1
18.0
31.8
24.2
15.9
1995
20.2
18.5
33.2
28.6
16.7
2000
16.4
15.4
26.9
23.9
13.6
2005
16.3
15.8
26.4
25.2
13.9
Difference,
8.1
7.4
14.5
4.4
7.8
1982–2005
SOURCE: Robinson (2007).

The percentage of both men and women reporting their health as fair
or poor has also declined. This trend suggests that a growing proportion of the older population would be capable of working. In the mid1970s, 29 percent of men aged 62 reported their health as fair or poor.
Two decades later, in the mid-1990s, that percentage was not reached
by men reporting their health until they hit their early seventies—an
improvement of 10 years over a 20-year period (Cutler, Liebman, and
Smyth 2006). The improvement in self-reported health was more rapid
than the increase in life expectancy.
While the prevalence of self-reported fair or poor health declined
for both men and women, a more complex pattern emerges for other
demographic groups (Table 2.2). The largest decline over the period
1982–2005 for people aged 50–64 self-reporting fair or poor health
occurred for non-Hispanic blacks, causing a move toward convergence
for blacks and whites. However, Hispanics have seen basically no
improvement by this measure over the past 20 years.
Despite these general trends of improvement over the past several
decades, more-recent evidence is mixed concerning trends in health,
and therefore the ability to work. Some evidence suggests a reversal
in the trend of improving health at older ages (Korczyk 2002). A study
of baby boomers aged 51–56 concludes that their self-reported health
was worse than that of people the same age 12 years earlier (Soldo et
al. 2006). Possible explanations for that ﬁnding include that obesity has
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increased, that baby boomers are more likely than earlier generations
to complain about health issues, that improvements in diagnosis and in
pharmaceutical treatments have made people more aware of their health
problems, or that this trend is the result of increased stress. The percentage of the population aged 50–64 reporting their health as excellent or
very good has increased over the past several decades (Robinson 2007).
However, the incidence of diabetes among the population aged 55–60
rose between 1992 and 2002 (Johnson 2004). Other evidence indicates
that the prevalence of diabetes has declined among non-Hispanic whites
aged 50–64, while it has increased among non-Hispanic blacks that age
(Robinson 2007). Thus, the recent evidence is mixed, and cannot be
simply summarized as a trend of overall improvements.
Disability
Disability rates for people in their ﬁfties, sixties, and older have
declined over the past two decades. National Long-Term Care Survey
(NLTCS) data indicate that the incidence of chronic disability (lasting at
least three months) declined for the population aged 65–74 for the years
from 1984 to 1999 (Spillman 2003). Estimates from several national
sources show that the proportion of the noninstitutionalized population
aged 70 and older with severe disabilities has declined since the mid1990s (Freedman et al. 2004). Functional limitations among men aged
60 to 74 have also declined over time (Costa 2002).
Reasons for the decline in disability incidence include improved
medical technology and health care, better personal health practices,
better technical aids helping people with disabilities, reduced exposure
to infectious diseases, and increased education and living standards
(Korczyk 2002). One study found that improvements in medical care
relating to cardiovascular disease led to a signiﬁcant part of the decline
in disability among adults (Cutler, Liebman, and Smyth 2006). Surveying a number of measures of health status, including disability rates, the
same study has concluded that people aged 62 in the 1960s and 1970s
were equivalent to people in their early seventies today, an improvement of about a decade.
The future is not as clear as the past concerning these issues. Similar
to the ﬁnding of mixed recent evidence concerning health trends, some
evidence suggests that the decline in disability rates may have stopped
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or reversed. Comparing people aged 55–61 in 2004 with people of the
same age range in 1992, researchers found that the reported incidence
of work limitations was 19 percent for the 2004 group, versus 18 percent for the earlier group, a difference that is not statistically signiﬁcant
(Mermin, Johnson, and Murphy 2006).
A survey of a number of studies of disability at older ages
(Freedman, Martin, and Schoeni 2002) has concluded that disability
rates declined at older ages over the decade from the late 1980s to the
late 1990s. However, disability rates at younger ages have been increasing. Between 1990 and 1996, disabilities among those in their forties
increased slightly, perhaps because of the increased incidence of obesity (Lakdawalla, Bhattacharya, and Goldman 2004).
In sum, life expectancy at older ages has increased for all major
demographic groups. Compared to the 1980s, disability rates have
declined and self-reported health has improved for persons at older
ages. These patterns also hold for demographic groups viewed as
vulnerable because of their higher old-age poverty rates—blacks and
women. However, over the past 10 or 15 years, mixed evidence suggests that improvements in health and disability rates may have slowed
or, for some groups, possibly reversed.

FACTORS AFFECTING HEALTH AT OLDER AGES
While the advance of medicine inﬂuences the health of people at
older working ages, behavioral factors also affect older persons’ ability
to continue working. To better understand the trends in health and ability to work at older ages, this section examines some of the underlying
determinants.
Increased Education
Higher education levels are associated with better health, presumably in part because better-educated people are better informed about
healthy lifestyles. They also tend to have higher income, better access to
medical care, and possibly better diets. The percentage of the older pop-
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ulation with at least four years of high school education has increased
(Table 2.3).
Workers with higher levels of education are more likely to continue
working at older ages. One study found that the increase in college
graduation rates combined with a decline in high school dropout rates
accounted for about a third of the increase in workers’ expectations that
they would work past age 62 (Mermin, Johnson, and Murphy 2006).
Education level plays an important role in the downward trend in disability rates over the past 20 years. That trend appears to have occurred
only among persons who completed high school (Schoeni, Freedman,
and Wallace 2001). Disability rates have not improved among people
who have not completed high school, and who are thus more likely to
have physically demanding jobs.
Decline in Smoking
Smoking is a major health risk factor. The percentage of adults who
smoke has declined since 1960: in that year, more than 50 percent of
men and 30 percent of women smoked. By comparison, in 2004, 23
percent of men and 19 percent of women smoked.
Smoking is closely linked to having a low level of education and
thus to working in occupations that are physically demanding. In 2004,
Table 2.3 Percentage of Population with Educational Attainment of
Four Years of High School or More, Aged 55–64, by Race and
Ethnicity, 1960–2004, Selected Years (%)
Year
Blacks
Hispanics
Whites
1960
10.1
—
28.4
1970
16.2
22.4
42.7
1980
30.2
29.0
63.8
1990
46.4
40.0
73.2
2000
67.8
47.2
83.6
2004
76.4
56.5
87.7
Difference,
66.3
—
59.3
1960–2004
NOTE: — = data not available.
SOURCE: Robinson (2007).
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adults without a high school degree were three times as likely to smoke
as persons with a bachelor’s degree or higher (National Center for
Health Statistics 2006).
The percentage of the population aged 55–64 currently smoking
declined over the period 1965–2004 for both blacks and whites. The
decline was less for blacks than whites, but the rates for the two groups
converged, as blacks started from a lower level (Table 2.4).
Increase in Obesity
Increases over the past few decades in the rate of obesity may have
a negative effect on the health of the older working-age population.
Since 1960, the proportion of adults who are overweight but not obese
has remained steady at about one-third. However, the percentage who
are obese has roughly doubled since the late 1970s (National Center for
Health Statistics 2006). Two-thirds of adult Americans are overweight,
including one-third who are obese. Obesity rates for both blacks and
whites have increased (Table 2.5).
Obesity is associated with adult-onset diabetes (CDC 2003a). It is
also linked to hypertension, high cholesterol, heart disease, and some
forms of cancer. The earlier the onset of obesity, the more serious its
health effects may be. However, people who exercise regularly and are
both fat and ﬁt may suffer fewer consequences of being overweight.
Researchers hold differing views about the severity of the effects of
the obesity epidemic on disability, particularly when obesity begins in
childhood (Olshansky et al. 2005; Preston 2005).
Table 2.4 Percentage of Population Smoking Cigarettes, Aged 55–64,
by Race, 1965–2004, Selected Years (%)
Year
Black
White
1965
31.0
36.4
1974
38.7
33.4
1983–1985
35.8
29.0
1990–1991
24.9
23.2
2000–2001
25.9
21.6
2002–2004
24.8
20.0
Difference, 1965–2004
−6.2
−16.4
SOURCE: Robinson (2007).
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Table 2.5 Obesity Rates for Males, by Race and Ethnicity, 2000–2008 (%)
Non-Hispanic
Non-Hispanic
Mexican
Year
white
black
American
1999–2000
34.3
26.4
29.7
2007–2008
38.4
38.0
35.8
SOURCE: Flegal et al. (2010).

The effect of obesity on increased mortality rates may, however,
have decreased over the past several decades, perhaps from improvements in pharmaceuticals (Fiebelkorn 2006). Some of the effects of
obesity—high blood pressure, high cholesterol, and diabetes—can be
controlled pharmacologically. However, because of the large population without health insurance currently—some 50 million Americans—
the ability to offset the health effects of obesity is not available to many.
Thus, obesity may have a more limited effect on health for people with
adequate medical care than for lower-income persons lacking good
medical care. If health care reform, passed by Congress in 2010, succeeds in extending health insurance to uncovered populations, this difference in effect would be reduced. However, while obesity has not led
to declines overall in life expectancy, the increase in obesity among
people in their sixties and older in the United States may explain why
the improvements in longevity at older ages have been less rapid in the
United States than in other advanced countries.

ABILITY TO WORK AT OLDER AGES
This section examines direct measures of the ability of people to
work in their late ﬁfties and early-to-mid-sixties. The ability to work
at older ages clearly varies across job types that have differing physical requirements. However, the desire to work at older ages also varies
across jobs. For example, in the University of California statewide system, the average age for retirement of professors is 66, but the average
age for retirement of staff, who are in the same pension plan, is 60 (University of California 2010). This difference has important implications
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for the distributional effects of policies that change the ages at which
beneﬁts can be received.
Health Impairments and Work
In 2003, about 25 percent of early retirees in the age range 62–64
were unable to work because of health impairments (Leonesio, Vaughan,
and Wixon 2003). By comparison, in the mid-1980s, 16 percent of new
Social Security beneﬁciaries reported they were unable to work at all,
and 17 percent reported they were limited in their ability to work (Social
Security Administration 1986).
About as many in the 2003 study that reported they were unable to
work received early retirement beneﬁts from Social Security as received
Social Security Disability beneﬁts or Supplemental Security Income
disability beneﬁts (Leonesio, Vaughan, and Wixon 2003). Some disabled people do not qualify for Social Security Disability Insurance
beneﬁts because they do not meet the requirement for having worked a
sufﬁcient number of years. The Social Security early retirement beneﬁts
appear to serve as an important, unofﬁcial disability beneﬁts program
for some early retirees, which is a point to be considered if the early
retirement age were to be raised.
Obesity, Diabetes, and Work
An Australian study documents an association between obesity at
older ages and a lower probability of being in the labor force (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2005). Among people aged 55–64,
the obese were 8 percent less likely to be in the labor force and were
20 percent less likely to be employed full time than the nonobese. The
obese also had higher absenteeism rates than the nonobese, suggesting an effect of obesity through health issues on ability to work. A
U.S. study has found that obese persons tend to be absent from work
due to illness substantially more than nonobese persons (Tucker and
Friedman 1998). Burton et al. (1998) reported that greater body mass
index (BMI—a measure of the amount by which one is overweight or
obese) was associated with a higher probability of short-term disability.1
Similarly, people with diabetes at older ages are less likely to work
than people without diabetes. Among adults aged 45–64, 51 percent
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of those with diabetes were working, compared to 72 percent of those
without diabetes (National Academy on an Aging Society 2000).
Because both obesity and diabetes have increased over the past several decades, these two factors would lead to a decreased ability to work
at older ages for some people. However, their effects may have been
offset by other changes affecting the ability to work, including changes
in the physical demands of jobs.

THE DECLINE IN PHYSICALLY DEMANDING JOBS
The ability to postpone retirement depends not only on older
workers’ physical capabilities but also on the physical demands of
jobs. Working longer would be facilitated by a decline in the physical
demands of jobs.
Occupations and Industries
Jobs with a high level of physical demands are decreasing in relative number, both because of a decline in the relative number of some
types of jobs and because of technological changes that ease the physical requirements of some jobs.
Since the beginning of twentieth century, jobs have shifted from
agriculture to manufacturing, and then from manufacturing to the service sector, with the latter shift generally being from physically demanding to less physically demanding jobs. More recently, jobs have shifted
to the knowledge economy, where the physical demands are even less.
Between 1950 and 2000, the share of jobs in the goods producing sector, which includes manufacturing, mining, and construction, fell from
41 percent to 20 percent (Johnson 2004).
Even within manufacturing, jobs have shifted away from ones with
high physical demands. In 1984, 21 percent of those employed in manufacturing industries held a job in a professional, managerial, or technical occupation. By 2000, nearly 28 percent of workers in manufacturing worked in those occupations. Over the period 1984–2000, growth
in employment in management, professional, technical, and high-level
sales occupational categories accounted for about two-thirds of job
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growth. Those job categories accounted for only about one-third of jobs
at the beginning of the period (Kirsch et al. 2007).
Farm workers were among the occupations with the largest job
declines over the period 1988–2000. Technology gains and new laborsaving machinery were the main reasons for the decline, along with
increased farm consolidation leading to greater efﬁciencies. Other
physically demanding occupations that experienced a decline in the
number of workers included highway maintenance workers (declined
7 percent), butchers and meat cutters (declined 15 percent), ﬁshermen (declined 22 percent), and cannery workers (declined 32 percent)
(Alpert and Auyer 2003).
Direct Measures of Physical Effort
Jobs can be examined to obtain direct measures of physical effort.
While various measures can be used, one measure of physically demanding work is the requirement to lift or carry heavy objects. Between 1950
and 1996, the percentage of the workforce in jobs that required frequent
lifting or carrying of objects weighing 25 pounds or more declined from
20 percent to 8 percent (Steuerle, Spiro, and Johnson 1999).
Using a different measure, in 1982, researchers found that 11 percent of older workers reported that their jobs involved heavy strength
requirements and 39 percent reported at least medium strength requirements. These measures differed by gender, with 17 percent of men in
jobs having heavy strength requirements and 47 percent in jobs having
at least medium strength requirements, compared to 4 percent and 29
percent for women (Table 2.6).
Workers whose jobs require physical effort all or most of the time
tend to have relatively little education. In 2002, 28 percent of workers
aged 55–60 who did not attend college reported that their jobs required
physical effort all or most of the time (Johnson 2004).
Between 1992 and 2002, both men and women workers aged 55–60
saw slight declines in the percentage who reported jobs that required
substantial physical effort most of the time. The decline was from 20 to
19 percent for men and from 21 to 17 percent for women (Table 2.6).
While these ﬁgures are not directly comparable to the ﬁgures from the
early 1980s, they suggest that a substantial decline has occurred since
then. However, when disaggregating by education, the decline between
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Table 2.6 Physical Requirements of Jobs, by Gender, 1982–2002, Selected
Years (%)
Deﬁnition of
Year
job requirement
Women
Men
1982
Medium or greater
29
47
strength requirement
1992
Always requires
21
20
physical effort
2002
Always requires
17
19
physical effort
NOTE: The data for 1982 are not directly comparable to the later data.
SOURCE: Social Security Administration (1986); Johnson (2004).

1992 and 2002 in percentage of jobs requiring substantial physical
effort only occurred for older workers with four or more years of college (Johnson 2004). Thus, the decline did not occur among workers
with relatively low education.
Technology
Technological improvements may lessen the effects of some conditions on ability to work. For example, character recognition software
with voice synthesizers allow blind persons to listen to electronic documents being read out loud by a computer, including documents that have
been scanned into computers. This technology allows blind persons to
function much more independently in a computerized ofﬁce work environment than in the past. More generally, technology has reduced the
physical demands of some jobs, allowing workers to continue working
at older ages.
Stressful Jobs
Although a considerable amount of evidence indicates that the physical demands of work have declined for most workers, some evidence
indicates that the stress level of work may have increased. Workers aged
55–60 who reported that their jobs involved a lot of stress increased
from 18 to 21 percent between 1992 and 2002 (Johnson 2004). In a
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survey, three-quarters of workers indicated that they thought jobs had
gotten more stressful compared to a generation earlier (NIOSH 1999).
A possible contributing factor to an increase in job stress is the
increase in working hours for men. While the average work week varies from year to year, it was 43.0 hours for men in 1969, 1980, and
1990. Since 1990, it has trended upward, and in 2005 it was 45.9. The
average work week for women also has varied over time, but without
a clear trend.2
Bridge Jobs
Changes in workers’ ability to continue working and changes in the
prevalence of physically demanding jobs do not tell the whole story.
The U.S. labor market is ﬂexible, as are individual workers. Sometimes,
workers can adjust to declining physical ability as they age by changing
jobs, changing the way they do jobs, or changing the hours they work.
Currently, about half of all workers aged 55–65 are in “bridge
jobs,” meaning jobs that are a transition from a career job to retirement
(Purcell 2002). Bridge jobs can be an adjustment to aging. Bridge jobs
sometimes involve different occupations from career jobs. Other types
of bridge jobs include self-employed, part-time, and temporary jobs,
which provide ﬂexibility to workers who may be unable to continue
working full time in their career job because of its physical demands.
Related to bridge jobs, in that it is also a transition to retirement, is
phased retirement, which is offered by some employers. With phased
retirement, the worker is able to reduce the number of hours worked
at his or her career job. While phased retirement seems like a desirable
option to allow workers to extend their work lives but not work full
time, employers rarely offer it as a formal beneﬁts program because it
faces a number of regulatory hurdles (Hill 2010).
Pensions to Accommodate Early Retirement
Besides changing to less physically demanding jobs at older ages,
another option for occupational groups unable to continue working into
old age because of the physical demands of their work may be occupational pension plans that permit early retirement (Turner and Guenther
2005). For example, police, ﬁreﬁghters, the military, and miners—
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occupations with physically demanding jobs—all have pension plans
that permit early retirement.
Errors in Decision Making
Some people may retire earlier than they otherwise would because
of errors in decision making (Hill and Reno 2005). They may overestimate the value of a lump sum beneﬁt from a deﬁned contribution plan
in terms of its ability to provide a stream of income during retirement.
They may underestimate the effect of inﬂation eroding the real value
of ﬁxed beneﬁts, such as those often provided by deﬁned beneﬁt plans.
They may underestimate their life expectancy and overestimate the
expected return on their investments (Turner and Witte 2009). As longevity increases, public policy may need to devise ways to help people
make better decisions as to when to retire.
In sum, changes have occurred in many workplaces that allow
workers to work at older ages. In addition, some workers can change
workplaces as they age to ﬁnd employment that better suits their needs,
but some workers retire earlier than would best serve their interests
because of errors in decision making.

PHASED RETIREMENT AND ITS RELEVANCE TO RAISING
THE RETIREMENT AGE
Because it is difﬁcult under U.S. pension law for workers to collect
a pension while phasing out of work in the same job, people may retire
earlier than they want to, doing so in order to access their pension. Currently an employer wishing to offer ﬂexible employment faces numerous barriers arising from the Internal Revenue Code, the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), and the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA) (Penner, Perun, and Steuerle 2007).
Phased retirement can be complex to arrange for employers offering deﬁned beneﬁt plans (Hill 2010). The Pension Protection Act of
2006 permits in-service distributions of deﬁned beneﬁt plan beneﬁts for
employees aged 62 or older, which is a step toward facilitating phased
retirement at older ages. However, phased retirement starting earlier
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than age 62 cannot include partial payment of the employee’s deﬁned
beneﬁt plan beneﬁt. There are also unresolved issues relating to the
partial payment of subsidized early retirement beneﬁts because the payment of beneﬁts that are more highly subsidized to younger early retirees may be considered to be age discrimination. Employers would be
more likely to encourage phased retirement if this regulatory issue was
clariﬁed.
The government could take a proactive stance and provide guidance
to employers, who are wary of experimenting under threat of losing
their tax deductions for pensions. It could issue guidelines based on
the progressive and effective experiments with phased retirement in the
public sector.
Phased retirement may allow some older workers to continue working longer than they otherwise would. Some older workers may experience poor health or develop some degree of physical disability that
limits their abilities to work full time. Other people may have to provide
caregiving services to family members. These concerns may be ameliorated by employment and pension arrangements that allow workers
to gradually retire through phasing out of work over a period of time.
Phased retirement may be helpful to older workers in other contexts
as well. Some people may need to work in order to supplement their
retirement beneﬁts. Others may wish to work for nonﬁnancial reasons.
For these purposes, most people presumably would prefer not to work
full time. However, under current employment and pension regulatory
conditions, full retirement is generally the only viable choice for those
near retirement age who wish to collect their pension. Such an option
deprives society of the contributions of these individuals, as it diminishes their opportunity to work. This dilemma could be resolved by
arrangements that would allow workers to gradually retire.
Some people prefer retiring from work gradually rather than
abruptly. For example, according to the 2001 Retirement Risk Survey,
sponsored by the Society of Actuaries, two-thirds of preretirees (66 percent) and almost half of retirees (47 percent) said they were or would
have been very or somewhat interested in being able to gradually cut
back on the hours they worked at their current job, rather than stopping
work all at once when they got closer to retirement. Moreover, almost
2 in 10 retirees (19 percent) described their retirement process as being
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closest to the following: “gradually reduced the number of hours you
worked before stopping completely” (Society of Actuaries 2003).
Some retirees prefer part-time work to full retirement. In a 2003
survey, 70 percent of workers intended to work in retirement and 28
percent of retirees had worked at some time during retirement, according to the Retirement Conﬁdence Survey, conducted by the Employee
Beneﬁt Research Institute, Mathew Greenwald and Associates, and the
American Savings Education Council (EBRI, ASEC, and Greenwald
2003).
Phased retirement may beneﬁt society. For society, such an arrangement could offset some of the expected labor force shortage, even as it
helps contain the costs of pensions. And from a business perspective,
it is important to retain and use long-service employees to mentor and
train younger workers.
Despite their desirable effects, formal phased retirement arrangements are rare, at least in part because there are a number of barriers to
their implementation, including legal barriers, barriers relating to pension plan objectives, and others (Chen and Scott 2003; Penner, Perun,
and Steuerle 2002). Though, in principle, hardly anyone opposes phased
retirement, it seems workers don’t ﬁnd employers’ offers for phased
retirement very attractive (Hutchens and Chen 2007). While about 80
percent of older workers work in establishments where employers say
that phased retirement is possible, opportunities for phased retirement
depend in part on the characteristics of older workers, and are frequently
not offered to all workers in an establishment.

VULNERABLE WORKERS
Generally, people are living longer, are healthier at older ages, and
have lower disability rates at older ages than did their counterparts two
or more decades ago. The primary criticism, however, to policies that
encourage working longer is that doing so places an unfair burden on
certain vulnerable groups. These groups fall into three areas: 1) those
who have relatively short life expectancies, 2) those who are unable
to work at older ages because of physical limitations or the physical
demands of their jobs and lack early retirement pensions, and 3) those
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who become unemployed at older ages and are unable to ﬁnd other
jobs. The research surveyed suggests that workers with low levels of
education may be a vulnerable group. Raising the eligibility ages for
Social Security may pose problems for workers forced to take early
retirement or who are ﬁred or laid off in the few years before the early
retirement age because of the greater difﬁculty older workers have in
ﬁnding a job. Several studies have attempted to determine the number
of people in these vulnerable groups.
In the early 1980s, 19 percent of early retirees were either totally
unable to work or had partial limitations and jobs that required heavy
physical exertion. If the group of vulnerable workers is expanded to
include workers with partial limitations and medium physical requirements of their jobs, plus workers with no physical limitations and heavy
physical requirements, the ﬁgure would rise to 30 percent of new retirees (Social Security Administration 1986).
One study found that 20 percent of people taking Social Security
beneﬁts at age 62 have a health condition that limits the type or amount
of work they can do (Panis et al. 2002). That study found that approximately one-half of these early retirees with a health condition did not
have a private pension. In addition, approximately one-half of the early
retirees with a health condition but without a private pension worked
in physically demanding jobs. Approximately 5 percent of all early
claimants, or about 2.5 percent of workers, are particularly vulnerable
because they have work limitations, do not have a private pension, and
work on a physically demanding job. The study did not determine what
percentage of these workers would be eligible for Social Security disability beneﬁts.
Another study found that 17 percent of early retirees receiving Social
Security beneﬁts have signiﬁcant impediments to work but would not
qualify for Social Security Disability beneﬁts or Supplemental Security
Disability beneﬁts (Leonesio, Vaughan, and Wixon 2003). They would
not qualify for disability beneﬁts because they would not have worked
the minimum required number of years to be eligible for those beneﬁts.
They also would not qualify for Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
disability beneﬁts because they had assets above the level required by
the asset test to qualify.
The self-reported health status of workers whose jobs always
required physical effort improved between 1992 and 2002. In 2002,
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28 percent of persons aged 55–60 who did not attend college reported
that their jobs required physical activity some or most of the time. Of
those older workers whose jobs required physical effort all the time, 11
percent in 2002 reported themselves to be in poor health, down from 17
percent in 1992 (Johnson 2004).
People who take Social Security beneﬁts at age 62 frequently have
pensions or other resources that would allow them to retire at that age
without Social Security, or have jobs where they could continue working. Munnell et al. (2004) ﬁnd that 4 percent of the population aged 62
are vulnerable, meaning that they have a combination of lack of alternative resources and poor health, which makes it difﬁcult to continue
working.
Measuring the extent to which raising the retirement age would
hurt vulnerable groups, an earlier study found that less than 10 percent
of men who take Social Security beneﬁts at age 62 are both in poor
health and have no source of pension income other than Social Security.
For women, the ﬁgure is 20 percent (Burkhauser, Couch, and Phillips
1996). These ﬁndings were later conﬁrmed by a study done by the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (1999), which found that if dependency on
Social Security retirement beneﬁts at age 62 was deﬁned as resulting
from being poor and having a health condition that limited the ability to
work, then about 10 percent of the population that age was dependent
on those beneﬁts.
In sum, while studies differ to some extent as to precise results, the
general conclusion is that a small percentage of the population aged 62,
ranging from 2.5 percent to 10 percent, would be unable to continue
working and lack sufﬁcient resources to retire, and thus would be vulnerable to hardship resulting from an increase in the early retirement
age. The studies, however, have not counted as being vulnerable those
older workers who are laid off before age 62, when they become eligible for Social Security, and are unable to ﬁnd a job and lack a pension.
Doing so would increase the percentage of older people who are vulnerable.
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PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES
It may be more difﬁcult to make public policies reﬂecting improved
life expectancy in the United States, with its more racially and ethnically heterogeneous population, than in countries such as Japan, where
the population is more homogeneous. Policies that encourage later
work in the United States have a differential effect by race because of
the racial disparity in life expectancy at older ages.
However, if instead of a cross-sectional approach, the perspective
is taken of comparing the ability to work and the physical demands of
work currently with the situation for counterparts in the past, the pattern is clear. Both blacks and whites are living longer, people of both
races are self-reporting to be healthier at older ages, at least compared
to several decades ago, and disability rates at older ages are decreasing.
In Social Security policy, women are often considered to be a vulnerable group because of their higher old-age poverty rates. With respect
to longevity policy and raising the early retirement age, however, life
expectancy has improved for women (as well as for men) and the percentage of female workers in physically demanding jobs has declined.
One area of uncertainty for future longevity policy concerns the
obesity epidemic. The increasing obesity among children is a predictor of increasing obesity among adults. The earlier onset of obesity
may lead to more serious health consequences of the condition, which
implies that the health effects of obesity that impinge on the ability to
work at older ages may be worse in the future than they are currently.

CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has presented evidence concerning improvements
in the ability to work at older ages, and in reductions in the physical
demands of many jobs. Based on that evidence, it appears clear that if
older workers were economically motivated to do so and the demand
for older workers was sufﬁcient, it would be feasible for many older
workers to work longer. The age at which one takes retirement is one of
the most important ﬁnancial decisions a worker makes, yet it appears
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that many workers retire too early, perhaps because of myopia as to the
consequences of the decision.
To facilitate a policy favoring postponed retirement, it would be
desirable to address barriers to employment at older ages. Many older
workers report age discrimination if they are in the situation of looking
for a job—for example, if they have been laid off. While this book does
not address this issue, it recommends that further research be done on
the issue of age discrimination and policies to deal with it. A further
topic worth exploring is the issue of educating workers on the beneﬁts
of postponing retirement.

Notes
1. The BMI is calculated by dividing a person’s weight (measured in kilograms) by
his or her height squared (measured in meters). A BMI of 18.5 to less than 25 is
classiﬁed as a healthy weight. A BMI of 25 or higher but less than 30 is classiﬁed
as overweight but not obese. A BMI of 30 or higher is classiﬁed as obese.
2. The data in this paragraph came from http://laborsta.ilo.org, an International
Labour Ofﬁce database on labor statistics.
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3
Automatic Adjustment
Mechanisms to Maintain
Social Security’s Solvency
The trustees of Social Security project in their 2010 report that
Social Security will not have sufﬁcient resources to pay beneﬁts on
time starting in 2037.1 At that point it will be able to pay 75 percent of
promised beneﬁts (Social Security Board of Trustees 2010). Over the
long term, increases in life expectancy are a major cause of the projected insolvency of Social Security. Yet policies proposed to deal with
the projected insolvency often are not directly tied to increases in life
expectancy.
In the past, countries have made ad hoc reforms to maintain the solvency of their social security programs. Ad hoc reforms require elected
ofﬁcials to enact legislation each time an adjustment to social security
ﬁnancing is needed. These reforms carry a high degree of political risk
for participants because their timing and magnitude are unknown in advance. Their distributional consequences are also unknown in advance,
and depend on whether beneﬁts are cut, taxes raised, or both. Because
of the political difﬁculty in legislating cutbacks in social security programs, ad hoc reforms tend to occur in a crisis, with little advance notice
to workers and retirees as to the legislated changes (Turner 2007).
Reforms are much easier to enact when beneﬁts are being raised
than when they are being cut. In the age of social security retrenchment, some countries have adopted automatic adjustment mechanisms
because of the difﬁculty in enacting unpopular reforms involving beneﬁt cuts. These mechanisms automatically change the social security
program depending on economic and demographic developments, such
as increases in life expectancy. For example, these policies decide in
advance how the social security system will adjust to maintain adequate
ﬁnancing if life expectancy increases. Automatic adjustment mechanisms address the interrelated problems of social security sustainability,
the political difﬁculty for politicians of reforms that involve retrench-
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ment, and the political risk to workers and retirees associated with ad
hoc social security reforms. The automatic adjustments involve beneﬁt
cuts, increases in tax revenue, or increases in retirement age.
Automatic adjustment mechanisms can eliminate the need for large
program changes made in a crisis. They can eliminate the risk of insufﬁcient ﬁnancing. They, however, do not eliminate all risk. Workers
still face the risk that beneﬁt levels may be reduced, taxes raised, or
retirement ages moved back. Risk is reduced in that workers know under what circumstances such changes will occur. Political risk may be
reduced with automatic adjustment mechanisms, but it is generally not
eliminated, as politicians can always intercede and modify the changes
that were designed to be automatic (Turner 2010a).
This chapter surveys high-income countries that have automatic adjustment mechanisms that cut beneﬁts or the accrual of beneﬁts or raise
revenue for social security. It describes automatic adjustment mechanisms that achieve and maintain solvency. It concludes by considering
how U.S. Social Security could use automatic adjustment mechanisms
to improve and maintain solvency.

THE PROBLEM
The U.S. Social Security program, like most traditional social security programs, is ﬁnanced on a pay-as-you-go basis, with a relatively
small trust fund. The annual inﬂow of contributions roughly equals the
annual outﬂow of beneﬁts. It historically has maintained a reserve fund
to smooth out ﬂuctuations in contributions over the business cycle, and
currently it has built up a larger reserve than normal, but that will be
drawn down as the baby boom generation retires and receives beneﬁts.
Changes in the ratio of beneﬁciaries to covered workers (the oldage dependency ratio) play a key role in social security ﬁnancing in
pay-as-you-go systems. The ratio of beneﬁciaries to covered workers
acts like a “price” for beneﬁts, meaning the amount the average worker
must pay in social security taxes to raise the average beneﬁt level by
one dollar (Turner 1984). For example, when there are 10 workers for
every social security beneﬁciary, a dependency ratio of 0.10, it costs
each worker $0.10 to provide one dollar of beneﬁts to each beneﬁciary.
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By contrast, when there are two workers for every beneﬁciary, a dependency ratio of 0.50, it costs each worker $0.50 to provide one dollar of
beneﬁts. Thus, as the dependency ratio rises with an aging population,
the “price” to workers of providing social security beneﬁts to retirees
on a pay-as-you-go basis also increases. Generally, economics predicts
that when the price of something increases, the quantity demanded falls.
This occurs because of the law of downward-sloping demand curves.
Thus, the increase in the shadow price of social security beneﬁts would
be expected to reduce the level of beneﬁts provided. A related point,
however, is that demand is affected not only by price but also by income, and with rising income people may wish to have more leisure,
including spending a greater percentage of their life in retirement.
The question can be raised as to whether the law of downwardsloping demand applies to social security beneﬁts, since they are not
purchased in the marketplace, but are determined through the forces of
politics and public policy. Ultimately that is an empirical question that
has received little attention, but the theory that this law does apply to
social security beneﬁts has received some conﬁrmation (Turner 1984).
Between 1970 and 2000, the growth rates in Social Security–
covered workers and beneﬁciaries in the United States were roughly
equal, implying no change in the dependency ratio. However, between
2000 and 2030, according to the intermediate projection of the Social
Security Administration actuaries, the number of beneﬁciaries will
grow considerably faster than the number of covered workers (Table
3.1). That change places pressure on Social Security ﬁnancing and thus
strengthens the case for adopting an automatic adjustment mechanism.

AUTOMATIC ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS
Recognizing the political risks for politicians and workers of resolving social security insolvency through ad hoc reforms, at least 12
countries have adopted life-expectancy indexing of social security
beneﬁts or automatic adjustments tied to an indicator of social security insolvency. Both types of reforms provide automatic adjustment
mechanisms for sustaining the solvency of social security systems.
With life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts, taxes, or the early or normal
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Table 3.1 Projected Percentage Change in Old-Age and Survivors
Insurance (OASI)–Covered Workers and Beneﬁciaries,
Selected Periods, 1970–2030
Ratio of
OASI
beneﬁciaries
OASI-covered
beneﬁciaries
to covered
Year
workers (000s)
(000s)
workers (%)
1970
92,788
22,618
24.4
2000
154,624
38,556
24.9
2030 (intermediate
184,794
71,547
38.7
projection)
Percentage change
1970–2000
66.6
70.5
2.0
2000–2030
55.0
85.6
55.4
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from Social Security Board of Trustees (2008).

retirement age, increases in life expectancy automatically lead to program parameter changes. However, the adjustment mechanisms used
for indexing can vary.
Six issues need to be considered in analyzing automatic adjustment
mechanisms:
1) The frequency of the adjustment
Some automatic adjustments test for the need for change and make
any necessary changes annually; these adjustments are designed as
part of the ongoing ﬁnancing to maintain the solvency of a system. For
example, life-expectancy indexing of initial beneﬁts generally is done
annually, as in Sweden, but Italy adjusts beneﬁts every three years.
2) The triggering event
The choice of triggering event has varied. Some adjustments are
tied to the social security system’s underlying economics and demographics, such as changes in life expectancy, the dependency ratio, or
real wages. Others are tied to a measure of the insolvency of the system,
and adjustments are made only if the system is judged not to be solvent
over the long run.
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3) Whether the trigger is a hard trigger or a soft trigger
The trigger can be a “soft” trigger, meaning that the government is
obligated to do something, but may choose among different measures.
Alternatively, it can be a “hard” trigger, meaning that the adjustment
is automatic (Penner and Steuerle 2007). In most countries adopting
automatic adjustment mechanisms, the trigger is a hard trigger if the
adjustment involves life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts. However,
triggers tied to a measure of insolvency are sometimes soft triggers,
with some degree of political involvement in the process. Even in Sweden, discussed later, which has a hard trigger with respect to insolvency,
the government maintains oversight, so the automatic adjustment may
be overridden.
4) Whether retirees or workers, or both, are affected
The intergenerational effects of an adjustment can differ. In some
countries retirees are considered particularly vulnerable and are exempt
from beneﬁt reductions, with workers bearing the full cost of the adjustment. In other countries, both retirees and workers are affected by the
automatic adjustments.
5) The change that is triggered
The change that is triggered can be an adjustment in tax rates, current or future beneﬁts, retirement ages, or other parameters, such as the
number of years counted in the beneﬁt calculation.
6) The extent of advance notice of a change
The change can take place immediately, with little or no advance
notice, or it can take place with a number of years of advance notice.
Indexing for Life Expectancy: Shifting Risk to Retirees
Starting in the late 1990s, a number of countries, but not the United
States, have reformed their social security systems to incorporate lifeexpectancy indexing or other automatic adjustments. Life-expectancy
indexing is the policy of adjusting some parameter of social security,
such as beneﬁts, taxes, the early retirement age, or the normal retirement

Turner 2011.indb 45

5/17/2011 9:53:46 AM

46 Turner

age, for changes in life expectancy. While the costs of social security
beneﬁts presumably are ultimately borne by both workers and retirees,
life-expectancy indexing determines in advance how the distribution of
those costs will be borne.
Indexing Beneﬁts
Deﬁned contribution pension systems use life-expectancy indexing when they annuitize beneﬁts based on current life expectancy.
This feature of deﬁned contribution systems can be incorporated into
social security beneﬁt systems by life-expectancy indexing of their
beneﬁts. Life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts automatically reduces
annual beneﬁts to offset the increase in lifetime beneﬁts that accompanies an increase in life expectancy. With life-expectancy indexing of
beneﬁts, retirees are still protected from their individual (idiosyncratic)
life-expectancy risk because they receive beneﬁts as long as they live.
Individual or idiosyncratic life-expectancy risk is the risk that individuals will live longer than the average for their cohort.
Life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts gradually lowers the replacement rate—the ratio of earnings in the period before retirement
to beneﬁts received at retirement. Life-expectancy indexing results in
reduced annual beneﬁts (but not lifetime beneﬁts) relative to earnings.
Thus, over time, the generosity of the social security system, measured
by the replacement rate, is reduced. With increased life expectancy,
working longer is a desirable policy outcome for many people who are
able and willing to do so. For anyone who chooses and is able to do so,
reductions in social security beneﬁts could be offset by working longer.
Countries have used a couple of methods to index beneﬁts for
changes in life expectancy. One method adjusts for the percentage increase in life expectancy. For example, if life expectancy at retirement
age increases by 1 percent, beneﬁts would be reduced by 1 percent.
Portugal and Japan use this method.
A more commonly used method adjusts for the percentage increase
in the present value of beneﬁts caused by the increase in life expectancy.
For example, if an increase in life expectancy raises the expected present value of beneﬁts at retirement by 1 percent, annual beneﬁts would
be reduced by 1 percent. With the interest discounting of future beneﬁts
(because of the time value of money), an increase in life expectancy
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of 1 percent raises the expected present value of beneﬁts by less than 1
percent because the increased beneﬁts are received years in the future.
For that reason, the second method of indexing results in a smaller reduction of beneﬁts for a given increase in life expectancy than the ﬁrst
method.
Indexing Retirement Ages
Alternatively, retirement ages can be indexed. Life-expectancy indexing of the normal retirement age (for full beneﬁts) and the early
retirement age (eligibility age) has two dimensions:
1) The level of beneﬁts received at the new retirement age
2) The increase in early or normal retirement age
The ﬁrst dimension of retirement-age indexing is the level of beneﬁts received at the new retirement age. The level or amount of beneﬁts
can be the same as that payable at the former age. For example, if the
age were raised from 62 to 63, the beneﬁts formerly receivable at 62
would be receivable at 63. With this approach, indexing the earliest
retirement age in Social Security would reduce beneﬁt costs because
workers would receive the same level of annual beneﬁts, but for fewer
years. The replacement rate would be unaffected by that adjustment,
but would generally be raised if the worker worked an additional year.
Alternatively, the level of beneﬁts can be raised for those retiring
at age 62 to reﬂect the adjustment for postponed retirement. The beneﬁts receivable at 63 would be the same as the beneﬁts receivable at 63
under the former eligibility age. Thus, there would be no effect on the
beneﬁts of people retiring at ages 63 or higher. This method of indexing
the earliest retirement age would have little effect on beneﬁt costs in the
United States because the increased beneﬁts with postponed retirement
offset the effect of the reduced number of years that beneﬁts would be
received.
The second dimension of indexing retirement ages is the increase
of either the eligibility age or the normal retirement age, or both. For
example, either age could increase one year for every year’s increase
in life expectancy, or it could increase at a rate that would maintain a
constant ratio of retirement years to working years. Alternatively, the

Turner 2011.indb 47

5/17/2011 9:53:46 AM

48 Turner

increase could be set to maintain a constant ratio of beneﬁciaries to
workers (dependency ratio) (Gebhardtsbauer 1998).
The different ways in which the eligibility age or the normal retirement age can be indexed to life expectancy have different effects
on social security ﬁnancing. With indexing to maintain a constant life
expectancy at the retirement age, the costs of the social security system
will decline over time because the ratio of beneﬁciaries to workers will
tend to decline (Gebhardtsbauer 1998).
With life-expectancy indexing to maintain a constant ratio of retirement years to working years, because the length of the retirement
period increases over time, the expected present value of beneﬁts rises
with increases in life expectancy. However, keeping the ratio of the
retirement period to the working period constant and setting the beneﬁt
level so that the beneﬁts at the new age equal those receivable at the
old age insulates the social security system from adverse ﬁnancial effects due to increasing life expectancy. If maintaining a constant ratio of
work years to retirement years also maintains a constant ratio of workers to retirees, there would be no change in the old-age dependency
ratio, and the system’s solvency would be unaffected by changes in life
expectancy. However, life-expectancy indexing done this way is not
sufﬁcient to maintain a constant payroll tax rate when the retirement of
an exceptionally large age cohort looms, such as the baby boom generation, since such a shift has a major impact on the old-age dependency
ratio, and thus on the cost of providing beneﬁts.

INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH AUTOMATIC
ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS
This section surveys the experience of high-income countries that
have automatic adjustment mechanisms to maintain social security
solvency. It investigates how these mechanisms work. The details of
the international experience are provided because they yield valuable
insights as to how such policies might be implemented and how they
would work in the United States.
The countries that have these mechanisms can be divided into four
groups. First, traditional pay-as-you-go systems that have instituted
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life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts are considered. Second, countries
that use life-expectancy indexing of the earliest age at which social
security beneﬁts can be received are reviewed. Third, countries are
considered that automatically adjust other parameters of their social
security systems, such as the number of years for full beneﬁts. And
fourth, countries with automatic adjustment mechanisms that are tied to
solvency are considered.
1) Life-Expectancy Indexing in Traditional Pay-as-You-Go
Social Security Programs
Life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts can be incorporated within the
framework of a traditional pay-as-you-go social security system, such
as the U.S. system. Finland, Norway, and Portugal have done so.
Finland. In 2003, Finland passed a law to incorporate increases
in life expectancy into the calculation of social security beneﬁts. The
law took effect in 2010. As in other countries adopting life-expectancy
indexing, the life-expectancy adjustment uses unisex mortality tables,
thus ignoring gender (or other) differences in life expectancy.
Because of year-to-year ﬂuctuations in mortality rates, countries
using life-expectancy indexing generally average mortality rates over
several years, which smoothes out the yearly ﬂuctuations. Finland uses
mortality tables based on past mortality data averaged over a ﬁve-year
period to adjust initial pension beneﬁts at age 62. Thus, in the ﬁrst year,
the average life expectancy at age 62 for the years 2004–2008 was compared to the average for the years 2003–2007.
The life-expectancy adjustment for an individual’s beneﬁts depends
on the person’s year of birth. A person’s beneﬁts at retirement are adjusted for unisex life expectancy at age 62 for that birth cohort, without
regard to the person’s age at retirement. Thus, two persons retiring at
ages 62 and 63 but born in the same year would have the same percentage reduction in their annual beneﬁts. Of course, the person retiring at
age 63 would receive a larger beneﬁt because of the beneﬁt adjustment
for postponement of retirement.
Life-expectancy indexing in Finland is done so that increases in life
expectancy do not raise the expected present value of lifetime social security beneﬁts. The indexing is based on the amount that an increase in
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life expectancy would increase the expected present value of beneﬁts.
A 2 percent discount rate is used to calculate the annuity value. Disability pensions are also adjusted this way (Alho, Lassila, and Valkonen
2006; Lindell 2003). By 2040, after 30 years of life-expectancy indexing, the level of beneﬁts is expected to be reduced to 89 percent of the
level without indexing, or a reduction of less than 0.4 percent per year
(Whitehouse 2007a).
Portugal. In 2006, Portugal passed legislation that indexes its
social security beneﬁts for improvements in life expectancy. The legislation took effect in 2008. The reduction of beneﬁts is based directly on
the percentage change in life expectancy, rather than on the percentage
change in the expected value of pension beneﬁts arising because of the
improvement in life-expectancy (Whitehouse 2007b).
2) Indexing the Eligibility Age for Improvements in Life Expectancy
Rather than indexing beneﬁts, the eligibility age to receive beneﬁts
can be indexed for improvements in life expectancy.
United Kingdom. A British pension commission proposed lifeexpectancy indexing of the earliest age at which workers are eligible
to receive social security beneﬁts (Pensions Commission 2005). The
commission was chaired by Adair Turner, now Lord Turner, and was
informally known as the Turner Commission. The early retirement age
in 2009 was 65 for men and 60 for women, but starting in 2010 it was
scheduled to rise to 65 for women by 2020. The British proposal would
index the eligibility age so that the ratio of working years to retirement
years would be constant. It would announce any increase in the eligibility age 15 years in advance. Thus, for the current age of 65 for men,
no one aged 50 or older would be affected. Based on the projection of
life expectancy improvements, such indexing would result in an early
retirement age of 68 in 2050. The Pensions Commission argues that
this type of indexing would be fair across generations because every
generation would spend roughly the same proportion of adult life in
retirement.
With this proposal, the eligibility age would not increase one-toone with increases in life expectancy. Rather, if the ratio of retirement
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years to working years is one to two, then for every three years’ increase
in life expectancy, the eligibility age would increase by two years to
maintain the ratio of one retirement year for every two working years.
The British Parliament modiﬁed the Turner Commission proposal.
The law Parliament enacted raises the eligibility age in three steps. The
eligibility age ﬁrst increases between April 2024 and April 2026 from
65 to 66, followed by a phase-in from April 2034 to 2036 of the increase from 66 to 67, and a phase-in from April 2044 to 2046 of the
increase from 67 to 68 (Watson Wyatt Worldwide 2007). This reform is
not indexing because the increases are not linked to actual increases in
life expectancy. However, it could be called quasi indexing because the
increases are linked to projected increases in life expectancy.
Denmark. As of 2010, Denmark was the only country to enact legislation to index the social security beneﬁt eligibility age to increases
in life expectancy. This change takes effect with a long delay. Denmark
provides two old-age social security beneﬁts. First, the early retirement
pension beneﬁt requires the recipient to have worked a certain number
of years in Denmark. Denmark will raise the eligibility age for that
beneﬁt by six months each year from 2019 to 2022, so that the early
retirement eligibility age increases from 60 to 62.
The second old-age beneﬁt program is a universal old-age pension
that is available based on a person’s years of residence in Denmark. It
has no work history requirement. The eligibility age for this universal
old-age pension will rise by six months each year from 2024 to 2027,
so that the universal pension eligibility age increases from 65 to 67.
From then, increases in the eligibility age for both beneﬁt programs
will be tied to increases in life expectancy. The life expectancy review
is supposed to be done every ﬁve years (the ﬁrst review is scheduled for
2015), and the change in retirement age will take effect after a notice
period of 15 years. The Danish parliament must approve every increase
in the retirement age. By 2045, the eligibility age is expected to reach
68.3 years (Whitehouse 2007b). The goal is for the early retirement age
to be raised so that life expectancy from that age, measured at age 60,
will be 19.5 years. Thus, the Danish reform does not split the increased
life expectancy between the working years and retirement years but
fully raises the eligibility age for increases in life expectancy.
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3) Indexing Years of Contributions Required for a Full Beneﬁt
Other parameters of the social security beneﬁt calculation can be
indexed, such as the years of contributions required for a full beneﬁt.
France. In 2008, French workers needed 40 years of contributions
to receive full social security beneﬁts. Starting in 2009, that number has
increased by one calendar quarter per year and will continue to do so
until it reaches 41 years in 2012. This change will reduce social security
beneﬁts by about 2.5 percent for people working 40 years. Thereafter,
through 2020, the contribution period for full beneﬁts will increase as
needed to keep the ratio of the contribution period to the average retirement period equal to its ratio in 2003, which was approximately two to
one.2 The ratio is measured as the number of years required for a full
pension for work starting at age 20, divided by the expected duration
of retirement.
This adjustment mechanism effectively results in a reduction in
beneﬁts that is tied to increases in life expectancy. The French government retains the right to forgo these adjustments if weak labor market
conditions do not make it feasible for workers to work the extra years.
4) Countries with Automatic Adjustment Mechanisms
Tied to Solvency
Some countries have adopted automatic adjustment mechanisms
tied to measures of the solvency of their social security program.
Sweden. Sweden is a leader in the movement toward automatic
adjustments of social security. For that reason its system is explained
in greater detail than for other countries that have followed its lead. In
1994, the Swedish parliament passed legislation establishing the principles of the reform. This was followed by a series of implementing
laws passed starting in 1998 that established a Notional Deﬁned Contribution (NDC) system, alongside a mandatory, fully funded individual
account plan. The legislation for the automatic balancing mechanism in
the NDC plan was passed in 2001. That system is ﬁnanced by a combined employer-employee tax rate of 16 percent of wages (Table 3.2).
Each worker has a notional account to which contributions are credited.
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Table 3.2 Sweden: Changes in Contributions and Beneﬁts
System parameter
Value (%)
Contributions: employer-employee tax rate
Rate in 2010
16
Future rate
16
Beneﬁts: replacement rate (avg. worker)
Rate in 2008
53
Future rate (2050)
40
NOTE: The replacement rate includes both the NDC pension and the mandatory individual account pension.
SOURCE: Swedish Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2005).

The accumulated account balance is credited each year with a rate of return equal to the growth rate of average wages.3 In addition, 2.5 percent
of wages up to a ceiling are paid to the individual account plan, called
the premium pension.
Each year, because of life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts, the initial beneﬁts received by new beneﬁciaries are adjusted downward as
a new birth cohort reaches the eligibility age of 61 (Table 3.3). The
life-expectancy indexing of the system started in 1995, before the NDC
system actually began. It is expected that by approximately 2032, after
nearly 40 years of indexing, workers would need to postpone retirement
by two years and seven months to avoid receiving lower beneﬁts in
Table 3.3 Sweden: Life-Expectancy Indexing of Beneﬁts
(4)
Retirement
age required to
(5)
neutralize the
Implying an
(1)
(2)
(3)
effect on beneﬁts expected length
Birth Reaches age Life expectancy of increased life
of retirement
cohort
65 in
at age 65
expectancy (col. 3 minus col. 4)
1930
1995
82 yrs. 5 mos.
65 yrs. 0 mos.
17 yrs. 5 mos.
1940
2005
83 yrs. 7 mos.
65 yrs. 9 mos.
17 yrs. 10 mos.
1950
2015
84 yrs. 10 mos. 66 yrs. 7 mos.
18 yrs. 3 mos.
1960
2025
85 yrs. 7 mos.
67 yrs. 2 mos.
18 yrs. 5 mos.
1970
2035
86 yrs. 3 mos.
67 yrs. 7 mos.
18 yrs. 8 mos.
SOURCE: Swedish Social Insurance Agency (2005).
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comparison to the beneﬁts they would have received had there been no
indexing. Thus, people formerly retiring at age 63 would need to retire
at 65 years and 7 months to receive the same level of beneﬁts as without
the beneﬁt reduction.
Life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts is done by an adjustment that
reﬂects improvements in life expectancy at age 65. No further adjustments to retirees’ beneﬁts are made for improvements in mortality after
age 65.
The Swedish system uses period mortality tables, which are based
on the experience of a cross section of older persons, not projecting
future mortality improvements. For example, period tables would be
based on the mortality experience of the population alive in the year
2000, rather than the expected experience of people aged 61 in that
year, projecting into the future. For each cohort, the annuity divisor
adjustment—the amount by which the worker’s accumulated balance is
divided to determine the worker’s initial beneﬁt—is established at age
65, with a provisional adjustment made for retirements starting at age
61, which is the eligibility age.
In establishing adjustment mechanisms, a fundamental question is
whether any of the adjustment will be borne by current retirees. Generally, U.S. Social Security reform proposals exempt current retirees and
workers nearing retirement age on the grounds that people in those age
groups have limited ability to change their work and savings plans to
adjust to reforms. Sweden has not adopted that principle.
In Sweden, if the growth rate of real per capita wages is constant
at 1.6 percent per year, the social security annuity is adjusted solely by
changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). However, if the annual
growth rate of real per capita wage income in Sweden falls below 1.6
percent, the cost-of-living adjustment is less than the increase in the
CPI, and if the growth rate of real per capita wage income exceeds 1.6
percent, the adjustment is greater than the CPI. For example, if the annual growth rate in real per capita wages was 1.5 percent, the increase
in beneﬁts in payment would be the rate of growth of the CPI minus 0.1
percent, which would cause a slight decline in the real level of beneﬁts
paid.
Real per capita wage growth in Sweden has averaged about 2 percent a year over long periods (Palmer 2000). Because this average rate
exceeds the rate of 1.6 percent in the adjustment formula, over time this
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indexing is expected to be more generous than price indexing. Thus,
Swedish pensioners share with workers in the ﬂuctuations in the Swedish economy and in the long-term growth of the economy. However,
in an economic recession, as occurred in 2009–2010, indexed beneﬁts
of Swedish pensioners are increased by less than the level provided by
price indexing.
Life-expectancy indexing and the adjustment of beneﬁts in payment for changes in productivity may at times be inadequate to assure
solvency. To handle this, Sweden has built into its system a mechanism
called the automatic balancing mechanism. This adjustment mechanism
has two goals: 1) to set the contribution rate so that there will be no need
to raise it in the future and 2) to automatically restore ﬁnancial balance
to the social security system without the intervention of politicians. The
automatic balancing mechanism is used when the system is not fully
solvent in the long run.
To determine whether it needs to implement the automatic balancing mechanism, each year the Swedish government measures the assets
and liabilities of its social security system. The assets in the system are
measured as the assets in the associated trust fund, called a buffer fund,
plus the estimated present value of future contributions. If the present
value of liabilities for future beneﬁts exceeds the value of assets, adjustments are made to reduce future beneﬁts. Speciﬁcally, the adjustment
mechanism reduces the rate of return used to calculate accruals in the
notional balances below the rate of growth of average real wages.4 It
also reduces by the same amount the indexing rate for beneﬁts in payment. For example, if a shortfall of assets to liabilities of 5 percent
develops, the current beneﬁt accruals of workers and the beneﬁts in
payment would be reduced by 5 percent. Thus, both workers and retirees are affected by the adjustment. The level of contributions is not
affected.
When the system is in good ﬁnancial condition, workers can be assured that these cuts will not occur in the near future. However, if the
system is near the point where adjustments may be made, workers and
retirees face uncertainty as to whether cuts will occur within the next
few years. This mechanism shares the burden of the adjustment across
generations. However, if cuts are made and the trigger later is switched
off because conditions have again become more favorable, those who
were working during the adjustment phase will not be affected at all:
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the value of their accumulated pension rights will be restored. The pensioners affected by the balancing mechanism, on the contrary, will not
receive any compensation for what they lost during the period when the
balancing mechanism was active.
The logic of the system dictates that the adjustment occurs through
accrual and beneﬁt reductions, but not through tax rate changes. If the
payroll tax rate were increased, that would increase the contributions
credited to the individual accounts, which would increase future beneﬁt
liabilities, and thus would not help restore solvency.5
Because of the fall in world stock markets in 2008, the reserve funds
for the Swedish Notional Deﬁned Contribution (NDC) system fell considerably in value. The buffer funds received a negative return of −21
percent (Sundén 2009). Balance is restored by reducing per capita wage
indexation of earned pension rights for current workers and reducing
the indexation of beneﬁts for current retirees. The adjustment occurs
with a lag, so the 4.5 percent scheduled increase in pension beneﬁts
in 2009 was not affected by the ﬁnancial crisis. Because of slow wage
growth, beneﬁts were scheduled to decrease by 1.3 percent. But, as a
result of the automatic adjustment mechanism, beneﬁts were scheduled
to decrease by a further 3.3 percent in 2010, or a total of 4.6 percent.
The cuts would continue until the system regained ﬁnancial balance.6
With current projections, the outlook improves only after 2012. Any
surpluses that occur after balancing are used to increase indexation until
the value of pension credits and beneﬁts are restored.
The proposed cuts generated an immediate response from the ﬁve
Swedish political parties that support the pension reform. They proposed a change in the procedure for valuing buffer fund assets from
market value to a three-year average in order to smooth the pattern.
The government decided to go forward with the change. As a result,
the response of the NDC plan ﬁnancing to the economic recession will
be muted, and it should take longer for the system to return to balance.
Instead of a reduction in beneﬁts of 4.5 percent in 2010, the reduction
was 3.0 percent. That means that if inﬂation is 3 percent, there will be
a real reduction in beneﬁts of 6 percent. In 2011, instead of a nominal
reduction in beneﬁts of 1.7 percent, the reduction will be 2.8 percent.
And in 2012, instead of a projected increase in nominal beneﬁts of 0.8
percent, nominal beneﬁts will be reduced by 0.5 percent (Sundén 2009).
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While these changes modify the original adjustment mechanism,
substantial cuts in real beneﬁts still occur over a short period, as real
beneﬁts decline by approximately 12 percent over two years and 16
percent over three years, assuming a 3 percent inﬂation rate.
A criticism of the Swedish system is that, because of its automatic
adjustments, its replacement rate is falling over time. That criticism is
addressed for low-wage workers in Sweden by the provision of a minimum beneﬁt. Beneﬁciaries with relatively low beneﬁts also receive the
guarantee beneﬁt. About 43 percent of beneﬁciaries receive that beneﬁt
(Sundén 2009). When the NDC beneﬁts are cut by the automatic adjustments, the beneﬁt from the guarantee beneﬁt is increased, somewhat
offsetting the cut for the retirees receiving the guarantee beneﬁt.
At some point, however, Sweden may decide it needs to raise its
early retirement age, which is relatively low at 61. Raising the early retirement age would allow Sweden to raise the replacement rate because
higher beneﬁts would be received, but for fewer years.
The Swedish public, after its limited experience with the NDC system, appears to have readily accepted the Swedish system. The lack of
widespread criticism may be because the replacement rate is declining slowly, so the public may have limited awareness of the long-run
decline in the replacement rate. Also, acceptance of the system could
diminish when the automatic adjustment mechanism is used to reduce
accruals and the price indexing of beneﬁts.
Germany. Unlike Sweden, Germany does not index social security
beneﬁts for life expectancy. It, however, has changed the calculation of
beneﬁts to incorporate life expectancy as one aspect of a more complex
adjustment mechanism. The adjustment mechanism is called the sustainability factor. The sustainability factor, which was introduced in 2004
and took effect in 2005, attempts to achieve sustainability by limiting
the growth rate of average beneﬁts (Table 3.4). The sustainability factor
incorporates not only life-expectancy changes but all demographic factors that affect the dependency ratio (Toft 2007). It includes the effects
of changes in migration, birth rates, labor force participation rates, and
retirement rates. It is used to index beneﬁts, but part of the adjustment
to solvency also raises the social security payroll tax rate.
Initial beneﬁts for a retiree are determined by multiplying the beneﬁts received under the beneﬁt formula of the previous year by the
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Table 3.4 Germany: Changes in Contributions and Beneﬁts
System parameter
Value (%)
Contributions: employer-employee tax rate
Rate in 2008
19.5
Future rate (2030)
22.0
Beneﬁts: replacement rate (avg. worker)
Rate in 2008
70.0
Future rate
64.0
SOURCE: Toft (2007).

sustainability factor. The sustainability factor is based on the percentage
change in the dependency ratio.7
A safety clause, however, sets a limit on the adjustment so that nominal beneﬁts cannot be reduced. Without this clause, nominal beneﬁts
could be reduced during a period of low earnings growth or declining
earnings, as occurred in Sweden. The safety clause took effect immediately in Germany, limiting the effect of the sustainability factor in 2005
and 2006 (Toft 2007).
The sustainability factor has reduced the projected payroll tax rate
necessary to ﬁnance the system in 2040 from 28 percent to 24 percent
(Capretta 2006). Germany’s goal is to limit the payroll tax rate to no
higher than 20 percent by 2020 and 22 percent by 2030 (Penner and
Steuerle 2007). The sustainability factor is weighted so that it offsets
just one-quarter of the percentage increase in the system’s dependency
ratio, rather than the full increase. The difference is made up by the
projected increase in payroll taxes.
Germany uses a points system for calculating social security beneﬁts. In that system, contributing for one year at the average wage earns
a worker one point. A retiree’s beneﬁts are based on the total number of
points earned by the retiree multiplied by a factor measuring the value
of a point. The sustainability factor affects the value of a point, so it affects both current and future retirees. Thus, the beneﬁts of retirees are
affected by the adjustment, as in Sweden.
Japan. Japan has studied the reforms in Sweden and Germany
and developed its own system of automatic adjustments that incorporates features from both countries. Japan calls its approach modiﬁed
indexation.
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Japan’s social security program has had to deal with increasing life
expectancy at older ages that is among the highest in the world. In addition, it has faced a continuing decline in the birth rate to below the rate
that would be sufﬁcient to maintain the population at its current level.
Because of the low birth rate and limited immigration, Japan’s population and workforce are both declining.
Even though Japan passed major social security reform legislation
in 2000, greater-than-expected improvement in life expectancy, plus
greater-than-expected decline in the birth rate, caused the need for further reform in 2004. Because of the political cost to politicians of the
repeated process of making unpopular social security reforms, Japanese
politicians wanted an automatic mechanism that would return the system to solvency without their continued intervention (Sakamoto 2005).
As in the United States, so in Japan, Sweden, and Germany there
is a desire to not raise the payroll tax rate above a set level. In Japan,
Sweden, and Germany that desire motivated the introduction of the automatic adjustment. Japan decided to introduce the adjustment in part
because younger workers were concerned about the possibility of high
contribution rates, which they viewed as unfair to their generation.
In reform legislation passed in 2004, Japan incorporated a demographic factor into the calculation of social security beneﬁts (Sakamoto
2008; Takayama 2006). The social security adjustment reduces the indexing of initial beneﬁts and beneﬁts in subsequent years.
The Japanese government is gradually increasing the payroll tax
rate for its social security program, called the Employees’ Pension Insurance Scheme, to 18.3 percent in 2017. At that point, the payroll tax
rate is considered to be ﬁxed, with no further increases necessary (Table
3.5). In the absence of the 2004 reforms, the payroll tax rate was projected to increase to 25.9 percent. It was 13.58 percent in 2004.
With these increases in the payroll tax rate, it is estimated under
the best-case scenario that the modiﬁed indexation will continue until
2023, when indexation will return to that used in 2004.8 In the Japanese social security system, initial beneﬁts grow at the rate of growth
of disposable income. Under the automatic adjustment mechanism, the
indexing of initial beneﬁts at retirement is reduced until ﬁnancial solvency is restored.
The reduction factor takes into account the decline in the number
of people in the Japanese workforce and the increase in life expectancy.
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Table 3.5 Japan: Changes in Contributions and Beneﬁts
System parameter
Value (%)
Contributions: employer-employee tax rate
Rate in 2008
15.35
Future rate (2017)
18.30
Beneﬁts: replacement rate (avg. worker)
Rate in 2008
59.00
Future rate (2023)
50.00
SOURCE: Sakamoto (2008); Takayama (2006).

The factor equals the rate of decline in the Japanese workforce participating in social security programs plus the rate of increase in life
expectancy at age 65.
Japanese policy experts have noted that the growth rate of the beneﬁciary population also affects solvency. However, they took a long-term
perspective and did not incorporate that into the calculation, since the
growth rate of the beneﬁciary population would eventually reﬂect the
growth rate of the workforce (Sakamoto 2005).
For the beneﬁt calculation, the projected rate of increase in life
expectancy at age 65 is ﬁxed in the law at 0.3 percent annually, or approximately three weeks a year. That adjustment is based on the 2002
projection over the period from 2000 to 2025. Thus, this indexation can
be categorized as quasi indexing because it is not tied to actual changes
in life expectancy. It was ﬁxed in advance to avoid year-to-year ﬂuctuations in the beneﬁt adjustment and to set the beneﬁt adjustment so that
Japanese workers would be able to know in advance the change that
would affect their beneﬁts.
It is expected that the demographic factor will reduce the indexation rate for beneﬁts at retirement by 0.9 percentage points per year
on average, compared to the previous method. By reducing the growth
rate of beneﬁts to less than the growth rate in real wages, this change
is projected to reduce the average replacement rate from 59 percent in
2008 to 50 percent by 2023.
The adjustment factor, however, is not applied if it would cause
nominal beneﬁts to decline, as in Germany. If the Consumer Price Index declines in a year (which has happened in Japan and in the United
States) or if per capita disposable income declines, beneﬁts are main-
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tained at their nominal value, rather than being cut to reﬂect the effects
of indexing.
Also, if the replacement rate fell much more rapidly than expected,
and fell to 50 percent or lower, the adjustment mechanism would be
stopped, and the policy would be reviewed. Thus, the law contains a
provision to override the automatic stabilizer. This provision is known
as the minimum beneﬁt provision.
Canada. Canada uses an approach to automatic adjustments that
differs from Sweden, Germany, and Japan. Canada introduced its automatic adjustment mechanism in 1997.
The Canada Pension Plan (CPP) is the main social security program for Canada, except for the province of Quebec, which maintains
a similar but separate plan—the Quebec Pension Plan. These two plans
operate on top of a ﬂat beneﬁt. The CPP is a hybrid between a pay-asyou-go system and a fully funded system. It is partially funded, but,
unlike the U.S. Social Security system, it is not projected to run out
of money. Beneﬁts are designed to replace 25 percent of the worker’s
average wages into the future, and thus grow over time for successive
cohorts at the growth rate of average wages (Table 3.6).
The payroll tax rate is projected to be sufﬁciently higher than the
rate necessary to maintain pay-as-you-go funding for a number of years,
so the trust fund will continue to grow over time. The CPP is ﬁnanced
with a combined employee-employer tax rate of 9.9 percent. Its fund
is invested partially in world stock markets. The system is designed so
that the fund will be adequate to pay for the retirement beneﬁts of the
Canadian baby boomers and to cover the aging of the population. There
Table 3.6 Canada: Changes in Contributions and Beneﬁts
System parameter
Value (%)
Contributions: employer-employee tax rate
Rate in 2008
9.9
Future rate
9.9
Beneﬁts: replacement rate (avg. worker)
Rate in 2008
25.0
Future rate
25.0
SOURCE: Ofﬁce of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada (2007).
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should be no need for further contribution rate increases or beneﬁt cuts.
However, if ﬁnancial markets are weak for a prolonged period or if life
expectancy increases considerably more rapidly than anticipated, or if
another economic or demographic variable affecting funding turns out
to be much more adverse to funding than expected, an adjustment may
be needed.
Every three years, the system’s chief actuary evaluates the CPP’s
ﬁnancial sustainability. If the chief actuary determines that the system is
not ﬁnancially sustainable in the long run, legislation requires an automatic adjustment (Ofﬁce of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions
Canada 2007). However, the automatic adjustment takes effect only if
the Canadian provincial ﬁnance ministers cannot ﬁrst decide on an adjustment of their own—an outcome that is considered unlikely.
If the automatic adjustment takes effect, it freezes beneﬁt indexation for three years, eliminating cost-of-living increases for retirees
during that period. In addition, the automatic adjustment increases the
contribution rate over that three-year period by an amount equal to half
of the adjustment needed to reach the new long-term contribution rate
required to restore solvency. That rate is maintained until the next triennial evaluation. Thus, the changes are borne both through an increase
in contributions and a reduction in beneﬁts in payment (Brown 2008).
If changes in long-run assumptions raise the projected steady-state
contribution rate required to maintain a constant ratio of assets to expenditures, the contribution rate will be increased permanently.
The Canadian social security system has been designed so that there
is little need for the adjustment mechanism. By moving toward partial
funding, the system is designed to maintain both a constant payroll tax
rate across age cohorts and a constant replacement rate. This is a degree
of long-run stability that few social security systems have achieved.

COMPARING THE OPTIONS: THE PROS AND CONS
Life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts results in a falling replacement rate over time when measured at a ﬁxed retirement age. For this
reason, social security will provide a decreasingly generous beneﬁt
over time as traditionally measured by the replacement rate concept.
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Working longer can offset this effect by raising a person’s beneﬁts. Alternatively, workers not wishing to work longer could increase their
savings for retirement, though the evidence of widespread undersaving
for retirement suggests that this approach would not be popular.
Any system with a declining replacement rate, such as the Swedish
system, eventually will reach the point where the replacement rate is
politically unacceptable, and further reform will be necessary. Thus, a
system that achieves solvency with a declining replacement rate does
not prevent the need for future reforms. The outcome of future reforms
is subject to the usual political risks as to timing and distributional
consequences.
One Swedish commentator (Scherman 2007) is highly critical of the
decline in replacement rates that will result from the Swedish reform.
He argues that the early retirement age should be raised to offset the decline, and that the payroll tax rate should not be considered permanently
ﬁxed. Furthermore, he advocates reinstituting a “normal pension age”
to clarify to the general public what retirement age is needed to obtain a
“decent” pension. Moreover, he calls for an in-depth discussion of how
the labor market reacts to the need for offering employment opportunities at an advanced age.
Life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts preserves the option of receiving social security beneﬁts at an early age. That said, some people
who retire at the early retirement age, particularly those with long life
expectancy, probably would be ﬁnancially better off if they postponed
retirement to a higher age, when they would receive higher beneﬁts.
People generally will receive higher annual social security beneﬁts if
the early retirement age is indexed than if pension beneﬁts are indexed,
because pensioners will receive the beneﬁts starting at a later age and
for fewer years.
Indexing the eligibility age has the added feature of encouraging
people to work longer. However, not everyone is able to do so. People with long careers in physically demanding jobs and people in poor
health may be unable to postpone their retirement. Options could be
provided to meet the needs of these people. For example, the eligibility age could be maintained at its current level for people with long
careers or for people with low lifetime average earnings. The eligibility
requirements for disability beneﬁts could be eased for people above a
certain age but below the social security eligibility age.
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Indexing can also be compared to quasi indexing. With quasi
indexing, instead of relating policy changes to actual changes in life
expectancy, such policy changes could be linked to projected changes
in life expectancy, as in Japan. An argument in favor of indexing is
that if life expectancy improves more slowly than anticipated, the system automatically adjusts to the new reality, and smaller reductions in
beneﬁts are made. However, indexing creates uncertainty as to when
changes in social security will occur and how large they will be. With
quasi indexing, a schedule of changes is announced in advance so that,
for example, people would know far in advance the early retirement
age or the beneﬁt reduction that would be relevant for their birth cohort.

DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES
The options have different consequences as to the distribution of
resources across people with different characteristics. Distributional issues can be addressed across the income distribution within a given age
cohort and across age cohorts. A reform that raises the eligibility age
will have relatively less effect on workers who already are postponing retirement past the eligibility age. That group includes high-income
workers who ﬁnd considerable nonpecuniary, as well as pecuniary,
rewards from their work. It also includes low-income workers who continue to work because they need the money.
While the adjustments in beneﬁts resulting from indexing generally produce an across-the-board cut in beneﬁts, their effects on retirees
would differ across the income distribution. For example, a 5 percent
cut in beneﬁts due to life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts would leave
the distribution of beneﬁts the same across income classes. However, it
would affect the distribution of income because lower-income persons
tend to rely more on social security beneﬁts, so their income would fall
by a greater percentage than the income of higher-income persons.
Indexing the early retirement age may be more favorable to lowerincome workers than indexing beneﬁts, provided other changes are
made to help lower-income people who are unable to extend their working lives. However, if beneﬁts are indexed, it may be less likely that
those changes in other programs would be made.
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The different options for social security reform also have different
distributional consequences across age cohorts. Automatic adjustment
mechanisms designed to maintain the solvency of social security tend
to result in smaller changes made over a longer period of time and affect
more age cohorts than changes made to restore solvency when insolvency is impending.
Life-expectancy varies across racial groups. Where there is racial
diversity within the population, such as in the United States, lifeexpectancy indexing of the eligibility age raises the question of whether
this policy would be fair to all racial groups. The effects on different
racial groups with different life expectancies and different risks of
disability depend in part on whether disability beneﬁts would also be
subject to life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts. If disability beneﬁts
were not also life-expectancy indexed, groups that have a higher takeup rate for those beneﬁts, such as blacks, would be treated relatively
favorably since those beneﬁts would not be reduced.
All countries with life-expectancy indexing use unisex life expectancy rather than having different indexing for men and women or for
other identiﬁable groups (such as race) with different mortality rates. If
life expectancy improved at different rates for different demographic
groups, indexing that was based on the average for all groups might be
unfair to some groups. Singh and Siahpush (2006), among others, have
documented a widening of the mortality gap by socioeconomic status.
In this situation, less than full indexing might be desirable. If lifeexpectancy indexing were seen to adversely affect low-income groups,
that effect could be offset by increasing the progressivity of social security beneﬁts through changes in the beneﬁt formula.

INDEXING OPTIONS FOR U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY
Life-expectancy indexing of U.S. Social Security beneﬁts could
be structured several ways. Beneﬁts received at age 62 could be reduced. That approach was proposed by the President’s Commission to
Strengthen Social Security (2001), which recommended that beneﬁts be
adjusted every 10 years. Another option would be to index the eligibility age and the normal retirement age so that the eligibility age was a
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ﬁxed number of years earlier than the normal retirement age. This type
of indexing would result in a smaller reduction in beneﬁts than under
life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts because the increase in the eligibility age would offset the beneﬁt reduction. The legislated increases in
the normal retirement age account in part for a projected decline in the
Social Security replacement rate (Table 3.7).
Savings Estimate
Life-expectancy indexing of U.S. Social Security beneﬁts would be
a major step toward resolving the program’s future ﬁnancial problems.
The Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (CBO) has estimated the effect of a
reform that involved life-expectancy indexing of initial Social Security
beneﬁts. This one change, put into effect in 2012, would eliminate 43
percent of Social Security’s 75-year deﬁcit and would push back the
date of insolvency by seven years (CBO 2005). An alternative estimate
has indicated a smaller effect, with 27 percent of the deﬁcit eliminated
(Shelton 2008).
The two estimates differ in part because of the different ways that
life-expectancy indexing is applied. The CBO estimate adjusts for the
percentage change in life expectancy at age 65, while the Shelton estimate adjusts for the percentage change in the present value of lifetime
beneﬁts due to the increase in life expectancy.9 An alternative estimate
indicates that life-expectancy indexing of initial beneﬁts at retirement
Table 3.7 United States: Changes in Contributions and Beneﬁts
System parameter
Value (%)
Contributions: employer-employee tax rate
Rate in 2008
12.4
Future rate
12.4
Beneﬁts: replacement rate (avg. worker)
Rate in 2008
41.0
Future rate (2030)
37.0
NOTE: The replacement rate is projected to fall for three reasons: 1) the increase in the
normal retirement age, which acts as a cut in beneﬁts; 2) an increased share of beneﬁts
being taxable; and 3) increased contributions for Medicare, which are deducted from
Social Security beneﬁts.
SOURCE: Munnell (2003).
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by correcting for the change in the present value of beneﬁts would reduce the Social Security beneﬁts of new retirees by about 0.24 percent
per year (Goss 2003).
Growth Rate of Beneﬁts
In the U.S. Social Security system, initial beneﬁts at retirement are
designed to grow with the growth rate of average real wages in the
economy. The system achieves that result by indexing Social Security–
covered wages to age 60 by the growth rate of average wages.10
A number of countries have reformed their systems to slow the
growth rate in average beneﬁts to below the growth rate of average
wages, which is the growth measure used in the U.S. Social Security
system. In Sweden, initial beneﬁts at retirement grow at the growth rate
of average wages minus an adjustment for the increase in life expectancy. In Japan, the average beneﬁt level grows at the growth rate of
average wages less the growth rate in life expectancy.
The policies of one country may work differently when applied in
another country. For example, countries differ in their degree of income
inequality and degree of population heterogeneity with respect to life
expectancy. For example, Sweden may have greater toleration than the
United States for cutting the real value of social security beneﬁts in
payment because it has a low poverty rate for older persons. Using internationally comparative data, in Sweden 2.1 percent of the population
aged 65 and older has income below 40 percent of the median income,
compared with 15.0 percent in the United States (Luxembourg Income
Study 2007).

CONCLUSIONS
Increasingly, countries are adopting automatic adjustment mechanisms for social security ﬁnancing. These mechanisms attempt to deal
with problems of sustainability and of political risk. While political risk
has been reduced by these changes, it remains in most systems because
of oversight of the process by the government and the potential need for
further reforms due to declining replacement rates.
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Countries have relatively little experience with life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts, so it is not possible yet to assess the long-term effects
of such policies. Countries may eventually decide that life-expectancy
indexing of beneﬁts results in too large a drop in the replacement rate.
That said, the drop can be offset by workers who choose to work longer
or by a policy encouraging longer work years, for example by raising
the social security eligibility age.
As of 2010, only one country—Denmark—has indexed the social
security eligibility age. The United Kingdom considered such a proposal but adopted quasi indexing instead, a method in which the age
rises according to a ﬁxed schedule.
Automatic indexing done annually involves regular, incremental
changes. This type of indexing becomes part of the regular functioning
of the social security system. However, for indexing to function as it is
designed, it must be supported by a broad-based political commitment
not to seek vote-winning modiﬁcations that undermine its effectiveness. In this regard, it might appear likely that the automatic adjustment
mechanisms would work in Sweden and Japan because of the consensus nature of their politics. Sweden, however, revised its automatic
adjustment mechanism to modify its effects. Italy and Germany have
also overridden automatic adjustments. Thus, the international experience does not provide a clear lesson as to how this type of adjustment
would work in the United States.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter recommends that an automatic adjustment mechanism
be adopted to help restore and maintain Social Security’s solvency. It
recommends that Social Security beneﬁts be indexed for life expectancy,
so that increases in life expectancy would not cause an increase in the
lifetime value of pension beneﬁts. This type of indexation has been
adopted by Sweden for its social security program. With this type of
indexation, every year for each new retirement cohort, there would be a
slight downward adjustment in beneﬁts to take into account the effect of
increased life expectancy on the lifetime value of beneﬁts. The adjustment would occur for each cohort only once, with beneﬁts received at
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retirement facing no further adjustments. This type of indexation results
in a reduced replacement rate over time. The following two chapters
consider policies that address that issue.

Notes
1. This chapter is largely based on Turner (2009).
2. The projection for life expectancy at age 60 in 2012 is 21.8 years, which is 54.5
percent of the 40-year working period starting at age 20 (Whitehouse 2007a).
3. This aspect of the Swedish system is similar to the U.S. Social Security system,
where beneﬁts are indexed to the growth rate in average wages. However, a difference is that the U.S. system can increase tax rates without having that change raise
beneﬁt entitlements, which the Swedish system cannot do.
4. The actual procedure for calculating the present value of future contributions is
somewhat different. The expected turnover distribution is calculated as the difference between the expected average pension–weighted age of beneﬁt receipt,
which is 76, and the expected average income–weighted age of payroll tax payments, which is 43. The difference between those two ages is 33. Total assets are
measured as the buffer fund plus 33 times annual contributions.
5. The NDC system has few actual assets because it is funded on a pay-as-yougo basis with a reserve fund that is small relative to liabilities. To calculate
assets for the purposes of the automatic balancing mechanism, the annual contributions received by the system are multiplied by what is called the expected
turnover duration. The expected turnover duration is the average length of
time, measured in years, until the system must pay out beneﬁts to liquidate
the liability created in the current year. It can be shown that if the population
structure of the system is stationary, the present value of beneﬁts accrued during a year equals the contributions during the year times the turnover duration.
(Japan has evaluated this method of determining the future liabilities of its
system and decided that it would not work for the country because it has a declining workforce rather than a stable population structure [Sakamoto 2005].)
This value of assets is compared to the present value at the end of the ﬁscal
year of the liabilities for future beneﬁt payments. If assets exceed or equal liabilities in value, no adjustment is made. If assets are less than liabilities, the rate of
return credited to the notional account balances is reduced, and the indexing of
current beneﬁts is reduced. To smooth out temporary variations, the calculation is
done on the basis of a three-year moving average of the ratio of assets to liabilities
(Könberg, Palmer, and Sundén 2006). Similar to the U.S. Social Security system,
Sweden’s system calculates three projections: 1) a base case, 2) an optimistic case,
and 3) a pessimistic case. It uses the base case for determining whether an adjustment is needed and the other two cases for determining the range of possible future
outcomes.
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6. Balancing affects the NDC beneﬁt. Beneﬁciaries without income-related beneﬁts
or with low NDC beneﬁts can qualify for the minimum guarantee government
beneﬁt. Among Sweden’s 1.8 million retirees, approximately 800,000 have some
guarantee beneﬁt. When the NDC beneﬁt is reduced, guarantee beneﬁts will increase for beneﬁciaries with both beneﬁts. Thus, the net effect on total beneﬁts will
be less for this group.
7. With the sustainability factor A, the beneﬁt formula is multiplied by the following
factor:
A = 1 + α(1 – R) ,
where R is the ratio of the dependency rate in year t − 2 (i.e., two years earlier) to
the dependency rate in year t − 3, and is thus a number greater than 1 because of the
increasing dependency ratio over time. The parameter α has been set in the German
reform at 0.25. If it had been set at zero, there would be no sustainability factor
adjustment. If it had been set at one, the impact of changes in the dependency rate
would fall entirely on beneﬁts, with no increase in the payroll tax rate. It was set at
0.25 because that adjustment factor would result in future payroll taxes rising to no
more than 20 percent in 2020 and 22 percent in 2030, based on current projections
(Toft 2007). The term α(1 – R) (where α is greater than zero) is negative (but greater
than –1), making the sustainability factor A have a positive value that is less than 1.
An example clariﬁes how this operates. If the dependency rate is growing at
2 percent a year, which is more rapidly than the U.S. dependency rate is projected
to grow between 2000 and 2030 (Table 3.1), R would equal 1.02, α(1 – R) would
equal –0.005, and A would equal 0.995. This means that beneﬁts would grow at
0.5 percent less than the growth rate of average wages.
8. Japan decided not to follow the Swedish approach, which involves calculating the
turnover ratio, because in the context of the Japanese social security system it is
difﬁcult to calculate that measure. This difﬁculty arises because of the variety of
types of linked beneﬁts, including disability beneﬁts, provided by the Japanese
system.
9. The difference may also be explained in part by the differences in the underlying
models for calculating Social Security’s ﬁnancing: the CBO model calculates a
smaller long-term deﬁcit than the approach used by the Social Security Administration actuaries.
10. Once in payment, beneﬁts are indexed to prices.
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4
Raising the Early Retirement Age
Even if Social Security were not projected to have insufﬁcient funds
based on current life expectancy, continued increases in life expectancy
would cause an insufﬁciency to occur in the future. Therefore, a practical reform proposal to maintain Social Security’s solvency should
include an adjustment of Social Security for rising longevity.
Many policy options could deal with the effects of increasing life
expectancy on Social Security ﬁnancing.1 First, the normal retirement
age could be raised to a higher predetermined age. In the 1983 amendments to the Social Security Act, the normal retirement age was raised
from 65 to 67, and that change is being phased in with a long delay, only
taking full effect for people born in 1960 or later. The normal retirement age is also referred to as the full retirement age, but neither term
is descriptively accurate. It is the age at which a worker can receive
Social Security beneﬁts that are not reduced for early retirement. It varies from age 65 to 67, based on year of birth. For example, for workers
born between 1943 and 1954, the normal retirement age is 66. Liebman,
MacGuineas, and Samwick (2005) suggest that the normal retirement
age be raised to 68.
Second, the normal retirement age could be indexed to rise as the
life expectancy of retirees increases. The 1994–1996 Advisory Council
on Social Security included such a measure in its recommendations.2
Third, the normal retirement age could remain ﬁxed, with beneﬁts indexed to life expectancy, so that beneﬁts gradually decline as longevity
rises for successive cohorts, as recommended in Chapter 3. Fourth, the
early retirement age could be raised, with the beneﬁts currently receivable at age 62 being received at age 63. Other options include raising
the payroll tax rate, raising the payroll tax ceiling, adding general revenue funding, changing the beneﬁt formula, and changing the number
of years used in calculating Social Security beneﬁts.
While raising the early retirement age is not a popular idea, none
of the options for restoring solvency pass that test. For more than 40
years, Social Security’s early retirement age of 62 has been an impor-
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tant benchmark for workers considering retiring. Raising it to keep it in
line with increases in life expectancy could have a powerful effect on
the retirement decisions of workers and on all retirement program costs,
in both the public and private sectors. To allow workers ample time to
adjust their plans, if the eligibility age for Social Security were raised to
63, such a change would presumably occur with a long delay, possibly
20 years, and with a phase-in period.3
An early retirement age of 63 has international precedents. In Germany, for example, the early retirement age is 63, while in the United
Kingdom it is currently 65 for men, and is being raised over time to 65
for women. In Switzerland it is 65 for men and 63 for women. In New
Zealand and Ireland, it is 65 (Turner 2007).
In addition, historical precedent supports a higher early retirement
age. In 1940, when Social Security ﬁrst paid beneﬁts, the earliest age
at which workers could receive beneﬁts was even higher—age 65. For
more than 20 years, the earliest age at which men could receive Social
Security beneﬁts remained at 65. In 1961, the early retirement age for
men was reduced to 62. The reduction for women had occurred ﬁve
years earlier, in 1956.
Chapter 2 considered issues relating to whether older workers
would generally be able to extend their work lives if the early retirement age for Social Security were raised. Evidence presented in that
chapter indicates that life expectancy has increased for both men and
women, and for all major demographic groups in the United States. In
addition, the physical demands of work have decreased, though not for
everyone.
This chapter considers a possible policy change of raising the early
retirement age in Social Security from age 62 to 63 as one step toward dealing with increased longevity. Arguably, this change would be
superior to the alternative of workers receiving less in Social Security
beneﬁts in the future. Either this change could be done in an ad hoc way,
or it could be done through life-expectancy indexing, as discussed in
the previous chapter. This chapter surveys early eligibility ages and eligibility requirements for social security old-age beneﬁts in other OECD
countries, plus selected other countries with informative experience. A
focus of the chapter is on the attempts of various countries to provide
ﬂexible early eligibility requirements that are targeted to meet the needs
of groups with particular characteristics as to their work histories. At
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the end of the chapter, an alternative to raising the early retirement age
is considered, which is a ﬂexible full retirement age that varies by income level (Monk, Turner, and Zhivan 2010).

VIEWS ON RAISING THE EARLY RETIREMENT AGE
It is important to distinguish between changes in lifetime Social
Security beneﬁts and changes in annual beneﬁts. Changes in lifetime
beneﬁts affect the wealth value of Social Security and measures of its
money’s worth. Changes in annual beneﬁts more directly relate to measures of the adequacy of Social Security, such as the replacement rate.
These changes can be viewed from different perspectives.
No changes in the Social Security program, including no changes in
annual beneﬁts, would mean that lifetime beneﬁts would increase over
time because of the increase in life expectancy. This change occurs both
for high-income workers and low-income workers, because life expectancy has increased over time for both groups. Both annual beneﬁts and
lifetime beneﬁts could be maintained if the Social Security early retirement age were increased over time to offset the effect of increases in
life expectancy on lifetime beneﬁts. Such a change would not adversely
affect either high-income or low-income workers if it were done by
adjusting for the lesser improvement in life expectancy experienced by
low-income workers.
It is often argued that raising the early retirement age is adverse
to low-income workers. They have a shorter life expectancy than
high-income workers, and thus an increase in the early retirement age
constitutes a greater percentage decline in their years of retirement than
it does for high-income workers. This argument views the change at a
point in time, rather than in the broader framework that includes considering changes in life expectancy over time. Economists have generally
moved from point-in-time analyses of issues affecting workers to lifecycle analyses.
Under a life-cycle analysis, a worker is promised a pension beneﬁt
when the worker begins work—say, at age 22. When the worker retires
more than 40 years later, the value of the promised beneﬁt has increased
considerably for deﬁned beneﬁt plans because of the increase in life
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expectancy that has occurred over that period. Raising the early retirement age to take that increase in life expectancy into account would
not constitute a reduction in lifetime beneﬁts, but would merely offset
the increase in payment that was due to rising life expectancy over the
period.
Raising the early retirement age could be motivated by a desire to
reduce Social Security’s beneﬁt costs. Lifetime beneﬁts would effectively be cut if the reform resulted in age 62 beneﬁts being receivable at
age 63. For workers born in 1960 and later, those who retire at age 62
would receive an amount equal to 70 percent of their Primary Insurance
Amount (PIA), which is the unreduced value of Social Security beneﬁts
if they are received at the normal retirement age, which is 67 for these
workers. Those retiring at age 63 would receive 75 percent of their PIA.
Thus, workers retiring at age 62 would receive the same level of annual
beneﬁts but one fewer year of beneﬁts. Workers retiring at age 63 and
later would receive lower beneﬁts. For those retiring at 63, the beneﬁts
would be 9.3 percent lower (70/75).
However, another motivation for raising the early retirement age
might be to raise annual beneﬁt levels to offset other beneﬁt cuts. The
annual beneﬁts of persons taking retirement at age 62 could be raised
by raising the early retirement age to 63, with no reduction in annual
beneﬁts receivable at that age. In this case, workers formerly retiring
at age 62 would receive one fewer year of beneﬁts, but they would
gain from the postponement in beneﬁt receipt and consequently would
receive beneﬁts that were 7.1 percent higher (75/70). Those retiring at
age 63 or later would have no change in their beneﬁts.
Workers could voluntarily postpone the age at which they take
Social Security beneﬁts past age 62, and many do. Social Security is
roughly actuarially fair at age 62, so that for a person with life expectancy equal to the actuarially assumed life expectancy, expected lifetime
beneﬁts at age 62 are the same as at age 63 for a person delaying receipt
of beneﬁts. For a person who not only delayed receiving beneﬁts but
also continued working, generally their beneﬁts would be higher because of the continued work.
Since the option of postponing receipt of beneﬁts to age 63 is already available, the question arises as to why that option should be made
mandatory. First, because they have ﬁnancial myopia, some workers
opt to receive beneﬁts at age 62, not taking into account that they might
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be better off over the remainder of their lifetime by receiving higher
beneﬁts but at a later age. Second, the incentive to postpone retirement
built into the Social Security beneﬁt structure only operates for people
with relatively long life expectancy. For persons with life expectancy
shorter than average, their incentive in terms of maximizing lifetime
beneﬁts is to retire at age 62. Third, while some people are poor planners because of myopia, persons wishing to leave the labor force at age
62 still are free to do so, especially if they plan so that they ﬁnance their
retirement at that age through additional savings from other sources.

COMPARABLE EARLY RETIREMENT AGES WITH
INCREASES IN LIFE EXPECTANCY
With increases in life expectancy and improvements in health at
older ages, a case can be made that the early retirement age should also
increase. From a life-cycle perspective, rather than assuming a one-forone increase in retirement age with an increase in life expectancy, a rule
of thumb would be to maintain a constant proportion of life spent in
retirement. The life-cycle perspective would consider the balance between the years working (and saving for retirement) compared to the
years retired because of the focus on ﬁnancing retirement years with
working years.
Assuming that the number of years in retirement is roughly 20,
and that someone who has worked a full career has worked roughly 40
years, then the number of years in retirement is half the number of years
spent working. In that case, the early retirement age would be raised by
two-thirds of the increase in life expectancy to maintain a constant ratio
of retirement years to working years.
Table 4.1 shows the increases in life expectancy by race and gender since 1950 and 1960. It makes various calculations of what might
be considered a comparable early retirement age. At the high end, if
workers had the same number of years of life remaining in 2006 as they
did in 1950, when the early retirement age was 65, the early retirement
age could be raised to 67 and each race-gender group would still be
better off than the earlier generation by one year. Taking the life-cycle
perspective of maintaining the same ratio of retirement years to work-
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Table 4.1 Comparable Early Retirement Ages with an Increase in Life
Expectancy at Age 65, by Race and Sex, 1950–2006 (years)
White
White
Black
Black
Year
men
women
men
women
1950
12.8
15.1
12.9
14.9
1960
12.9
15.9
12.7
15.1
2006
17.1
19.8
15.1
18.6
Change in life expectancy
4.3
4.7
2.2
3.7
from 1950 (from 1960)
(4.2)
(3.9)
(2.4)
(3.5)
Comparable early retirement
69.3
69.7
67.2
68.7
age to 1950 (age 65) in
2003 in terms of number of
years in retirement
Comparable early retirement
66.2
65.9
64.4
65.5
age to 1961 (age 62) in
2003 in terms of number of
years in retirement
Comparable early retirement
64.8
64.6
63.6
64.3
age to 1961 (age 62) in 2003
assuming retirement years
are one-half of work years
SOURCE: National Center for Health Statistics (2009b) and author’s calculations.

ing years and comparing to 1961 (using data for 1960), when the early
retirement age was 62, the early retirement age could be raised to 63,
with each race-gender group being better off than the earlier generation.

FAIRNESS
Fairness is an important aspect of the issue of raising Social Security’s early retirement age. Would such a change be fair to demographic
groups with relatively short life expectancy, to people with physically
demanding jobs, or to people at older ages unable to work or to ﬁnd
work? The issue of fairness can be addressed in terms of either crosssectional equity or intergenerational equity. To examine cross-sectional
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equity, we compare workers at different income levels at a point in time.
However, because workers worked to older ages early in the history of
Social Security, the past becomes a natural point of comparison, which
is a comparison of intergenerational equity.
Munnell et al. (2004) note that raising the early retirement age without any associated cut in beneﬁts would result in greater lifetime Social
Security wealth (the expected present value of Social Security beneﬁts)
for long-lived demographic groups and less Social Security wealth
for short-lived groups. By this measure, such a policy is relatively advantageous to women and disadvantageous to blacks because of their
relatively longer and shorter life expectancies. This measure considers
equity across a generation.
Addressing the issue of cross-sectional equity, a simulation study
has examined the distributional effects on people of raising the Social Security early retirement age from 62 to 65 (Mermin and Steuerle
2006). That study ﬁnds that workers in all income quintiles would receive lower lifetime Social Security beneﬁts. However, workers in the
lowest income quintile are least affected as a group, in part because a
higher percentage of them receive Social Security disability beneﬁts. In
that simulation, it was assumed that the level of beneﬁts and age at ﬁrst
receipt for Social Security disability beneﬁts would not be affected by
raising the Social Security early retirement age.
Using intergenerational equity as a measure of fairness, different
demographic groups are compared to their counterparts in earlier generations. By the intergenerational method, all groups, including blacks
and women, are relatively better able to work at older ages, and would
still be able to spend a higher percentage of their adult life in retirement, if the early retirement age were raised. Thus, it can be argued
that raising the early retirement age would violate neither standards of
cross-sectional equity nor intergenerational equity.

AN ALTERNATIVE TO BENEFIT CUTS
If the projected future insolvency of Social Security is dealt with
through beneﬁt cuts, eventually the replacement rate provided at the
early retirement age would fall to where it would be viewed as un-
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acceptably low. The replacement rate provided by Social Security is
already not generous by international standards. With changes in law
that already have been legislated, average earners retiring at age 62 will
see their replacement rate fall from 30 percent today to 23 percent in
2030. These replacement rates are net of Medicare part B premiums,
but they do not include possible future beneﬁt cuts made to restore Social Security’s solvency (Munnell et al. 2004).
If beneﬁts were cut to restore solvency, a cut in beneﬁts for people
retiring at 62 could be offset by raising the early retirement age. More
than half of workers eligible to claim Social Security beneﬁts do so at
62, the early retirement age in Social Security (Panis et al. 2002).4 If
beneﬁts were cut by 7 percent but the early retirement age was raised
by one year, from 62 to 63, people retiring at age 63 instead of 62 would
receive roughly the same level of annual beneﬁts as before the cut,
thus helping to maintain Social Security’s ability to keep people out
of poverty and to provide a base level of retirement income. If people
worked the extra year, their annual beneﬁts would generally be higher
than before the beneﬁt cut because of their extra work and postponed
retirement.
Raising the early retirement age from 62 to 63 would raise the annual beneﬁts of those claiming before age 63 because of the actuarial
adjustment for postponed beneﬁt receipt. It could further raise their
beneﬁts if these claimants worked the additional year. People already
claiming Social Security beneﬁts at age 63 or later would be unaffected
by this change, since the beneﬁts receivable at age 63 and higher would
be unaffected. The effect on Social Security solvency of raising the
early retirement age would be negligible because on average, across the
population, raising this age does not affect the expected lifetime level of
beneﬁts. However, without changes in other programs targeted to help
vulnerable older workers, such a change might signiﬁcantly reduce the
level of lifetime beneﬁts for individuals who are forced to claim early
because of poor health or poor labor market opportunities (Zhivan et
al. 2008).
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INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE
The international experience across the OECD countries varies
considerably concerning age and eligibility requirements for early retirement under Social Security. Most U.S. workers are able to qualify
for beneﬁts at the early retirement age of 62, but for some countries,
eligibility requirements are designed to permit long-career workers—
who started work at relatively young ages and who also tend to be less
educated—to receive old-age beneﬁts at earlier ages than others. The
eligibility requirements are based on an attempt to permit people who
may be less able to continue work at older ages, but who do not qualify
for disability beneﬁts, to retire relatively early.
In the international context, pensionable age may be a preferable
term to early retirement age because for some countries the earliest age
is 65 or even higher. A pensionable age of 65 is becoming increasingly
common in OECD countries. In 1993, nearly half of the 23 OECD
countries (11) had a pensionable age of 65 or higher for men (Turner
2007). By 2035, three-ﬁfths of the countries (14) are scheduled to
have a pensionable age of 65 or higher, based on current legislation.
However, looking backwards, four-ﬁfths of the countries (19) had a
pensionable age of at least 65 in 1949. Thus, both historical precedent
and current legislation support the feasibility of a pensionable age of
65—three years higher than the U.S. age of 62.
In 2002, in about a third of the traditional OECD countries (7), the
pensionable age was lower for workers with 40 years of work than for
those with 30 years of work (Turner 2007). In a few countries (3), the
pensionable age was higher for workers with 10 years of work than for
those with 30 years of work; in addition, in a few countries (3), workers
were ineligible for old-age beneﬁts with only 10 years of work.
Related policies designed to encourage postponed work include
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•

raising the qualifying conditions for eligibility for beneﬁts at
the pensionable age,

•

reducing the level of beneﬁts available at the pensionable age,

•

raising the incentive for postponing retirement by increasing
the amount by which beneﬁts are raised with delayed retirement, and
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•

reducing the availability of alternative pathways to early
retirement.

Countries That Have Raised the Early Retirement Age
While many U.S. policy analysts consider it to be politically difﬁcult to raise the early retirement age for Social Security, since the early
1990s a number of countries have done so, motivated by the desire to
reduce budgetary outlays and encourage postponed retirement.
In describing the legislated changes, we give attention to aspects of
the timing of the increase—the length of the initial delay after the legislation was enacted until the ﬁrst increase, and the length of the phase-in
or transition period. The following examples identify selected countries
that have raised the pensionable age for both men and women.
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•

In 2002, Finland legislated changes that took effect in 2005.
The pensionable age in the social security earnings-related pension system was raised from 60 to 62, and the individual early
retirement pension, which had been available at age 58 to longservice workers, was abolished (OECD 2008).

•

Greece raised the pensionable age to 65 for both men and
women who began working after 1993 and who have had
short- or medium-length working careers. The current pensionable age, however, is 58 for men and women with long
careers (10,500 days, or approximately 40 years) and age 60
for men and women with 4,500 days (approximately 18 years)
of contributions.

•

Japan is raising the pensionable age for both its ﬂat rate social
security pension (National Pension) and its earnings-related
pension (Employees’ Pension Insurance Scheme). Legislation
Japan passed in 1995 raised the pensionable age for its ﬂat rate
pension by one year every three years; it will reach 65 in 2014.
For sailors and miners, because of the physical difﬁculty of
their work, the pensionable age for the ﬂat rate pension will not
reach 65 until 2030. Based on legislation passed in 2000, Japan
is raising the pensionable age for its earnings-related pension
(Employees’ Pension Insurance) by one year every three years
starting in 2013. With these changes, men born after 1960 and
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women born after 1965 have a pensionable age for both programs of 65.
•

New Zealand raised its pensionable age from 60 in 1991 to 65
in 2001. Those workers who turned 60 before March 31, 1992,
were eligible for a social security beneﬁt at age 60. The legislation passed August 1, 1991, and took effect the following April
1, when eligibility increased from age 60 to 61. Beginning July
1, 1993, eligibility rose by three months for each six-month period until April 1, 2001, when the pensionable age reached 65.
Thus, a ﬁve-year increase in the pensionable age was phased
in over nine years. A Transitional Retirement Beneﬁt was paid
over this period to those affected by the changes, and the age of
eligibility for this beneﬁt also rose, until it was phased out on
April 1, 2001.

Some OECD countries have had a long-standing pensionable age
of 65. In Australia, Austria, Germany, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom, the pensionable age for men has been 65 since at least 1949.
In Ireland, the social security retirement pension is available at age 65
for both men and women.
Countries That Have Restricted Qualifying Conditions
Some countries have increased the incentive for postponed retirement by raising the amount by which beneﬁts increase when a worker
delays retirement. The United States has done that for retirement postponed beyond the normal retirement age up to age 70. The United
States has also eliminated the earnings test for working Social Security
beneﬁciaries older than the normal retirement age (currently age 66).
Some countries, including the United States, have attempted to reduce
the effect of their social security pensionable age on retirement ages by
moving toward actuarial neutrality concerning the effect of postponed
retirement on the present value of social security beneﬁts. That change,
however, only makes Social Security neutral for people with roughly
the average life expectancy, but still leaves incentive effects for people
with signiﬁcantly longer or shorter life expectancies.
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Countries That Have Restricted the Availability of Pathways That
Facilitate a Relatively High Pensionable Age
Countries with a relatively high pensionable age usually establish
policies for people unable to work at older ages that provide alternative
pathways to retirement. The effective retirement age in countries with a
relatively high pensionable age is generally at least several years lower
than the pensionable age in social security, due in part to alternative exit
routes from the labor force. The easy availability of disability insurance
and unemployment insurance beneﬁts for older workers facilitates early
retirement in some countries, since these programs serve as de facto
early retirement programs. Because of alternative pathways to early retirement, in many countries the pensionable age has a limited effect on
retirement ages. However, that situation is changing as some countries
restrict the availability of alternative pathways to early retirement.
In Australia, a pensionable age of 65 is facilitated by having a
two-tiered mandatory old-age beneﬁt, with one tier having a lower pensionable age. The pensionable age for the means-tested old-age beneﬁt
(the age pension) is 65 for men and will rise to 65 for women by 2013.
Workers can receive the mandatory employer-provided beneﬁt at age
55; this is being raised to age 60.
A pensionable age of 65 or higher is facilitated as a social policy
in some countries, such as Germany, by having a lower pensionable
age for long-service workers. This policy allows workers who have had
long careers to retire early. This type of policy may help workers with
long years of work in physically demanding jobs. It often, however,
does not help women because they traditionally have interrupted their
work in the labor market to care for children, though some countries
give limited credit for child rearing.
Some countries offer government-provided early retirement beneﬁts through a separate program. In Denmark, workers can receive the
state-sponsored early retirement beneﬁt at age 60. In Iceland, workers can receive their mandatory occupational pension beneﬁts in their
two-tier system at age 62 (OECD 2008). Also, many older workers receive disability beneﬁts. In Norway, nearly all workers are covered by a
generous early retirement pension that provides beneﬁts at age 62. The
early retirement pension is considered to be a private sector pension,
but the government pays 40 percent of the cost.
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In the United Kingdom, workers who contract out of (withdraw
from) the social security beneﬁt can receive their contracted-out private
sector beneﬁt at a younger age, as speciﬁed by the rules for their plan,
than they could receive their state beneﬁt, or at age 60 if they contract
out using an individual account (personal pension).
In the Netherlands, the basic social security old-age pension is
available at age 65; however, the country’s early retirement program
(VUT), developed in the early 1980s, provides an alternative exit from
the workforce. With at least 10 years of uninterrupted employment, a
worker aged 60 can retire with a replacement rate of at least 80 percent. The government in 2003 announced plans to phase out this system
(Brooksbank 2003), and in 2004 legislation was passed ending the tax
subsidy for the VUT except for people aged 55 or older on January 1,
2005 (Rossingh 2004). It has also ended the tax deductibility of longterm sickness and early retirement pensions.
In addition, some countries have a lower pensionable age for workers in certain arduous occupations, such as mining and ﬁshing. Greece,
Japan, Portugal, and Spain are examples.

FLEXIBLE NORMAL RETIREMENT AGE
Increasing the normal retirement age in the United States while
holding the early retirement age ﬁxed could be effective in reducing
Social Security program costs, but eventually it will result in replacement rates that are viewed by many as too low. A possible policy to
maintain replacement rates is to raise the early retirement age. However, an increase in the early retirement age introduces possible unfairness because the variation in life expectancy across socioeconomic
groups is positively correlated with lifetime income. A ﬂexible normal
retirement age is an alternative policy that could preserve or even enhance the progressivity of Social Security beneﬁts. If life expectancy
were correlated with lifetime income, Social Security policy could use
the AIME (Average Indexed Monthly Earnings) to target policies that
are more equitable for people with both lower lifetime income and
lower life expectancy. However, while life expectancy is strongly correlated with AIME for men, it is only weakly correlated for women, and

Turner 2011.indb 83

5/17/2011 9:53:52 AM

84 Turner

when pooling the genders the correlation disappears (Monk, Turner,
and Zhivan 2010). Alternatively, targeting could be done by the “max
AIME,” which is the AIME for single persons and the maximum of
the husband’s or wife’s AIME for married couples. Monk, Turner, and
Zhivan ﬁnd that the max AIME, which is a household measure of
lifetime income, could be used for constructing a ﬂexible normal retirement age because it is negatively correlated with mortality risk and also
negatively correlated with other measures of economic vulnerability or
inability to work at older ages. With a ﬂexible normal retirement age,
individuals in households with a low max AIME would have a lower
normal retirement age than other individuals.

RAISING THE MAXIMUM AGE FOR ACTUARIAL
ADJUSTMENT OF BENEFITS
If the early retirement age is raised, the same arguments justifying
that change should also lead to an increase in the maximum age for
actuarial increases in beneﬁts. This change would beneﬁt people who
continue working into older ages, but also would encourage people to
do so. Currently, the Social Security Administration adjusts beneﬁts for
postponement of receipt up to age 70 in the United States. If the early
retirement age is increased to age 63, the maximum age for actuarial
adjustment should be raised in tandem to 71.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
This book recommends that the early retirement age in Social Security be raised to age 63, with that change being phased in starting in 15
years, and that thereafter it be periodically adjusted to take into account
continuing improvements in life expectancy. The initial change would
occur at the rate of 2 months every other year, so that for persons aged
47 the new early retirement age would be 62 years and 2 months; for
persons aged 45, it would be 62 years and 4 months; and so on.
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If this change were done to help restore solvency, the beneﬁts
receivable at the new early retirement age would be the same as those
currently receivable at age 62. This change would both encourage
postponed retirement and address Social Security’s ﬁnancing. Alternatively, if this change were done in conjunction with the recommended
life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts, proposed in Chapter Three, the
beneﬁts receivable at age 63 would be the same as those receivable at
63 before the increase in the early retirement age.
If Congress raises the early retirement age, then the same arguments justifying that change should also lead it to raise the maximum
age for actuarial increases in beneﬁts. Currently, beneﬁts are adjusted
for postponement of receipt up to age 70. If Congress should raise the
early retirement age to 63, then it should also increase the maximum
age for actuarial adjustment to 71.
Notes
1. See Social Security Advisory Board (2005) for a discussion of various additional
options. In addition, see Turner (2009) for an international comparison of
longevity-related reforms to social security systems.
2. The Advisory Council’s report is available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/
adcouncil/report/toc.htm (accessed January 5, 2011). The American Academy of
Actuaries also advocates indexing the normal retirement age to longevity.
3. See Turner (2007) for international experience with such a policy.
4. This is also referred to by different authors as the early entitlement age, the early
eligibility age, and the pensionable age.
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Longevity Insurance Beneﬁts
With increased longevity, retirees face an increased risk of having insufﬁcient resources to maintain their standard of living at older
ages. While Social Security provides a guaranteed lifetime beneﬁt, that
beneﬁt is insufﬁcient for most retirees to maintain their preretirement
standard of living. Thus, most people need to supplement their Social
Security beneﬁts with other sources of income. While the causes of
old-age poverty are complex, one factor is that as people grow older,
especially if they live longer than they expected to, they risk exhausting their sources of income other than Social Security. People in their
eighties with low Social Security beneﬁts are particularly economically
vulnerable. Few are able to compensate for a loss of non–Social Security income by working. People in this age group, often called the
old-old, may not have sufﬁcient resources to enjoy the last years of their
lives without ﬁnancial worries.
This chapter proposes a new type of Social Security beneﬁt, called
longevity insurance, which may be particularly useful for this vulnerable group. This proposed beneﬁt strengthens social insurance for people
in their eighties and older by adding longevity insurance to the social
insurance protection Social Security provides. Longevity insurance is
a deferred annuity that starts at an advanced age. Much of the utility
value to workers of annuitization is provided by this beneﬁt because
the annuity value comes from insuring against the possibility of running resources down to a very low level if one lives to be older than
expected (Brown 2001). The beneﬁt would be supplied through Social
Security and would be universally available, but with eligibility based
on a beneﬁts test, so that only people with low Social Security beneﬁts
would receive it.
The longevity insurance beneﬁt proposed here is an enhanced
Social Security beneﬁt starting at age 82, which is roughly the life expectancy of someone retiring at age 62. Qualifying persons receiving a
Social Security beneﬁt below a minimum level would have their beneﬁt
raised at that age.
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Longevity insurance can be an important component of a policy
package to restore Social Security solvency. Public policy changes to
restore solvency likely will reduce the generosity of Social Security
old-age beneﬁts as part of a package of changes. Most reform packages that cut beneﬁts would raise elderly poverty. To offset that effect,
policymakers may want to increase the generosity of some beneﬁts to
better target beneﬁts to vulnerable groups. That goal could be achieved
by providing longevity insurance beneﬁts. This insurance shifts Social
Security resources toward persons who both are old and have low incomes, and thus provides better targeting of limited resources in terms
of the protection provided to vulnerable persons.

AN INCREASING RISK OF POVERTY WITH ADVANCING AGE
Poverty rates among older persons increase with age. Elderly poverty is especially high among people aged 80 and older—a third higher
than for people aged 65–69 (Whitman and Purcell 2006). Poverty is
particularly a problem for older women (Smith 2003). Women aged 80
and older had a poverty rate of 14 percent in 2004, and 25 percent had
income below 125 percent of the poverty line, compared to 10 percent
and 13 percent for women aged 55 to 61 (Social Security Administration 2006). A reason for the increase in poverty at older ages is a decline
in the importance of non–Social Security sources of retirement income
at older ages.
Ofﬁcial poverty statistics understate the problem of poverty in this
age group because they no longer represent the minimum needs of older
persons. They are based on a methodology established in 1964. For
that reason, 125 percent of poverty is often used as a better measure
of persons with insufﬁcient resources (Butrica and Zedlewski 2008).
However, even that ﬁgure understates the percentage of older women
who have fallen into poverty. If no one fell into poverty as they aged,
poverty rates would decline at older ages because of the greater mortality risk of low-income persons as compared to high-income persons.
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Risks Leading to Poverty in Old Age
People over the age of 80 are at risk of falling into poverty even if
they have not been poor earlier in life. Also, they have greater difﬁculty
leaving poverty than people at younger ages (Lee and Shaw 2008). The
problem of poverty at advanced ages may be growing over time because while the bankruptcy rate for persons under age 55 fell during the
period from 1991 to 2007, it more than quadrupled for people aged 75
to 84 (Sedensky 2008).
Except for Social Security, most people do not receive retirement
income in the form of a price-indexed annuity. Partially for that reason,
people who were not already in poverty can fall into poverty at older
ages. This may particularly be a problem during periods of increasing
longevity, if people underestimate how long they will live and they fail
to plan adequately for a longer retirement.
The MetLife Retirement Income IQ Study (MetLife Mature Market
Institute 2008) provides evidence as to errors in retirement planning
that make a longevity insurance beneﬁt desirable. It ﬁnds that nearly
70 percent of preretirees overestimate how much they can withdraw
from their savings and assure that their savings will last. More than 40
percent indicate that they think they can withdraw 10 percent of their
savings each year while preserving their principal, while 14 percent
believe they can draw down 15 percent per year while maintaining their
principal. Almost half estimate that they will need 50 percent or less of
their preretirement income to maintain their consumption in retirement,
while ﬁnancial planners tend to put the ﬁgure in the range of 70 to 80
percent, depending on family circumstances, such as number of children. Six in ten underestimate their chances of living beyond average
life expectancy.
While the causes of old-age poverty are complex, in part because
of these problems in planning for retirement income at older ages, a
leading cause is that a higher percentage of people at advanced older
ages depend on Social Security for most or all of their income than do
people in their sixties and early seventies. For households aged 75 and
older, 40 percent depend on Social Security for 90 percent or more of
their income, compared to 27 percent of people aged 65 to 74 (Social
Security Administration 2006).
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LONGEVITY INSURANCE
Longevity insurance is a special type of annuity. Annuities are
ﬁnancial instruments that pay a stream of beneﬁts over time. A life annuity pays ﬁxed nominal beneﬁts periodically until death. Annuities can
be purchased privately or through pension plans. Social Security beneﬁts are also an annuity. Workers can purchase an immediate annuity
at retirement, or they can purchase a deferred annuity for receipt at a
later age.
Longevity insurance is a deferred annuity that starts at an advanced
age, such as 82. It is less commonly called an advanced life deferred
annuity. While all annuities provide a degree of longevity insurance, in
recent years that term has been used to refer to a deferred annuity starting payment at an advanced age. Adding longevity insurance to Social
Security would address the problem of people falling into poverty at
advanced ages, and it would provide cost-effective social insurance.
This insurance protection is similar to buying car or home insurance with a large deductible, which optimally deals with catastrophic
risk. Longevity insurance provides insurance against outliving one’s
assets, but only when that risk becomes substantial at advanced ages
(Milevsky 2005). Making assumptions about risk aversion (a coefﬁcient
of risk aversion of ﬁve), one study calculates that a longevity insurance
annuity beginning at age 85 provides 62 percent of the longevity insurance of an annuity beginning at age 60 (Webb, Gong, and Sun 2007). In
actual practice, a longevity insurance annuity would probably be sold at
more of an actuarially unfair price than a regular annuity because of the
greater presumption of longer-than-average life expectancy.
The life cycle theory suggests that rational planners may not save
for a level of consumption at advanced ages that is equivalent to the
consumption at earlier ages because of the low probability of being
alive at advanced ages. A longevity insurance annuity allows a person,
at low cost relative to the beneﬁt received, to obtain an annuity that
only pays beneﬁts at advanced ages (Webb, Gong, and Sun 2007). An
advantage of this type of annuity for life cycle planning is that workers
may be able to consume more of their nonannuitized resources in their
sixties and seventies, knowing that they have longevity insurance that
protects them if they live longer than their life expectancy.
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Annuity beneﬁts can conceptually be divided into two components:
old-age beneﬁts and longevity insurance beneﬁts. Longevity insurance
beneﬁts are a hedge against life expectancy risk. Increases in life expectancy at retirement age raise the need for longevity insurance. The
longer the retirement period, the greater the risk that retirees will outlive their resources and fall into poverty.
The Social Security beneﬁts paid at age 62 are primarily old-age
beneﬁts. This type of beneﬁt provides little longevity insurance at that
age. As life expectancy at age 62 has increased, the proportion of Social Security beneﬁts that serve the function of longevity insurance has
decreased. By comparison, beneﬁts paid starting at age 82 have a high
component of longevity insurance.
This Proposal
The longevity insurance beneﬁt that I am proposing here is a delayed annuity in the form of a minimum Social Security beneﬁt, which
would be paid starting at age 82. That age would increase in the future
as longevity increases. Age 82 is chosen because it is approximately
the average life expectancy at age 65 (CDC 2007). Longevity insurance is primarily a beneﬁt for women, since women outnumber men by
roughly two to one in this age group (Smith 2003).
The longevity insurance would be a price-indexed annuity, just like
current Social Security beneﬁts. Thus, the deferred aspect of the annuity would not disadvantage recipients because there would be no loss of
buying power from the annuity.
Recognizing this enhanced insurance protection, Social Security
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) would be renamed Social
Security Old-Age, Survivors, and Longevity Insurance (OASLI). The
renaming would help inform people about the beneﬁt: it would positively frame the beneﬁt as a form of insurance, rather than the beneﬁt
being thought of as an antipoverty beneﬁt.
In addition to serving as insurance against outliving one’s resources
in advanced old age, longevity insurance can simplify the problem retirees face of planning asset decumulation. Many retirees have difﬁculty
managing the spend-down of their assets over a retirement period of uncertain length, in part because of the inherent difﬁculty in planning for a
long and uncertain period. The prevalence of this problem will increase
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in the future as people live longer and as an increasing percentage of
retirees have 401(k) plans, which generally do not provide annuities.
With a longevity insurance beneﬁt, that planning problem is simpliﬁed.
Instead of planning for an uncertain period, retirees can plan for the
ﬁxed period from the date of their retirement to the date at which they
start receiving the longevity insurance beneﬁt.
As well as assisting in planning, longevity insurance may help
people who at advanced ages have difﬁculty managing their ﬁnances.
At advanced ages, people are increasingly likely to need assistance in
managing their ﬁnances because of declining mental ability and declining health. With longevity insurance, retirees have nothing to manage
concerning the receipt of the beneﬁts because the beneﬁts are handled
automatically by Social Security, generally with automatic deposit to
their checking account. They have no checks to cash or investments to
manage.
Webb, Gong, and Sun (2007) estimate that with longevity insurance provided at an advanced age, a substantial share of the longevity
insurance provided by an immediate annuity can be obtained. A deferred annuity starting at age 85 provides more than half the longevity
insurance of an annuity starting at age 65 (between 56 and 62 percent,
depending on the degree of risk aversion in their examples), and at a
fraction of the cost—roughly 15 percent. The authors calculate that
a household planning to smooth consumption through its retirement
would need to allocate only 15 percent of its age-60 wealth to a deferred
annuity with payments starting at age 85. The remainder of its wealth it
would hold in nonannuitized form to ﬁnance consumption from age 60
to 85. Much of the utility value to workers of annuitization comes from
insuring against the possibility of running resources down to a very low
level if one lives to be older than expected (Brown 2001).
Part of a Larger Reform
Longevity insurance can be an important component of a reform to
restore Social Security solvency. Reform likely will reduce the generosity of Social Security old-age beneﬁts. Most reform packages that cut
beneﬁts across the board would raise elderly poverty (see, for example,
Sarney [2008]). Thus, there would be a need to increase the generosity
of some beneﬁts to provide better targeting to vulnerable populations.
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That goal could be achieved by providing longevity insurance beneﬁts.
For low-income persons, the effects of beneﬁt cuts later in life when
they are least able to work would be moderated.
This policy shifts Social Security resources toward persons who
both are old and have low incomes. When this policy is enacted within a
ﬁxed budget constraint, without enhanced ﬁnancing for Social Security,
it would involve a transfer of resources from people who are young and
relatively well-off to people who are old and relatively poor.
Beneﬁt Payment Structures
Longevity insurance beneﬁts can be structured in different ways,
at different costs, and with different goals being served. Beneﬁts can
be universal or they can be targeted. Universal beneﬁts provide longevity insurance without regard for need. Targeted beneﬁts take into
account need. Because they are targeted, they can be provided at lower
total cost. Within those two categories for beneﬁt eligibility, beneﬁts
can be based on Social Security beneﬁt levels, years of contributions
to Social Security, or age, or they can be ﬂat beneﬁts, being the same
amount for everyone who qualiﬁes. For example, if the beneﬁt is universal, everyone aged 82 and older could receive the same ﬂat amount.
Alternatively, everyone aged 82 could receive the same amount, but
the amount would increase slightly more than the rate of inﬂation for
subsequent years, so that it increases in real value at older ages. If the
beneﬁt is targeted, it could be based on the recipient having worked a
minimum number of years, with the amount increasing based on the
number of years worked. While these options would provide longevity
insurance in different ways, the next section proposes a targeted option.
A Speciﬁc, Targeted Option
The level of beneﬁts provided by longevity insurance proposed
here would be based on quarters of contributions to Social Security. A
minimum of 20 years (80 quarters) of contributions would be required.
At that level, a beneﬁt of 70 percent of the poverty level for a single
or married person, depending on the Social Security beneﬁt received,
would be provided. For each additional four quarters, the beneﬁt would
increase by 1.5 percent, so that someone who had worked 40 years (160
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quarters) would receive a beneﬁt equal to 100 percent of the poverty
level. There would be no maximum number of quarters, so that someone who had worked 45 years would receive a beneﬁt at 107.5 percent
of the poverty level (Table 5.1).
This beneﬁt formula, by taking into account quarters of coverage,
supports the principle that Social Security rewards work. Persons with
more years of work who qualiﬁed for a longevity insurance beneﬁt
would receive a higher beneﬁt. It also establishes the principle that a
poor person who has worked at least 40 years is guaranteed at least
a poverty-level beneﬁt in advanced old age. Thus, a poor person who
has worked for many years and has contributed to Social Security is
guaranteed a minimum level of income, and the dignity associated with
that, in advanced old age. However, a factor that may possibly reduce
the effectiveness of this beneﬁt is that people with low lifetime earnings
tend to have more years of zero earnings than people with higher lifetime earnings. People in the lowest quintile of family lifetime earnings
have on average 9.1 years of zero earnings, compared to 2.4 years in the
second-lowest quintile (Sarney 2008).
Social Security currently treats divorced spouses as though they
had the cost saving advantages of economies of scale inherent in living
with another person. They receive the same beneﬁt as do spouses. The
longevity insurance beneﬁt would help divorced spouses whose former
spouses were still living.
The beneﬁt eligibility conditions set out here exclude people who
receive low beneﬁts for reasons other than a full career with low earnings. First, recipients receiving a low beneﬁt who have fewer than 80
quarters of covered earnings would be excluded. Second, recipients
Table 5.1 Relationship between Number of Years of Covered Work and
Beneﬁt Level for the Longevity Insurance Beneﬁt
Beneﬁt as a percentage of
Number of years (quarters) of covered work
the poverty level
20 (80)
70.0
30 (120)
85.0
40 (160)
100.0
45 (180)
107.5
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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receiving beneﬁts from pension plans in noncovered employment in
federal, state, or local government would generally be excluded because they would have insufﬁcient quarters of coverage. Thus, people
would be excluded who were affected either by the Government Pension Offset, which reduces the spouse’s beneﬁt for spouses who have
a government pension and were not covered by Social Security, or by
the Windfall Elimination Provision, which reduces the Social Security
beneﬁt for persons who have a government pension and were in a job
that was not covered by Social Security (and thus they did not pay Social Security taxes).
Social Security has provided a minimum beneﬁt in the past, but not
a longevity insurance beneﬁt. The minimum beneﬁt was available to
workers taking Social Security beneﬁts at the early retirement age or
any later age. Because it was not well-targeted to low-income workers
with long careers of covered employment, it was eliminated for beneﬁciaries who became entitled in 1982 or later. A more targeted minimum
beneﬁt was created in 1972 and still exists, but is being phased out.
Diamond and Orszag (2004) have proposed a new minimum beneﬁt,
available at the early retirement age, that has some features similar to
the longevity insurance beneﬁt proposed here. Their minimum beneﬁt
would require at least 20 years of covered work and would increase in
value for each additional year of covered work, reaching 100 percent of
the poverty threshold for workers with 35 years of covered work.
The longevity insurance beneﬁt would improve the progressivity
of Social Security by shifting resources toward a subset of low-income
persons. It also provides insurance against negative shocks, which
cause some people to have low Social Security beneﬁts.
Longevity insurance provided automatically to a broad group of
people years in the future avoids the problem of adverse selection in
insurance markets. When longevity insurance is purchased privately,
presumably only people with long life expectancy would purchase it,
which would drive up its price because of adverse selection.
While a pure longevity insurance beneﬁt would provide beneﬁts
to everyone reaching the target age, the targeted longevity insurance
beneﬁt proposed here also insures against low beneﬁts in old age because it is a beneﬁts-tested beneﬁt. However, it does not consider all
the resources available to older persons, but only their Social Security
beneﬁts. The advantage of this approach is that payment would be auto-
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matic, without requiring the recipient to apply for it. Thus, there would
not be the problem of having a low take-up rate among the targeted
population.
Low take-up is a problem with some beneﬁts for older persons.
An estimated 40 percent of the elderly who are eligible for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) beneﬁts do not apply for them (Hoskins
2008). Declining cognitive ability may contribute to a low take-up rate
at advanced older ages. For this reason SSI is not a good substitute for
longevity insurance beneﬁts. Longevity insurance would help make up
for the shortcomings of SSI, and could replace it for the target group.
Furthermore, it would not be stigmatized, given that the beneﬁt would
be described as a form of insurance, rather than as an antipoverty beneﬁt. It would not be as targeted a beneﬁt as it would if all resources were
considered as a qualifying condition, but that type of administrative
process is both expensive and intrusive.
Cost Estimate
This section presents a rough cost estimate for the proposed beneﬁt.
In 2004, there were 7.3 million persons aged 80 and older receiving
Social Security beneﬁts (Social Security Administration 2006). The
poverty threshold for a single person aged 65 or older in 2004 was
$9,060 (U.S. Census Bureau 2010). Roughly 24 percent of Social Security beneﬁciaries aged 80 or older had annual beneﬁts of less than the
poverty threshold, while roughly 11 percent had annual beneﬁts at less
than 70 percent of the poverty threshold (based on interpolation, Table
5.2). Thus, roughly 1.75 million were below the poverty line.
Somewhat dated data (for 1993) indicate that of the retired Social
Security beneﬁciaries living in poverty, 42 percent had worked between
21 and 40 years and 10 percent had worked for 41 or more years
(Diamond and Orszag 2004; Olsen and Hoffmeyer 2002). More recent
data for beneﬁt recipients in 2004 indicate that fewer than 20 percent
of recipients have less than 20 years of covered earnings (Pfau 2008).
Thus, if 80 percent of the target population aged 82 and older had at
least 20 years of service, that population in 2004 would be less than 1.4
million. For the cost calculations, we assume there would be approximately 1.4 million eligible persons.

Turner 2011.indb 96

5/17/2011 9:53:54 AM

Longevity Insurance Beneﬁts 97

Table 5.2 Social Security Beneﬁt Recipients with Low Annual Beneﬁts,
2004
Annual Social
Cumulative Cumulative percentage
Security beneﬁt
Percentage of
percentage of
of recipients below
level ($)
recipients
recipients
the poverty line
1–999
0.6
0.6
2.5
1,000–1,999
0.6
1.2
5.0
2,000–2,999
0.8
2.0
8.3
3,000–3,999
1.2
3.2
13.3
4,000–4,999
2.3
5.5
22.9
5,000–5,999
3.5
9.0
37.5
6,000–6,999
4.5
13.5
56.3
7,000–7,999
5.6
19.1
80.0
8,000–8,999
4.8
23.9
100.0
9,000–9,999
7.4
31.3
NOTE: Blank = not applicable.
SOURCE: Social Security Administration (2006).

The level of the longevity insurance beneﬁt received depends on
the level of the person’s Social Security OASI beneﬁt and the number of years the person or the person’s spouse (in the case of survivor
beneﬁts) had worked. The data in Table 5.2 suggest that the average
beneﬁts would be less than $3,000 a year. If these people each received
a supplemental beneﬁt that averaged $3,000 a year, the cost would be
approximately $4.2 billion a year. This ﬁgure is rough, but it indicates
approximate cost. For perspective, consider that the annual cost of this
beneﬁt would be less than half of the monthly cost of the Iraq war in
2009.
The choice of a level of beneﬁts involves tradeoffs between budgetary considerations if there are more generous beneﬁts and social
welfare considerations if there are less generous beneﬁts. Setting a beneﬁt at less than the poverty line for workers with less than a full career
of work represents the thinking that Social Security is not intended to
be the sole source of income for older persons, even though statistics
indicate that it is for many older persons. Basing the level of beneﬁts
on the current poverty line recognizes the reality that that amount is the
poverty measure used in the United States, ﬂawed though it may be. If
in future years the United States adopts a new poverty standard, at that
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time policymakers might want to consider using that standard for setting the level of the longevity insurance beneﬁt.
Who Else Would Be Affected?
The children of people in their eighties would be affected because
they would have less ﬁnancial responsibility for low-income parents.
Provision of longevity insurance may affect family relationships. It
may empower the poor elderly and raise their social standing within the
household and within their families.
Because this beneﬁt provides a form of insurance, it affects potential beneﬁciaries as well as actual beneﬁciaries. Thus, it provides
insurance to a person with low Social Security beneﬁts even if that person or the person’s spouse does not survive to receive the beneﬁt. While
the probability that a single person would survive to receive the beneﬁt
is roughly 50 percent, the probability is higher that at least one person
in a couple would survive to receive it.
In a broader philosophical sense, the insurance would beneﬁt all
Americans. While a person aged 50 with a career of high earnings
would probably never directly beneﬁt from the insurance, that person
could have been born into a family with less advantaged circumstances,
or they could have suffered from serious health problems, and their
situation at age 50 could have been much different.
A possible unintended consequence is that guaranteed minimum
beneﬁts reduce the incentive to save for people who anticipate that they
may qualify for those beneﬁts. Since the qualifying condition is the
level of Social Security beneﬁts at age 82, the unintended consequence
of people taking steps to qualify would be expected to be minimal. For
example, a person could retire at age 62 rather than age 65, possibly
qualifying himself for the higher beneﬁt at age 82, but at the cost of
lower beneﬁts for 20 years. It is thus unlikely that longevity insurance
would reduce labor supply at older ages.
Raising the level of Social Security beneﬁts could have the consequence that some people no longer would be eligible for food stamps,
Medicaid, housing allowances, and other programs for low-income
older persons.
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A possible unintended consequence is that picking the age of 82
would be unfair to African Americans because of their shorter life expectancy. However, at older ages the difference in life expectancy is less
than at younger ages, and at age 65 the difference for white and African
American women is less than two years. Furthermore, at age 65, the difference in life expectancy between males and females is greater than the
difference between African Americans and whites (CDC 2007).
Another possible unintended consequence is that governmentprovided longevity insurance would displace privately provided
longevity insurance offered by insurance companies. This outcome appears unlikely given that few companies offer the annuity and that not
many people purchase annuities—in particular not many of the target
population.
Provision of longevity insurance by the government for Social Security beneﬁciaries with low beneﬁts could stimulate demand among
higher-income retirees for private longevity insurance. The example set
by the government could serve as an endorsement that would encourage
higher-income persons to consider obtaining such insurance through
their 401(k) plans or purchased privately.
Political support tends to be greater for social insurance than for
public assistance, perhaps because of the broader base of people it
helps. For that reason, political support for adequate beneﬁts through
longevity insurance may be greater than for Supplemental Security Income or for a minimum beneﬁt framed as an antipoverty beneﬁt.

LONGEVITY INSURANCE IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
AND INTERNATIONALLY
Most U.S. life insurance companies do not provide longevity insurance annuities. These annuities are only available from a small number
of insurance companies (Iwry and Turner 2008). Longevity insurance
has been available since about 2005. It is offered by MetLife, Hartford,
and New York Life Insurance Company. If a 65-year-old man invested
$100,000 with MetLife’s Longevity Income Guarantee annuity (the
maximum beneﬁt without death beneﬁt), he would receive $83,000 a
year starting at age 85. Inﬂation protection and a return-of-premium
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guarantee can increase the premium by as much as 50 percent (Greene
2008).
U.S. pension plan tax qualiﬁcation rules make it difﬁcult for 401(k)
participants to purchase longevity insurance. The problem arises with
the requirement that minimum distributions from a 401(k) plan start by
April 1 of the year following the year the person turns age 70½. This
requirement prevents a person from using the entire account balance, or
a substantial part of it, to purchase an annuity starting at age 80 or 85.
Changes in these minimum required distribution rules should be considered to encourage the purchase of longevity insurance.
A further problem with private sector provision of these beneﬁts is
the long delay between the purchase and the ﬁrst receipt, which raises
the risk that the insurance company might go bankrupt. While insurance companies are backed by state guarantee funds, these funds are
inadequate to deal with the bankruptcy of a major insurance company,
such as AIG.
Old-age beneﬁts starting at advanced old ages are provided in a few
countries. The United Kingdom provides a small old age allowance to
persons aged 80 and older. Ireland pays a beneﬁt of about $800 a year
at age 80, called the Age 80 Allowance. That beneﬁt is automatically
received by persons receiving Irish social security pensions once they
turn 80. Italy has a special supplement for low-income persons aged
75 and older (European Commission 2001). The Riester pensions in
Germany are voluntary deﬁned contribution plans that were enabled by
a reform that took effect in 2002. They require that at retirement the participant purchase a longevity insurance annuity that begins payment at
age 85 (Börsch-Supan and Wilke 2005). Singapore is considering adding such a requirement to its mandatory deﬁned contribution system.

CONCLUSIONS
With increased longevity, older retirees face an increased risk of
ending life with insufﬁcient resources to maintain their standard of living. In the United States, people with low Social Security beneﬁts who
are in their eighties are a particularly vulnerable group. At that age, few
are able to compensate for their low beneﬁts by working. As a matter of
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national policy, it is desirable that people in this age group, often called
the old-old, be able to live with sufﬁcient resources that they are able to
enjoy the last years of their lives with dignity.
The target population for the proposal discussed here is people aged
82 or older with low Social Security beneﬁts and long work histories.
Age 82 is chosen because it is approximately the average life expectancy at age 65. Elderly poverty is particularly high among this age
group—a third higher than for people aged 65–69. People in this age
group are particularly at risk of falling into poverty even if they have
not been in poverty earlier in life. They also have greater difﬁculty leaving poverty than people at younger ages.
Longevity insurance can be an important component of a policy
package to restore Social Security solvency. Public policy changes
likely will reduce the generosity of Social Security old-age beneﬁts to
restore solvency. If general beneﬁt reductions, such as through longevity indexing of beneﬁts as of retirement age, are combined with a new
longevity insurance beneﬁt, it may be possible to retain much of the
longevity insurance that Social Security provides for low-income persons. For these persons, the effects of beneﬁt cuts later in life, when
such persons are least able to work, would be moderated. This policy
shifts Social Security resources toward persons who both are old and
have low incomes. It involves a transfer of resources from people who
are relatively young and well-off to people who are old and have low
incomes.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter recommends that a new type of Social Security beneﬁt
be provided, called longevity insurance. Longevity insurance would be
a type of social insurance providing beneﬁts to qualifying persons at an
advanced age—initially set at age 82, but periodically increased to take
into account future increases in life expectancy As retirees age, they
face an increased risk of poverty as they spend down their non–Social
Security assets. A longevity insurance beneﬁt would be paid by Social
Security starting at age 82 for people with at least 20 years of covered
earnings and receiving Social Security beneﬁts below a ﬁxed level.
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Payment would not require an application or a means test; it would
occur automatically. This would be a targeted, cost-effective way of addressing poverty at advanced old age. It could be included in a reform
package to restore Social Security solvency that contained beneﬁt cuts,
so that it would prevent beneﬁt cuts from increasing poverty rates at
advanced older ages.
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6
Deﬁned Contribution Plans
Encouraging Annuitization
Retirees risk outliving their assets. While Social Security provides
a guaranteed lifetime beneﬁt, it does not provide enough income for
most retirees to maintain their preretirement standard of living. Accordingly, individuals who reach retirement with a 401(k) plan and without
a traditional deﬁned beneﬁt plan generally need to convert at least part
of their account balance to a ﬂow of income to pay for their retirement consumption. Relatively few, however, actually do that. Only 10
percent of individuals with deﬁned contribution plans annuitized their
account balances when terminating employment at ages 60 to 64 and
ages 65 to 69 (Gale and Dworsky 2006).
Deﬁned contribution plans can pay old-age beneﬁts in any, or a
combination, of ﬁve basic ways: 1) a lump sum, 2) a life annuity, 3) a
phased withdrawal (based on annual recalculation of life expectancy),
4) installment (term-certain) payments, or 5) ad hoc withdrawals. An
annuity is a ﬁnancial instrument that converts an account balance into a
stream of periodic payments. With life annuities, workers receive periodic payments that continue until death. Life annuities, referred to here
simply as annuities, insure workers against running out of money if
they live longer than expected.
The U.S. pension system has shifted dramatically over the past 20
years from deﬁned beneﬁt plans to deﬁned contribution plans, primarily 401(k) plans. While deﬁned beneﬁt plans traditionally provided
beneﬁts as annuities, most 401(k) plans do not provide that option. Historical data indicates that traditionally deﬁned contribution plans have
generally not provided annuities. For example, in 1985, only 29 percent
of full-time participants in retirement savings and thrift plans had annuities as a payout option (Mitchell 1992). Deﬁned contribution plans
accrue beneﬁts in the form of an account balance and typically pay
beneﬁts as a lump sum. Money purchase plans are required to provide
the option of a joint and survivors annuity, but few participants choose
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that option (Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Beneﬁt Plans 2005b). While 401(k) plans are permitted to make a joint
and survivor beneﬁt the normal form of beneﬁt payment, relatively few
do. In 2000, 33 percent of deﬁned contribution plans offered annuities
(Blostin 2003).
This chapter considers changes in policy and changes in features of
annuities to expand the extent to which 401(k) plans offer annuities and
participants choose them. It makes a distinction between two types of
401(k) plans. For 401(k) plans that are sole or primary plans, it recommends further requirements so that they will function as pension plans
rather than as savings plans. For 401(k) plans that are secondary plans,
it does not recommend any changes.
To summarize the chapter in broad generalities, four approaches
can be used to increase the annuitization of 401(k) plans: 1) changes in
public policy (laws and regulations), 2) changes in annuity products, 3)
changes in marketing of annuities, and 4) changes in the advice people
receive when planning for retirement.

POLICIES ENCOURAGING WORKERS TO ANNUITIZE
Because of the insurance against outliving one’s assets that annuities provide, many public policy analysts support public policy to
encourage annuitization. This section considers policy options for encouraging workers to annuitize their 401(k) account balances.
Mandatory versus Voluntary Annuitization
Mandatory annuitization is the only policy that assures that everyone obtains an annuity from their 401(k) account balance. Because
trivial beneﬁt payments would result, mandatory annuitization generally excludes small account balances. Mandatory annuitization need not
require that full annuitization of the account balance occur at retirement.
Some degree of mandatory annuitization, such as partial annuitization
or annuitization at an older age, would help assure that workers would
not outlive their retirement savings. Mandatory annuity purchases
would reduce annuity prices by expanding the market to cover individ-

Turner 2011.indb 106

5/17/2011 9:53:56 AM

Deﬁned Contribution Plans: Encouraging Annuitization 107

uals regardless of health and life expectancy. Also, mandatory annuities
would be less expensive to administer than voluntary annuities, as they
would offer greater economies of scale and reduced enrollment costs.
The requirement of mandatory annuitization could be limited to deﬁned contribution plans that are the primary plan provided to workers.
Thus, if an employer also provided a deﬁned beneﬁt plan, annuitization
would not be mandated for the secondary deﬁned contribution plan.
A mandate, however, may not be in the best interest of all participants. Workers who have a high replacement rate from Social Security
and workers with short life expectancy may be better off without a mandate. Since low-income and low-education workers tend to have shorter
life expectancy and higher Social Security replacement rates than other
workers because of the progressivity of the Social Security beneﬁt formula, they as a group may be disadvantaged by an annuity mandate.
Furthermore, mandatory annuitization could be problematic when annuities are calculated on a unisex basis, because men possibly could
purchase larger annuities in the individual market. Another argument
against mandates is an ideological one: some people oppose mandates
as an unwanted government intrusion into the lives of Americans.
Mandates can take various forms. For instance, a weaker mandate
would require that employers offer annuities as an option. Alternatively,
a partial mandate could require that the portion of the account balance attributable to employer contributions be annuitized. A mandate
could take effect after a period of phased withdrawal. Partial annuitization could be required so that at least a minimum level of beneﬁts
was provided. For example, annuitization could be required of the
employer contribution and the investment earnings attributable to that
contribution. The requirement could be extended to the portion of the
accumulated balance due to government tax relief. Partial annuitization
has the advantage that it provides a guaranteed ﬂoor of retirement income while allowing the worker to maintain liquidity and control over
some assets.
An argument against mandating an annuity, or even mandating the
provision by 401(k) plans of one, is that workers can easily obtain an
annuity by purchasing one with their account balance. This option, however, has at least three drawbacks. First, a drawback for women is that
the annuity would be available on gender-based pricing, which would
increase its cost for women. Second, the annuity would be priced on an
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individual rather than a group basis, which would increase its cost for
both men and women. Third, this option is less convenient than obtaining an annuity through the pension plan, which reduces the likelihood
that workers would take it. Full mandatory annuitization could reduce
participation in a voluntary deﬁned contribution system, as long-lived
people are relatively more likely to participate than those with shorter
life expectations, given the requirement of mandatory annuitization
(Davis 2004).
Perhaps in part because of the interest rate risk associated with
converting an account balance to an annuity, many countries with mandatory individual accounts do not require that workers annuitize their
account balances. Seven countries in Latin America with mandatory
individual accounts allow their workers to choose between an annuity or phased withdrawals throughout retirement, while two countries
mandate annuity purchases (Kritzer 2000). Countries that do not mandate annuitization generally mandate that beneﬁts be withdrawn in an
orderly fashion through phased withdrawals.
Switzerland mandates provision of pensions that are similar to cash
balance plans. Each worker has an individual account to which interest
is credited. Pension law sets the minimum contribution rate, the minimum interest crediting rate, and the manner in which account balances
are converted to annuities at retirement. Beneﬁts must be paid as an
annuity except for small account balances.
A compromise would be to impose a limited mandate that preserves
the options of employees and employers. Such a mandate, favored here,
would require that all employers that offer a 401(k) plan as the sole
plan (i.e., without also offering a deﬁned beneﬁt plan meeting minimum
standards of generosity) offer an annuity as an option for workers.
Default Options
Behavioral ﬁnance has shown that defaults can have an important
effect on pension outcomes for workers. Some workers, when they
are eligible to participate in a 401(k) plan, do not decide whether to
participate. They end up not participating out of inaction, since nonparticipation is the default in their plan. This group is affected by inertia
and procrastination, which is also called “status quo bias.” Making par-
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ticipation the default appears to markedly increase the percentage of
workers participating in 401(k) plans (Madrian and Shea 2001).
Inertia or procrastination by workers may be the result of a number
of different mental processes (Turner and Verma 2007). For instance,
workers in this group may take a passive approach to decision making
(Choi et al. 2001). Or, they may have ambivalent feelings about the
decision and for that reason not decide whether to enroll. Ambivalence
and procrastination may also arise because of the complexity of the
decision-making process—in particular, the complexity of the decision
as to how to invest the pension funds, but also complexity in issues
relating to how to take withdrawals.
The positive experience concerning worker participation rates with
autoenrollment may appear to provide lessons for encouraging annuitization. Thus, it might be thought that making an annuity the default
option could have an important effect on the percentage of pension
participants taking annuities. For example, annuitization could be the
default, with other forms of beneﬁt receipt being allowed only if the
participant’s spouse agrees in writing. That approach is mandated for
beneﬁts provided by employer-sponsored deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans
and money-purchase deﬁned contribution pension plans, but not for
401(k) plans.
However, while defaults have a powerful effect on raising the participation rate among groups with low participation in 401(k) plans,
defaults do not always have such a strong effect in other contexts. Because of the ﬁnancial importance of the decision and its irreversibility,
if annuities were the default, considerably more people might opt out of
the default than has been the case with automatic enrollment. Anecdotal
evidence strongly suggests that many workers opt out of the default of
an annuity and take a lump sum distribution when that option is offered
in traditional deﬁned beneﬁt plans.
It also appears that workers are much more likely to take lump
sum distributions from cash balance plans than from traditional deﬁned
beneﬁt plans. This observation may provide further evidence of the importance of framing, suggesting that workers are less likely to choose
an annuity when the beneﬁt is presented to them as an account balance
than when it is presented to them as an annuitized beneﬁt.
Defaults appear to have a larger impact on outcomes when the decision is of less consequence to the worker. If the amount of money
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committed at any point in time is small, and the implicit commitment
to the default status for future purchases is reversible, defaults are more
likely to affect workers.
This lesson from the experience with defaults concerning small purchases suggests a possible policy to encourage annuitization. A possible
default for annuitization would be that workers would begin purchasing
annuity units with their contributions starting at a particular age, say at
age 40. Each pay period, part of their contributions would go toward
purchasing annuity units. This default is likely to be more effective than
a default at retirement because workers can opt out of later annuity
purchases, and the amount they are purchasing at any one time is small.
Workers would beneﬁt from dollar cost averaging by purchasing annuities over time at different interest rates. This approach mitigates the
conversion risk that occurs when the entire annuity is purchased at one
point in time at retirement (Iwry and Turner 2009).
Spousal Consent
Spousal consent is required in other pension decisions, so the
principle is established that spousal consent can be used as a way of
encouraging certain behavior, particularly when that behavior affects
the spouse. For example, spousal consent is required in deﬁned beneﬁt
plans if the participant takes an option other than a joint and survivor
beneﬁt. The choice of annuities in 401(k) plans could be encouraged
by requiring spousal consent for an option other than an annuity with
a joint and survivor beneﬁt. Currently, if an annuity option is not provided, spousal consent is not required for withdrawing part or all of a
worker’s account balance. Alternatively, the plan could be required to
notify the spouse if a different option were chosen. The pensions for
federal government employees provide examples of these approaches.
Federal government workers in the Thrift Savings Plan who participate
in the Federal Employees Retirement System (the “new” system) have
the ﬁrst of these two alternatives for requirement of spousal consent.
Federal government workers in the Thrift Savings Plan who participate
in the Civil Service Retirement System (the “old” system) have the second requirement of spousal notiﬁcation. The role of spousal consent
may, however, be limited in its ability to inﬂuence couples to opt for an-
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nuities, as evidenced by the experience with cash balance plans, where
consent is required but lump sums are commonly taken.
Incentives
Incentives could encourage employers to offer annuities as an
option in 401(k) plans. These incentives could include regulatory relief. Regulatory relief might take the form, for example, of allowing
electronic spousal consent, which would enable plans to save costs by
avoiding paper systems for spousal protections. Some participant-rights
activists argue, however, that electronic spousal consent can easily be
abused, because the quality of the signatures in currently available systems is too poor to allow veriﬁcation as to who has signed.
Tax incentives are another means to encourage the use of annuities. Incentives can take the form of either more favorable tax treatment
for annuities or less favorable tax treatment for lump sums and other
forms of withdrawals. Tax advantages could be provided for plans that
only provide annuities. They could be offered to workers that choose
annuities. In Japan, pension annuities receive preferential income tax
treatment: they are tax-free up to a certain amount per year, with a
variable deduction that declines in percentage terms in increments for
beneﬁts exceeding a certain level.
Adding tax incentives for annuities, however, would raise the tax
expenditures for the pension system. That would contribute further to
federal budget deﬁcits. These tax incentives would probably most beneﬁt middle- and upper-income workers because those workers are most
likely to have pensions. A bill proposed a few years ago, called the
Lifetime Pension Annuity for You Act of 2005, would have provided
deﬁned contribution plan participants with a tax exemption on 25 percent of income from annuities purchased through qualiﬁed plans, up
to $5,000. This ceiling would have limited to some extent the possible
adverse distributional consequences of providing favorable tax treatment of annuities.
If tax incentives were provided for annuities, presumably they
would apply to both deﬁned beneﬁt and deﬁned contribution plans.
However, if they did include both types of plans, that would increase
further the lost tax revenue, with much if not most of the forgone reve-
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nue going to beneﬁt participants in deﬁned beneﬁt plans, where workers
generally already take annuities.
Penalties
The opposite approach to providing tax incentives to take annuities
is to provide penalties for not taking them. In 2006, Spain reduced the
generosity of the tax treatment of lump sum beneﬁts in order to encourage workers to purchase annuities (Social Security Administration
2007). However, to the extent that lower-income workers, who have
lower life expectancy, do not take annuities, this approach would penalize them.
Immediate Annuity with Programmed Withdrawals
Chile has an annuity package that combines an immediate annuity
with programmed withdrawals (Social Security Administration 2004).
The advantage of this annuity package is that it pays beneﬁts for life
but the balance of the account used for programmed withdrawals is inheritable if the person dies early. This combination allows participants
to have both the advantages of guaranteed lifetime income through an
annuity and the possibility of leaving an inheritance to their offspring.
Insurance for Annuities
Annuity providers are insurance companies that are regulated in
the United States at the state level. Each state provides a guarantee fund
for annuities in case the insurance company should become insolvent,
but the amount guaranteed varies by state, ranging from $100,000 to
$500,000. Of greater concern is that the state insurance funds have insufﬁcient assets to guarantee the failure of a large insurance provider,
such as AIG. The United Kingdom, rather than having a patchwork of
insurers of insurance companies, has a single insurer at the national
level, the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. Annuities are insured at 90 percent of their value, with no ceiling.
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THE USE OF INFORMATION TO AFFECT BEHAVIOR:
EDUCATION, FRAMING, AND ADVICE
Education, framing, and advice are options for encouraging workers to choose annuitization. Education involves providing information
to participants. Framing relates to the way information is provided; it
highlights more important information. Advice goes beyond education
and framing and explicitly makes recommendations. These options all
relate to the way information is presented to workers.
Participant Education
Workers may need to be educated as to the advantages of guaranteed lifetime income provided by annuities. The Advisory Council
on Employee Welfare and Pension Beneﬁt Plans (2005a), an advisory
group appointed by the Secretary of Labor, commented that plan communications tend to focus on the accumulation phase rather than on the
payout phase. The council’s report recommended that the Department
of Labor provide guidance as to what constitutes education, as opposed
to advice, when employers provide information concerning beneﬁt options. Such guidance would alleviate concerns employers have over
their ﬁduciary liability in providing such information to their workers.
Education for workers may need to include information about mortality risk and life expectancy in old age. Information concerning life
expectancy is the most common way that information about mortality
risk is provided. However, roughly half the population at retirement
will outlive its life expectancy, so information about life expectancy
sets a low standard in terms of the number of years that a person should
be prepared to ﬁnance. It may be more useful, as far as helping participants understand the risks they face, to provide information on the
probability that they will live to age 90, and the probability that at least
one member of a couple will survive to age 90.
Participant education is often provided by the institution managing the investments of the participants’ accounts, which is usually a
mutual fund. Those institutions have an incentive to not provide information about the advantages of annuitization. Because they typically
do not provide annuities, their income will be greater if participants
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continue to maintain an account balance that the mutual fund manages.
Thus, policymakers may need to consider changing the incentives facing mutual fund companies as pension fund providers and as providers
of education to 401(k) participants. For example, mutual fund companies could be paid a fee when an account holder annuitizes an account.
However, unless the government provided a subsidy, this fee would
ultimately be paid by the account holder, thus reducing the retirement
income the account holder received.
The Pensions Advisory Service (2008), a part of the British government, provides a Web-based tool to help people understand the different
options available from annuities and how those options would affect
their level of beneﬁts. This tool is designed to facilitate the choice of an
annuity for people who do not have access to a ﬁnancial adviser.

Framing
The framing of the form of beneﬁt receipt may be important. The
concept of framing is that the way something is described is important
to how it is perceived. Participants are accustomed to thinking of 401(k)
plans in terms of their account balance. More participants might annuitize if they thought of their 401(k) plans in terms of the amount of
annuitized income the account could provide. Thus, it might be desirable for quarterly statements to provide information as to the amount
of annuitized income the account would provide if it were annuitized
at a different age, such as at 62, 65, or 67. Expressing the value of an
annuity this way would also have the advantage of clarifying to workers
the value of postponing retirement. The Social Security Administration presents Social Security beneﬁts this way on the annual individual
statements it provides.
Several issues arise in attempting to accurately and clearly present
the future annuitized value of a pension. The value presumably would
be expressed based on the amount accumulated in the worker’s account
to date. To make it easier to interpret, it should be expressed in current
dollars, rather than in future dollars, which would provide a misleadingly large ﬁgure because of inﬂation illusion. Since there is always
uncertainty surrounding interest rates in the future, the value would best
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be presented as a range, or with some indication of the likely range of
variability. Italy and the United Kingdom currently have this type of
beneﬁt reporting, where deﬁned contribution plan participants receive
an annual statement indicating the annuitized value of beneﬁts accrued
to date.
Advice
Increasingly, pension participants have access to computer software that provides advice concerning planning for retirement. It is rare
that any of this software advises users as to the beneﬁts of annuitizing
part of their accumulated assets (Turner and Witte 2009; Turner 2010b).
Even when confronted with a hypothetical case contrived to make annuitization a desirable option, most free retirement planning software
available over the internet does not advise annuitization (Turner 2010b).

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter considers a number of options for encouraging annuitization so that more participants in 401(k) plans would receive beneﬁts
as a life annuity. Based on these options, we have ﬁve recommendations
to make.
1) The ﬁrst recommendation is to require that 401(k) plans offer
annuities when those plans are provided by an employer that
does not also provide a deﬁned beneﬁt plan meeting minimum
standards of generosity. This requirement would treat 401(k)
plans in that situation as pension plans rather than as savings
plans, as they are currently treated.
2) The second recommendation is that 401(k) plans that are primary or sole plans be required to offer as an option the phased
purchase of annuities while working. This option would be a
considerably less risky way of purchasing annuities, compared
to the current method of making a single purchase at retirement.
3) The third recommendation is that spousal consent be required
for workers not choosing a joint and survivor annuity as the
distribution form of their 401(k) account for 401(k) plans that
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are primary or sole plans. This option presumably would be of
particular beneﬁt to women.
4) The fourth recommendation would be to require that pension
annuities be covered by federal annuity insurance rather than
by the inadequate, underfunded patchwork of insurance provided by the states.
5) Fifth, U.S. pension plan tax qualiﬁcation rules make it difﬁcult
for 401(k) participants to purchase longevity insurance. The
problem arises with the requirement that, to avoid tax penalties, minimum distributions from a 401(k) plan start by April
1 of the year following the year the person turns age 70½.
This requirement prevents a person from using the entire account balance, or a substantial part of it, to purchase an annuity
starting at age 80 or 85. Changes in these minimum required
distribution rules should be considered to encourage the private
purchase of longevity insurance.

Turner 2011.indb 116

5/17/2011 9:53:58 AM

7
Deﬁned Beneﬁt Plans
Flexibility to Deal with Increasing Life Expectancy
Improving longevity among workers causes the increasing social
security costs that so many nations are facing, but it also causes increasing costs for employers sponsoring deﬁned beneﬁt plans. This
increasing longevity raises the costs of providing beneﬁts in deﬁned
beneﬁt pension plans because workers receive beneﬁts for more years.
Deﬁned beneﬁt plans are traditional pension plans where the worker’s
beneﬁt at retirement is typically based on a beneﬁt formula that incorporates years of work and some measure of the worker’s salary. Over
a year, the effect on deﬁned beneﬁt plan costs of changes in life expectancy is small. Over a period of decades, however, the slow but continuous effect on pension costs of the cumulatively large increases in
longevity can be considerable. This chapter considers policies to deal
with the effects of increased longevity on deﬁned beneﬁt plans.

EFFECT OF LIFE-EXPECTANCY INCREASES ON DEFINED
BENEFIT PLAN COSTS
Life expectancy increased considerably during the latter half of the
twentieth century. A 40-year-old man was expected to live to 73 in the
1980 population life table, but was expected to live to 78 in 2002 (Oster
2003). This change increases the length of retirement from 11 years
to 16 years, assuming retirement at age 62—an increase in retirement
years of 45 percent. Thus, it is plausible that life expectancy increases
have had a substantial effect on the cost of deﬁned beneﬁt plans over
the past 20 years.
Assuming an average retirement age of 62 in both 1980 and 2002,
a 4 percent interest rate, and no inﬂation indexing of beneﬁts past retirement, the growth in life expectancy since 1980 has increased the
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nominal cost of providing a deﬁned beneﬁt plan per male participant
by more than 30 percent. This number is less than the 45 percent increase in retirement years because of the effect of interest discounting,
which reduces the present value of distant future beneﬁts. Thus, over
this period, deﬁned beneﬁt costs have grown by an average of more
than 1 percent per year per male participant because of the increase in
life expectancy. This number is a rough approximation, but it gives an
estimate of the magnitude of the effect for a typical deﬁned beneﬁt plan.
The “feminization” of some pension plans due to the increased labor
force participation of women would further increase costs, since that
would raise the average life expectancy of the participants in the plan.
Related evidence as to the effect of life expectancy on plan costs is
provided by the price changes made by life insurers. Life insurers in the
United States have revised downward their prices by amounts ranging
from 10 to 30 percent because new mortality tables are being used that
replace tables established in 1980 (Oster 2003).
In the United Kingdom, the effect of increasing longevity on
deﬁned beneﬁt plan costs is thought to be one of the reasons why employers are ending those plans in favor of deﬁned contribution plans
(Pensions Policy Institute 2007). According to a British survey, the
primary reasons for large numbers of employers terminating deﬁned
beneﬁt pension plans are increased costs due to lower real investment
returns and greater longevity (White 2003).
The Effects of Uncertainty on Improvements in Life Expectancy
The uncertainty of the cost imposed by unknown future changes
in longevity may also affect employers’ pension decisions. Future
improvements in life expectancy are inherently uncertain, causing employers sponsoring deﬁned beneﬁt plans to bear longevity risk. The
dramatic rise in obesity in recent years may cause life expectancy to
increase less than currently projected, or a revolution in medical science may cause the improvements to be greater than projected. As an
example of the differences of opinion among experts, the Social Security actuaries projected that between 2000 and 2080 there would be an
increase of six years for life expectancy at birth, but the 2003 Technical
Panel on Assumptions and Methods (2003), which examined the basis
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for that projection, recommended projecting an even greater increase in
life expectancy, about 7.5 years.
Pension plan sponsors during the late 1940s and 1950s, when many
deﬁned beneﬁt plans were established, may have poorly anticipated
improvements in life expectancy at older ages. The increases in life
expectancy at older ages during the preceding decades were relatively
small. Life expectancy at age 65 rose from 11.7 years in 1900 to 21.2
years in 2000, an 81 percent increase. However, 75 percent of this
change occurred after 1950. The improvements in life expectancy at
older ages generally accelerated over the century, thanks especially to
an unprecedented reduction in mortality from cardiovascular disease
beginning in the late 1960s (Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods 2003).

EMPLOYER PENSION RESPONSES TO INCREASED
WORKER LONGEVITY
Increasing life expectancy raises pension liabilities based on both
future and past work. Employers have a number of options for dealing
with this problem, though some good ones are prevented by U.S. pension law (Muir and Turner 2007). Some employers aggressively deal
with the problem by maintaining updated mortality tables; others use
conservative funding assumptions to offset the misrepresentation of
costs that an outdated mortality table yields; other employers cut future
beneﬁt accruals; and still others encourage their employees to take a
lump sum option, which frees them of liability for future longevity improvements during the worker’s retirement period. But in what is more
often the case, ﬁrms are switching to deﬁned contribution plans or cash
balance plans, where employer costs are unaffected by the apparent glacial inevitability of improved longevity.
In adjusting deﬁned beneﬁt plans to offset the beneﬁt cost increase
caused by increasing life expectancy, employers can cut beneﬁts received at normal retirement, cut early retirement beneﬁts, reduce
cost-of-living adjustments for beneﬁts being paid, or raise the early
or normal retirement ages, all of which are indirect ways of cutting
beneﬁts. Employers can end plan features that provide incentives for
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early retirement. In most countries, and in government-sector plans in
the United States, employees as a general rule directly share in the ﬁnancing of deﬁned beneﬁt plans by making mandatory tax-deductible
contributions. Raising these contributions is another way of dealing
with increased costs due to increased longevity. Besides making adjustments in deﬁned beneﬁt plans to offset the increased beneﬁt cost due to
increased longevity, employers may make other adjustments. Employers may reduce the amount of wage compensation they pay, so that
the workers themselves absorb the increased cost of providing pension
beneﬁts through reduced wages.
Employers can reduce future pension accruals for new employees
by establishing a higher early-retirement age or requiring more years of
service to qualify for early retirement, but making these changes is administratively complex. The approach of basing changes on the date of
employment has the further disadvantage that different employees who
may be holding similar jobs are treated differently. Nonetheless, such
an approach would be legal under pension law, and may be viewed by
employees as fair, since it becomes part of the labor agreement at time
of hire.
Employers can also reduce future pension accruals for current employees. When they do so, they must distribute an Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) Section 204(h) notice to employees, advising them of the change and explaining its effect on them. When the
reduction is for an early retirement beneﬁt, the notice must provide an
explanation of the beneﬁt before and after the change. More information is required if the simple description does not give a reasonable
picture of the full impact of the change (Segal Company 2003). Although these notice provisions do not prohibit plan amendments that
reduce accruals, they do ensure that participants are informed about
pending changes. These disclosure requirements may discourage plan
sponsors from taking actions that they would prefer not to highlight
to their employees or may enable employees to exert pressure against
potential plan amendments.
Relatively few sponsors of ERISA deﬁned beneﬁt plans have raised
their early retirement age, in spite of large increases in cost due to signiﬁcant increases in life expectancy (Muir and Turner 2007). However,
some private-sector employers have established separate plans with
higher early-retirement ages for new employees. In the government
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sector, the early retirement age has been increased in the federal government’s plan for civil servants, as well as in some state and local
government plans, especially for teachers. The evidence from the government sector provides some indication that the anticutback rule in
ERISA may be making it difﬁcult for private employers to adjust their
deﬁned beneﬁt plans for the increased costs stemming from increasing
longevity.
ERISA appears to have limited increases in the normal retirement
age (NRA) by legislative language that has been interpreted by some
pension attorneys to indicate that the NRA cannot be raised higher than
age 65. Even if ERISA would permit such a change, its substantive and
notice provisions may act as an implicit barrier.

INTERNATIONAL SURVEY
International evidence may provide further insights into reasons
why ERISA plans in the United States have not raised the early retirement age. The following survey of policies in different nations points
to international experience that may be useful for the United States in
considering policy options with respect to the early retirement age and
the normal retirement age in occupational pension plans. By providing
information about reforms in other countries, it may indicate the range
of feasible reforms.
Australia. The minimum retirement age is 55 for receiving a pension beneﬁt for both men and women born before July 1, 1960. It will
gradually increase so that for those born after June 30, 1964, the minimum retirement age will be 60.
Belgium. In 2003, Belgium passed a pension law stipulating that
pension beneﬁts cannot be paid before the age of 60. Previously beneﬁts could be received at age 58 or earlier. For all existing plans, the old
rules applied until January 1, 2010 (Watson Wyatt Worldwide 2003).
New Zealand. New Zealand has passed human rights legislation that bans compulsory retirement ages. Before that legislation, the
country’s police departments had set a mandatory retirement age of 55
(Global Action on Aging 2003).
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Switzerland. To make the early retirement age for social security
pensions the same as that for occupational pensions, in 2001 Switzerland increased the early retirement age for occupational pension plans
from age 62 to 64. The increase from 62 to 63 took place in 2001, and
the increase from 63 to 64 took place in 2005.
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom has raised the minimum
age at which occupational pensions can be received from 50 to 55. Civil
servants became subject to a new early retirement age of 65 for all new
employees starting in 2006; prior to that the pensionable age was 60.
European Union. Legislation proposed in 1999 and taking effect
in May 2004 increased the retirement age for European Union civil servants from 60 to 63. However, up to 10 percent of the civil servants will
be able to retire earlier under certain conditions (Spiteri 2003).

A LIFE EXPECTANCY–INDEXED DB PLAN
A factor that appears to have led to the decline in deﬁned beneﬁt
plans in the United States and elsewhere has been the increase in life
expectancy. Deﬁned beneﬁt plans do not have the ﬂexibility to deal
readily with this continued increase in cost.
A policy innovation would permit life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts at retirement: a life expectancy–indexed DB plan. This innovation
follows the Notional Deﬁned Contribution plan in Sweden. A traditional
deﬁned beneﬁt plan can easily be converted into a life expectancy–
indexed DB by adding a single feature to the calculation of initial
beneﬁts at retirement. Each year as another cohort reaches retirement
age, the generosity of beneﬁts would be reduced slightly to take into
account the continued improvement in life expectancy. The adjustment
would not reduce expected lifetime beneﬁts, but rather would offset
the increase in lifetime beneﬁts caused by increased life expectancy.
No further adjustments would occur for life expectancy improvements
during retirement. Thus, some of the cohort life expectancy risk would
remain with employers.
Life expectancy risk can be divided into the idiosyncratic risk that
a particular individual will live longer than expected and the cohort risk
that an entire cohort on average will live longer than expected. Annuity
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providers are able to deal with idiosyncratic risk by pooling it across
large numbers of people, effectively diversifying it away. However,
cohort risk cannot be pooled because it is correlated across workers.
Longevity bonds would provide a hedge, but a market for them has not
developed. The higher the percentage of a cohort that remains alive,
the higher the payout from longevity bonds. Life-expectancy indexing
of beneﬁts is one way of dealing with this risk. The idiosyncratic risk
is borne by the annuity provider, who can diversify it away. The cohort
risk is borne by workers, who are the beneﬁciaries of the improved life
expectancy.1
A life expectancy–indexed DB plan would arguably provide more
efﬁcient bearing of longevity risk than a traditional deﬁned beneﬁt plan.
Life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts would shift to workers the cohort
life-expectancy risk, which is the risk that an entire birth cohort will live
longer than expected, on average. The plan sponsor bears the idiosyncratic life-expectancy risk, which is the risk that a particular individual
will live longer than expected.
Different pension types vary in the life expectancy risk that workers
and employers bear (Table 7.1). In a traditional deﬁned beneﬁt plan, the
employer bears both the idiosyncratic and the cohort risk. In a 401(k)
plan without an annuity, the employee bears both of those risks. In a life
expectancy–indexed DB plan and in a 401(k) plan with an annuity, the
risks are shared, as employers bear the idiosyncratic risk and employees
bear the cohort risk.
Under current U.S. pension law (ERISA), this innovation would
not be allowed because it would violate the anticutback rule. The
Table 7.1 Bearing of Longevity Risk by Employers, Employees, and
Insurance Companies
Plan type
Idiosyncratic risk
Cohort risk
LE DB
Employer
Employee
Traditional DB
Employer
Employer
BMW’s DB plan (UK)
Insurance company
Insurance company
401(k) without annuity
Employee
Employee
401(k) with annuity
Insurance company
Employee
NOTE: “LE” stands for “life expectancy–indexed.”
SOURCE: Author’s compilation.
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anticutback rule is deﬁned in terms of annual beneﬁts. If that rule were
redeﬁned to take an economist’s perspective and use lifetime beneﬁts
as the measure, life-expectancy indexing would not constitute a cutback
in lifetime beneﬁts.
With this proposal, the risk that on average workers will live longer
is largely shifted from employers to workers. Workers are better able
to bear this risk than employers because they are also the beneﬁciaries
of the increased life expectancy. They can adjust to the beneﬁt cuts by
working longer, which is facilitated by their increased life expectancy.
An issue arises for plan sponsors as to who would generate the life expectancy index to be used. Department of Labor regulations may need
to resolve that issue, setting a required index or a minimum standard.
A similar approach for dealing with cohort life expectancy risk,
which may have the questionable advantage of being less transparent
to workers, would be to index the plan’s normal retirement age to increases in life expectancy. Doing so could also result in a reduction in
annual beneﬁts while maintaining the lifetime expected value of beneﬁts. This change is less transparent because it is presented to workers
as an increase in the normal retirement age rather than a cut in beneﬁts.
A variant of this proposal has been adopted by BMW in the United
Kingdom (Plumridge 2010). Under this arrangement, BMW has shifted
the cohort and idiosyncratic longevity risk to a life insurance company,
rather than shifting that risk to workers. It retains ﬁnancial market
risk.
LIFE-EXPECTANCY INDEXING OF FIXED AGES
IN PENSION LAW
U.S. pension law contains a number of ﬁxed minimum or maximum
ages for receipt of beneﬁts. For example, retirees generally must start
receiving beneﬁts shortly after they turn age 70½. Another example is
that they cannot receive beneﬁts from a 401(k) plan before age 55 without a tax penalty and without having terminated employment with that
employer, or age 59½ while continuing in employment with the same
employer. Pension law is generally interpreted as not permitting a normal retirement age in deﬁned beneﬁt plans higher than age 65. Given
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the increase in longevity, it may make sense to periodically review and
raise these ages or automatically index them.

LUMP SUM BENEFITS IN DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS
While deﬁned beneﬁt plans are not required to provide a lump sum
option, many of them do, presumably because participants like the option. Once a plan sponsor offers a lump sum distribution as an option
in a deﬁned beneﬁt plan, ERISA makes it difﬁcult for that option to be
ended. Thus, a possible change in pension law would be to clearly allow employers to terminate the lump sum distribution option in deﬁned
beneﬁt plans in order to encourage annuitization.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter recommends that pension law be amended to permit
a new type of deﬁned beneﬁt plan, called a life expectancy–indexed
DB plan. This plan would allow more efﬁcient bearing of life expectancy risk than is currently permitted in deﬁned beneﬁt plans. With a
life expectancy–indexed DB plan, at retirement the generosity of the
plan would be adjusted to take into account improvements in life expectancy, analogous to annuitizing a deﬁned contribution plan account
using current life expectancy. Thus, cohort life expectancy risk would
be shifted to workers, who can bear it more easily than plan sponsors
because the workers are the prime beneﬁciaries of the increase in life
expectancy.
In addition, this chapter recommends life-expectancy indexing:
legally set minimum or maximum ages in pension law to take into
account improvements in life expectancy. For example, the requirement that pension payments begin shortly after a person turns age 70½
would be periodically updated to take into account improvements in
life expectancy. Similarly, pension law should be clariﬁed so that a normal retirement age greater than 65 in deﬁned beneﬁt plans would be
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allowed. This chapter recommends that ERISA be clariﬁed to permit
deﬁned beneﬁt plans to terminate lump sum beneﬁts as an option, in
order to encourage annuitization.
Note
1.

Turner 2011.indb 126

A study has attempted to quantify the aggregate mortality risk, which is the risk
that an entire cohort will live longer than predicted (Friedberg and Webb 2005).
The study estimates that a markup of the annuity premium by 4.3 percent would
reduce the probability of insolvency due to cohort mortality risk to 5 percent, and
that a markup of 6.1 percent would reduce the probability of insolvency to 1 percent.

5/17/2011 9:53:59 AM

Part 4
Conclusion

Turner 2011.indb 127

5/17/2011 9:53:59 AM

Turner 2011.indb 128

5/17/2011 9:53:59 AM

8
Policy Recommendations
While increasing longevity at older ages is well known, U.S.
policymakers have not developed a uniﬁed national policy that deals
with its effects. In this book, I recommend a number of policies for
dealing with increased longevity, arguing that a uniﬁed longevity policy
would be more effective than dealing separately with the issues facing
older workers, pensions, and Social Security. Together, these policies
would encourage work at older ages, move Social Security toward
solvency, provide better targeting of Social Security beneﬁts, increase
annuitization of 401(k) accounts, and encourage employers to provide
deﬁned beneﬁt plans.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Chapter 2 presents evidence concerning improvements in the
ability of older persons to work and in reductions in the physical demands of many jobs. Based on that evidence, it appears clear that if
older workers were economically motivated to do so and the demand
for older workers were sufﬁcient, it would be feasible for many to extend their work lives. This change could be facilitated by encouraging
older workers to maintain and improve their job skills through training
programs or informal training on the job. To facilitate such a policy, it
also would be desirable to address barriers to employment at older ages.
Many older workers report age discrimination if they are in the situation
of looking for a job—for example, if they have been laid off. While this
book does not address this issue, it recommends that further research be
done on the issue of age discrimination and policies to deal with it. A
further topic worth exploring is the issue of educating workers as to the
beneﬁts of postponing retirement. Deciding at what age to retire is one
of the most important ﬁnancial decisions a worker makes, yet it appears
that many workers retire too early, perhaps because of myopia as to the
consequences of the decision.
129
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Recognizing the political difﬁculty in enacting reforms that involve
cutting beneﬁts, raising taxes, or raising the early retirement age, Chapter 3 recommends an automatic adjustment mechanism be adopted to
help restore and maintain Social Security’s solvency. The chapter recommends that Social Security beneﬁts be indexed for life expectancy,
so that increases in life expectancy would not cause an increase in the
lifetime value of pension beneﬁts. This type of indexation has been
adopted by Sweden for its social security program.
With this type of indexation, every year for each new retirement
cohort, beneﬁts would be slightly adjusted downward to take into account the effect of increased life expectancy on the lifetime value of
beneﬁts. The adjustment would occur for each cohort only once, with
beneﬁts received at retirement facing no further adjustments for continued increases in life expectancy during the retirement period. This type
of indexation results in a reduced replacement rate over time. Chapters
4 and 5 address that issue.
Based on the evidence presented in Chapter 2 indicating that the
early retirement age could be raised with relatively little hardship for
most workers, Chapter 4 recommends that the early retirement age
for Social Security be raised to 63, with that change being phased in
starting in 15 years, and that thereafter the early retirement age be automatically adjusted to take into account continuing improvements in
life expectancy. This change could offset to some extent the beneﬁt cuts
recommended above, so as to diminish the reduction in annual beneﬁts
workers would receive. The initial change would occur at the rate of
two months every other year, so that for persons aged 47 the new early
retirement age would be 62 years and two months; for persons aged 45
it would be 62 years and four months; and so on. This policy would be
enacted with a long lead time and phase-in period so as to allow people
time to plan for the change. It thus would not affect workers nearing
retirement and would only affect workers in the future, when it can be
expected that life expectancy will be even longer than it is now.
As a matter of social policy concern for vulnerable groups, it would
be desirable to consider other changes to help a small group of vulnerable workers who are unable to extend their work lives. While this
group of workers is often cited as a reason not to raise the early retirement age, the group is small, and policies can be enacted that address
their particular needs. These policies could include early beneﬁts for
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workers with many years of covered Social Security work or lowering
the requirements for receipt of disability beneﬁts at older ages.
If the early retirement age was raised to help restore solvency, the
beneﬁts received at the new early retirement age would be the same
as those currently receivable at age 62. This change would encourage
workers to postpone retirement, thus reducing Social Security’s deﬁcit.
Alternatively, if this change were done in conjunction with the recommended life-expectancy indexing of beneﬁts, the beneﬁts receivable at
age 63 would be unchanged, being the same as those receivable at 63
before the increase in the early retirement age.
While some people are adamantly opposed to any cuts in Social
Security beneﬁts because those beneﬁts already are not generous by
international standards, others are equally adamant that there should
be no increases in taxes to support Social Security. Once both groups
realize that some change is needed and it is a matter of making a choice
of which one, perhaps raising the early retirement age with a long lead
time might be less unpopular than the two alternatives. While some
people object to such a policy as placing a hard burden on workers,
those making that criticism seem to be unaware that when President
Franklin Roosevelt signed the Social Security Act in 1935, and for more
than 20 years afterward, during an era when life expectancy was lower
and more people had physically demanding jobs, the early retirement
age was 65.
If the early retirement age is raised, the same arguments justifying
that change should also lead to an increase in the maximum age for
actuarial increases in beneﬁts with postponed receipt of beneﬁts. Currently, beneﬁts are adjusted for postponement of receipt up to age 70.
If the early retirement age is increased to age 63, the maximum age for
actuarial adjustment should be raised to 71.
Taking steps to address low income at older ages, Chapter 5 recommends that a new type of Social Security beneﬁt be provided called
longevity insurance. Longevity insurance would be a type of social insurance providing beneﬁts to qualifying persons at an advanced age
—initially set at age 82, but automatically increased to take into account future increases in life expectancy.
As retirees age, they face an increased risk of poverty as they spend
down their non–Social Security assets. A longevity insurance beneﬁt
would be paid by Social Security starting at age 82 for people with at
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least 20 years of covered earnings and receiving Social Security beneﬁts below a ﬁxed level. Payment would not require an application or
a means test; it would occur automatically. This would be a targeted,
cost-effective way of addressing poverty at advanced old age.
Longevity insurance could be included in a reform package to restore Social Security solvency that contained beneﬁt cuts, so that it
would prevent beneﬁt cuts from increasing poverty rates at advanced
older ages. It would be ﬁnanced out of payroll tax revenue. Thus either
payroll taxes would need to be higher than otherwise in order to ﬁnance
it, or other beneﬁt cuts could provide the needed ﬁnancing.
Chapters 6 and 7 consider longevity policy options for employerprovided pension plans. Chapter 6 considers a number of options for
encouraging annuitization of 401(k) plan accounts so that participants
would receive beneﬁts as a life annuity. The ﬁrst recommendation is to
require that 401(k) plans offer annuities when those plans are provided
by an employer that does not also provide a deﬁned beneﬁt plan meeting minimum standards of generosity. This requirement would treat
401(k) plans that are the primary plan as pension plans rather than as
savings plans, as they are currently treated.
The second recommendation is that 401(k) plans that are sole or
primary plans be required to offer as an option the phased purchase
of annuities by the employee during that employee’s working years.
This option would be a considerably less risky way of purchasing annuities, compared to the current method of making a single purchase at
retirement.
The third recommendation is that spousal consent be required for
workers not choosing a joint and survivor annuity as the distribution
form of their 401(k) account when the 401(k) plan is the sole or primary
plan.
The fourth recommendation would require that pension annuities
be covered by federal annuity insurance rather than by the inadequate,
underfunded patchwork of insurance provided by the states.
Fifth, U.S. pension plan tax qualiﬁcation rules make it difﬁcult for
401(k) participants to purchase longevity insurance with their pension
assets. The problem arises with the requirement that minimum distributions from a 401(k) plan start by April 1 of the year following the year
the person turns age 70½. This requirement prevents a person from using the entire account balance, or a substantial part of it, to purchase an
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annuity starting at age 80 or 85. Changes in these minimum required
distribution rules would facilitate the purchase of longevity insurance.
Because of the different types of risks that deﬁned beneﬁt and deﬁned contribution plans impose on participants, a pension system would
be better diversiﬁed if it provided both deﬁned beneﬁt and deﬁned contribution plans to most workers. Deﬁned beneﬁt plans have declined,
and currently most workers with a pension plan only have a deﬁned
contribution plan. In order to encourage employer provision of deﬁned
beneﬁt plans, Chapter 7 recommends that pension law be amended to
permit a new type of deﬁned beneﬁt plan, called a life expectancy–
indexed DB plan. This plan would allow more efﬁcient bearing of life
expectancy risk than is currently permitted in deﬁned beneﬁt plans.
With a life expectancy–indexed DB plan, at retirement the generosity of the plan would be adjusted to take into account improvements in
life expectancy, analogous to annuitizing a deﬁned contribution plan
account using current life expectancy or to the changes proposed for indexing Social Security beneﬁts. Thus, cohort life expectancy risk would
be shifted to workers, who can bear it more easily than plan sponsors
because the workers are the prime beneﬁciaries of the increase in life
expectancy.
In addition, this chapter recommends life expectancy indexing–
ﬁxed ages in pension law, so as to take into account improvements in
life expectancy. U.S. pension law contains a number of ﬁxed minimum
or maximum ages for receipt of beneﬁts. For example, the requirement
that pension payments begin shortly after a person turns age 70½ would
be periodically updated to take into account improvements in life expectancy. Similarly, pension law should be clariﬁed so that a normal
retirement age greater than 65 would be allowed for deﬁned beneﬁt
plans. Furthermore, this chapter recommends that ERISA be clariﬁed
to permit deﬁned beneﬁt plans to terminate lump sum beneﬁts as an option, in order to encourage annuitization.

CONCLUSIONS
While the book argues for a number of distinct policies, its main
argument is for a package of longevity policies. These policies would
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reinforce each other and would facilitate the adjustment of workers and
pension systems to the costs and beneﬁts of a longer life. A uniﬁed
package of reforms dealing with longevity would not only be more effective, it would presumably be more feasible to enact from a political
perspective, because it would provide a more balanced approach.
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